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Abstract 
This doctoral dissertation investigates the development of the norm of 
sovereignty as responsibility by focusing on its institutionalization in the 
framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Prominent observers 
have regarded the emergence of a new norm of sovereignty as responsibility as 
one of the most significant normative shifts in international society since the 
aftermath of World War II. Against this backdrop, accounts have proliferated 
situating the ICC at the cutting edge of normative change. The present study 
critically engages with the whole set of theoretical foundations underlying this 
view, including the conventional constructivist understanding of norm 
development upon which the latter is premised. This, on the one hand, 
emphasizes the importance of norm institutionalization within “tangible” sets 
of rules or organizations. On the other, it understands institutionalization 
itself as a moment of clarity and stabilization, thus largely reducing it to an 
end-point of the norm emergence process. In other words, norm 
institutionalization is confined to a positivist view in which institutions fall 
back to the role of neutral fora. The result is a linear, static, and largely 
depoliticized account of norm content, which, while yielding to the traditional 
lack of communication between normative and empirical studies, ends up 
reiterating a dichotomic and simplistic view in which norms are scripts of 
emancipation, and power a practice of domination. The dissertation aims to 
unravel this dilemma altogether by offering a step forward in the development 
of a post-positivist constructivist approach. In other words, it takes a genuinely 
trans-disciplinary perspective and delves into the configuration of normativity 
as part of institutional practice, paying special attention to how the relative 
power of relevant actors reconstitutes norms during norm negotiation and 
implementation. Hence, the study  unfolds from an unusual location – at the 
intersection between normative international theory and the politics of 
international criminal law; and from there, it seeks to revive discussions about 
the power-laden nature of the normative fabric of international society, its own 
dis-symmetries, and its outright hierarchies. To this end, the dissertation asks 
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two major sequential questions: how the overarching system negotiated by 
states at the Rome Conference affects the selection of situations and cases 
before the ICC and their outcomes; and how the selection of situations and 
cases and their outcomes, in turn, “feeds back” to the norm of sovereignty 
institutionalized through the Court’s practice. The resulting analysis shows the 
following. While the Rome Statute reflects the persistence of the state as the 
primary site of political authority and coercion, it also cuts against the 
normative aspirations of sovereignty as responsibility by leaving the Court 
specifically ill-equipped to break with a notorious pattern of hyper-protected 
sovereignty. Outstanding issues such as the ICC’s selectivity and African bias, 
as well as the Court’s future prospects, are then reconsidered under this light. 
Those findings are then discussed in the final part of the study. Focusing on 
questions of delegation to international institutions, this ends with a note of 
caution. It concludes that the prospects of sovereignty as responsibility, as well 
as the broader discussion about cosmopolitan governance, lie more with the 
re-politicization of the debate than a straightforward invocation of greater 
forms of supranationalism. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction. Beyond the 
Practice-Norm Gap 
 
 
Norms lie in the practice 
Antje Wiener1 
 
 
1.1 The Research Puzzle 
At the end of the Cold War, normative inquiry once again raised its voice 
amidst the clamour of contending accounts of the international order.2 
Whereas the conditions for a revival of normative inquiry were clearly 
propitious at that time, it is interesting to note  that competing claims of 
change and continuity are still at the centre of heated debates today, three 
decades later.3 Against this backdrop, prominent observers have regarded the 
emergence of a new norm of sovereignty as responsibility as one of the most 
significant normative shifts in international society since the aftermath of 
World War II.4 In 2005, Anne-Marie Slaughter  referred to the latter as a 
 
1 Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, in press) 27.  
2 Robert J. Walker, ‘Norms in a Teacup: Surveying the “New Normative Approaches”’ (1994) 
38 Mershon International Studies Review 265. 
3 Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz and Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Major powers and the contested 
evolution of a responsibility to protect’ (2014) 14(4) Conflict, Security & Development 355, 
359. 
4 Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm—and Action?’ (2009) 1(1) 
Global Responsibility to Protect 22, 23. See also: Cristina Badescu, ‘The Evolution of 
International Responsibility: from Responsibility to protect to Responsibility While 
Protecting’ (2014-2015) 11 International Studies Journal 45, 53; Alex Bellamy, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten’ (2015) 29(2) Ethics & International Affairs 161; Alex 
Bellamy and Tim Dunne, ‘R2P in Theory and Practice’, in Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, 2016) 3; 
Amitai Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ (2006) 50(1) Orbis 71; Gareth Evans, ‘R2P: The 
Next Ten Years’ in Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the 
Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, 2016) 913, 914-915; Kathryn Sikkink, 
Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017) 27; Sarah Teitt, ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, in Christian 
Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne (eds) The Globalization of International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 325, 326-327.  
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‘tectonic shift’5 that reinterprets ‘the very act of signing the Charter in ways 
that will create a new legal and diplomatic discourse about member states’ 
obligations to their own people and to one another’.6 Today, nearly 15 years 
after Slaughter’s celebratory statements, we live in a world where the liberal 
discourse on the domestication of the international domain has clearly shifted 
onto the defensive.7 Yet, supported by the Kantian maxim of humanity’s 
ongoing moral progress, the idea of a progressive recharacterization of 
sovereignty as responsibility seems able to withstand the current setbacks; 
and, actually, it is still a cornerstone of many accounts of the world order.8 
Having said that, whereas the resilience of the concept may be interpreted as 
corroborating its own theoretical strength, the present study goes exactly in 
the opposite direction. It questions the set of theoretical foundations that 
underlies current narratives of sovereignty as responsibility. Furthermore, by 
delving into the intersection between normative and empirical studies, it 
critically engages with the popular view that situates the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) at the cutting edge of normative change. 
This dissertation moves from the assumption that the current debate 
about sovereignty has responsibility is hampered by a limited – more to the 
point, positivist – understanding about the development of norms within 
international society. Coming from the Latin positum, i.e. put or set, 
“positivism” generally designates any system that confines itself to the data of 
experience. In the 1980’s, Jean-François Lyotard wrote that ‘we are all stuck 
in the positivism of this or that discipline of knowledge’.9 Today, almost 40 
years later, a substantial part of social theory is still modelled on positivism. 
Yet, what I have in mind when speaking of positivism is not a fully-fledged and 
self-reflexive line of thought,10 but rather a broadly meant attitude of thought 
 
5 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, ‘Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN 
Reform’ (2005) 99(3) The American Journal of International Law 619, 627. 
6 Ibid.  
7 David Chandler, ‘Born Posthumously: Rethinking the Shared Characteristics of the ICC and 
R2P’, in (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 5, 7. 
8 See: Bellamy (n 4); Evans (n 4); Sikkink (n 4); and Teitt (n 4). 
9 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (G. Bennington 
and B. Massumi, Trans.) (Minneapolis. MN: University of Minnesota Press) (Original work 
published 1979), 41. 
10 Harry F. Dahms, Globalization, Critique and Social Theory: Diagnoses and Challenges. 
Current Perspectives in Social Theory (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 
168-169. 
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which underlies an empiricist reduction of knowledge to observation,11 with a 
consequent curtailment of the depth of theoretical perception.12 
The current dominant understanding of norm development was 
developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink two decades ago within 
constructivist IR theory,13 before being rapidly mainstreamed all across the 
discipline. In line with the positivist reductionism summoned above, 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s model lends itself  to the ‘naturalization [in this 
context, meaning primarily depoliticization] of what is being observed’,14  thus 
prompting a premature closure of the analysis.15 More to the point, yielding to 
a ‘positivistic, static account’16 of  law which understands rules as generating 
determinant and predictable outcomes over the course of their application,17 
Finnemore and Sikkink regard norm institutionalization within “tangible” sets 
of rules or organizations as a moment of clarity and stabilization.18 The task of 
norm research is, hence, deemed to be complete once states have ratified 
treaties.19 That is to say, norm institutionalization is reduced to an end-point 
of the norm emergence process, and is thus ultimately displaced from its role 
as a creative juncture.20 
It is from the standpoint just outlined that many observers have 
acclaimed the entry into force of the Rome Statute as an unequivocal success 
of justice and protection over sovereignty. By contrast, the following chapters 
aim to overcome the underlying positivism of the conventional  constructivist 
 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jeffrey Alexander, Theoretical logic in sociology (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press 1982), 10. 
13 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’ (1998) 52(4) International Organization 887. 
14 Ted Hopf, Ted, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’ (1998) 
23(1)  International Security 171, 183. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Jutta Brunnie and Stephen J Toope, ‘International Law and the Practice of Legality: Stability 
and Change’ (2018) 49 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 429, 432. 
17 Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
1, 4. 
18 Jennifer Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 5(4) Global 
Responsibility to Protect 365, 380. 
19 Ibid, 1. 
20 Alexander Betts and Philip Orchard, ‘Introduction: The Normative Institutionalization-
Implementation Gap’ in Alexander Betts and Philip Orchard (eds) Implementation and World 
Politics: How International Norms Change Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
2. 
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account by advancing a critical qualification thereof, whereby the adjective 
“critical” evokes the undertaking of critical international theory, meant as the 
spectrum of “post-positivist” and “post-rationalist” strands of IR that emerged 
in the 1980s to challenge the dominance of neorealism and neoliberalism.21 
These encompass post-Marxist scholarships influenced by the Frankfurt 
School, as well as postmodernist approaches.22 Constructivism can also be 
regarded as an outgrowth of so-called “Third Debate critical theory”,23 but with 
an important caveat. To the extent that constructivism creates distance – 
theoretical, epistemological, and methodological – between itself and its 
origins in critical theory, it becomes “conventional”.24 While Finnemore and 
Sikkink have opted for the conventional route, reaffirmed nowadays by most 
of the voices within the sovereignty as responsibility debate, this dissertation 
seeks to realign the latter to a critical – and, more to the point, post-modern – 
sensitivity.25 Such sensitivity implies, first and foremost, the displacement of 
the universal, rational subject who can act as an autonomous and self-willed 
agent in the political realm.26 The so-called “humanist subject” is, hence, 
decentered and reimagined as ‘a site of disarray and conflict inscribed by 
multiple contestatory discourses’27 and intersecting power circuits, the 
unmasking of which becomes central to the research endeavour. From such a 
genealogical deconstruction of subjectivity, a radical break with ‘totalizing, 
universalizing “metanarratives”’ also follows,28 including the rationalist 
epistemologies and positivist beliefs which,  prompted by the Enlightenment, 
 
21 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory 
and Constructivism’ (1998) European Journal of International Relations 4(3) 259, 289. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. See also Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Constructivist Approaches to European Integration’ 
(2006) Working Paper Series from RePEc; and Joe Kincheloe, Critical Constructivism 
Primer (New York, NY: P. Lang, 2005). 
24 Hopf (n 14) 181. 
25 For a discussion about the differences between the modernist and post-modernist 
orientation within critical theory, see Price & Reus-Smit (n 21) 261-262. The authors see the 
former as embracing a posture of ‘minimal foundationalism’ (quoting from Mark Hoffman, 
‘Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical 
International Theory’ (1991) 20 (2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 169, 170), 
while the latter as rejecting all foundationalism. 
26 Saul Newman, Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New Theories of the 
Political (New York: Routledge, 2005) 4. 
27 Patricia Ann Lather, Getting Smart: Feminist Research and Pedagogy With/in the 
Postmodern (New York: Routledge, 1991), 5. 
28 Ibid.  
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have become the trademark of modernity.29 Finally, a post-modern approach 
cannot fail to question liberalism as the political correspondent to the 
epistemology of the Enlightenment.30 In other words, it is keen on challenging 
liberalism’s assumed neutrality and universality, by uncovering the ‘relations 
of power, discipline and exclusion through which liberal identities are 
constituted’.31   
Having sketched both the shortcomings of the conventional 
constructivist understanding of norm development on the one hand, and the 
broad theoretical, epistemological, and methodological framing of the present 
research on the other, it is now easier to enter into a discussion of the 
substance of its aim as well. This doctoral dissertation intends to interrogate 
the dominant narrative about sovereignty as responsibility by offering a post-
positivist qualification of the conventional constructivist understanding of 
norm development. In other words, it reverses the standard tendency to 
reduce norm institutionalization to an end-point of the norm emergence 
process, by delving into the ‘configuration of normativity in and through 
practice’.32 More to the point, the analysis explores the “reconstitution” of 
norms as part of institutional practice, hence the focus on the ICC’s lived 
practice. Importantly, by paying special attention to how the relative power of 
relevant actors reconstitutes norms during norm negotiation and 
implementation, the following chapters seek to revive discussions about the 
power-laden nature of the normative fabric of international society,33 and its 
own dis-symmetries and outright hierarchies. However, let me be clear on this 
point: the dissertation does not aim to merely track how power and interests 
 
29 Newman (n 26) 4. 
30 See Ben Golder, ‘Foucault and the Unfinished Human of Rights’ (2010) 6(3) Law, Culture 
and the Humanities 354, 355; and  Newman (n 26 ) 2 – 16. 
31 Ibid, 28. 
32 See the “Towards a New International Relations Theory (NIRT)” research project, launched 
in 2017 by the University of Hamburg, under the coordination of Antje Wiener. More 
information about the project is available at https://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/en/fachbereich-sowi/professuren/wiener/forschung/aktuelle-
forschungsprojekte/nirt.html.  
33 Philip Liste, ‘International Relations Norms Research And The Legacies Of Critical Legal 
Theory’, Paper presented at the 11th Pan-European Conference on International Relations 
(EISA), 13-16 September, Barcelona, 10, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319876717_International_Relations_Norms_Re
search_and_the_Legacies_of_Critical_Legal_Theory (last visited 30 September 2018). 
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constrain international institutions in practice. This task, indeed, has already 
kept realists and neoliberals alike busy for several decades. Instead, by 
overcoming the traditional lack of communication between normative 
international theory and empirical international studies and, the present study 
makes an analytical leap beyond the study of how norms are applied in 
practice. That is to say, while retaining the conventional definition of norm as 
a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”, the 
dissertation takes a genuinely trans-disciplinary perspective and explores the 
following: how institutional practice “feeds back”34 to the normative structure 
by impinging on the shared expectations of relevant actors. 
 
 
1.2 The Current Practice-Norm Gap 
The idea of sovereignty as responsibility has been made popular by the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report.35 This was published by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 
2001,36 in the wake of the “ideational turn” emphasising the capacity of norms 
to shape state behaviour. According to the document, sovereignty is not an 
absolute right of governments. Instead, it is an earned right, based upon the 
fulfilment of the government’s responsibility to protect its people. Hence, 
when governments fail to protect their people, a residual responsibility to 
protect befalls the international community. At the same time, in an attempt 
to dispel the concerns raised by the earlier doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, the report has sought to ensure that such a recharacterization of 
 
34 See Jennifer M. Ramos, Changing Norms through Actions: The Evolution of Sovereignty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144. See also Amitav Acharya, The R2P and Norm 
Diffusion: Towards A Framework of Norm Circulation 466: The case of R2P calls for greater 
attention to agency and feedback in norm dynamics. 
35 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-
rtop-documents (last visited 30 September 2018).  
36 See Chris Brown, ‘The Antipolitical Theory of Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 5(4) Global 
Responsibility to Protect 423. Brown has noted that the ‘ICISS was technically an initiative of 
the Canadian Government, but from the beginning its work had a quasi-official relationship 
with the UN – the Co-Chair, Mohamed Sahnoun, was a Special Adviser to the UN Secretary 
General, another member, Ramesh Thakur, was Vice-Rector of the UN University in Tokyo’ 
(ibid, 433). 
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sovereignty does not entail any transfer or dilution of state sovereignty,37 a 
claim whose validity, as we shall see, is radically questioned in the present 
work. The R2P report was published a few months after 9/11, when the over-
optimistic mood of the 1990s had already started its retreat.38 And yet, the 
2005 World Summit resulted in the formal acceptance of the notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility by more than 150 states. By the time of this 
writing, the UNSC has passed several tens of resolutions reminding states of 
their protection responsibilities under R2P.39 These culminated in UNSC 
Resolution 1973, which authorized the 2011 intervention to protect Libyan 
populations in the context of the civil war that had erupted in the country. At 
the same time, however, R2P has not been immune from critique and setbacks, 
especially outside the liberal internationalist elite.40 In particular, according to 
some observers, the version of R2P adopted in 2005 was only “R2P Lite”.41 
They have noted that, while the 2001 report was ambiguous on the question of 
auctoritas,42 the World Summit made it clear that the international 
community may only act through the Security Council. A further change 
concerned the formulation of jurisdiction. In an attempt to limit what 
otherwise seemed to be an open-ended authorization of international 
involvement for protective purposes, feared by most countries of the South,43  
intervention was limited to specific crimes and organized around the subject 
matter jurisdiction of international criminal law, i.e. “genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.44 It should also be noted that 
Russia and China have sent mixed signals. On the one hand, they accepted the 
wording of the 2005 World Summit and let Resolution 1973 pass in 2011;45 on 
 
37  ICISS (n 35) para 2.14. 
38 Barbara J. Falk and Sara M. Skinner, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: A Normative Shift from 
Words to Action?’ (2016) (23)3 International Peacekeeping 493, 494. 
39 Teitt (n 4) 342. 
40 See Rotmann, Kurtz & Brockmeier (n 3) 364; and Carsten Stahn, ‘Marital Stress or Grounds 
for Divorce? Re-Thinking the Relationship Between R2P and International Criminal Justice’ 
(2015) 26(1) Criminal Law Forum 13, 14. 
41 Brown (n 36) 434. 
42 Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty (2009) 20 European Journal of 
International Law 513, 537. 
43 Anne Orford, ‘Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 30(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 981, 1005-
1006. 
44 Ibid,1005-1007. 
45 Brown (n 36) 440. 
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the other, they are responsible for the Security Council’s later paralysis over 
robust action in the Syrian crisis.46 Having said that, the terms in which R2P 
was reformulated in 2005 still envisage a broad role for the international 
community in policing governments’ actions.47 What is more, even states 
originally more hostile to R2P have themselves begun to expressly refer to it 
as the “norm”.48 All things considered, lite or heavy, the notion of sovereignty 
as responsibility is clearly the new “mantra” within the UN system.49 As Chris 
Brown has put it, R2P language has been mainstreamed in UN discourse ‘to 
such an extent that it has driven out other vocabularies for describing the 
appropriate ways of reacting to gross violations of human rights or mass 
atrocity crimes’.50  
The debate around sovereignty as responsibility, hence, provides a 
unique opportunity to glean a sense of international society’s present status 
and future prospects in a way that raises direct and pressing questions about 
the justification and waging of public authority.51 Such an inquiry appears even 
more compelling in the face of some recent geopolitical trends. The current 
climate is, in fact, caught between cosmopolitan visions, on the one hand, and 
technocratic trends and populist - when not clearly authoritarian - challenges, 
on the other. Indeed, at a time when states have withdrawn, or are considering 
 
46 See: Thomas Weiss, ‘After Syria, Whither R2P?’, in Robert W. Murray and Alasdair McKay 
(eds) Into the Eleventh Hour:  R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis, E-International 
Relations, January 2014, 34, 35, available at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-
Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018); and Aidan 
Hehir, ‘Syria and the Dawn of  a New Era’, in Robert W. Murray and Alasdair McKay (eds) 
Into the Eleventh Hour:  R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis, E-International 
Relations, January 2014, 72, 73-74, available at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf (last visited 30 
September 2018). For a cautionary tale of the Libyan intervention and its aftermath, see also 
Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds), The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
47 Orford (n 43) 1007. 
48 See Bellamy (n 4) 161-162. Bellamy has noted that at the 2014 General Assembly Sixth 
Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, China described R2P as a 
“prudential norm”, suggesting that “states should establish relevant policies and mechanisms” 
for implementing it, including the use of force as a “last resort”. Similar words of support have 
been expressed by Argentina, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and the Philippines, among 
other others. 
49 Brown (n 36) 440. See also Outi Korhonen and Toni Selkälä, ‘Theorizing Responsibility’, in 
Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds), The Oxford handbook of the theory of international 
law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 844, 850. 
50 Ibid.  
51 See Stahn (n 40) 45; and Anne Orford, From Promise to Practice; the legal significance of 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 3(4) Global Responsibility to Protect 400, 419-424. 
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withdrawing, from international institutions such as the European Union and 
the ICC itself, a profound engagement with the concept of sovereignty, its 
current status, and future prospects is particularly needed.52 
What is more, as anticipated at the onset  of this introduction, the need 
for such a study is heightened by the shortcomings in the dominant 
understanding of norm development. Clinging to the seminal model developed 
by Finnemore and Sikkink,53 it is popular to suggest that the development of 
international social norms goes through three stages: “norm emergence”, 
“norm cascade”, and “internalization”. “Norm cascade” can only occur after a 
critical mass of states have endorsed the emergent norm (the “tipping point”), 
and it is often facilitated by the “institutionalization” of the norm in specific 
sets of rules or organizations. This model acknowledges that the completion of 
the life-cycle is not an inevitable process. In other words, the norm life-cycle 
can stop at any time, with emergent norms thus failing to reach a tipping 
point.54 Yet, one can hardly discard the impression of an inexorable “win or 
fail” trajectory. Norms merely either go all the way from emergence to 
internalization or not. Furthermore, the vantage point is the moment of state 
consent.55 Accordingly, it is common to held that when an overwhelming 
number of states have given their consent to an international norm (by 
ratifying a treaty, for example), the content of that norm crystallizes, being 
thus ready to promote norm cascade and internalization. However, no matter 
how significant the ratification and entry into force of a treaty may be, these 
cannot be assumed to equate to interpretation, implementation, or 
compliance.56 The latter, instead, all take place ‘at a distance from the context 
in which the norm originated and was negotiated’,57 and they are crucial to 
observe as creative junctures where environmental and operational conditions 
come forcefully into play. Not to mention that institutionalization understood 
 
52 Similar considerations have inspired the 27th Annual SLS/BIICL Workshop on Theory & 
International Law, ‘The Return of the “S” Word: Sovereignty in Contemporary International 
Law’, held on 16th May 2018 at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
53 Finnemore & Sikkink (n 13). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Liste (n 34) 3. 
56 Betts & Orchard (n 20) 2. 
57 Welsh (n 18) 380. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in 
Contemporary Europe’ (1999) 43(1) International Studies Quarterly 83. 
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in its narrower sense amounts to a form of depoliticization - the 
institutionalized norm enters the zone of law, where it remains as long as 
states comply with it.58 Institutionalization so conceived not only entails a 
deterministic understanding of law which neglects that the interpretative 
powers of legal professionals or civil servants may, in fact, be decisive in 
determining what the law is;59 but, more to the point, it is functional to a 
dichotomic view in which norms are scripts of emancipation and power, at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, a practice of domination.60  
Summing up, norms are misconstrued as prefabricated scripts.61 
Instead, they are part of ongoing social processes, and ‘tend to be vague, 
enabling their content to be filled in many ways and thereby to be appropriated 
for a variety of different purposes’.62 To reference a norm, thus, may always 
add a moment of “reconstitution” of its original but never fixed meaning,63 all 
the more so during the everyday practice that bring norms to life. This is 
precisely what mainstream norm research tends to overlook, positing instead 
a linear, static, and largely depoliticized view of norm content. 
 
 
1.3 Redressing the Gap 
In their article ‘From Idea to Norm—and Action?’, Ramesh Thakur and 
Thomas Weiss have argued that the ‘ICC’s permanent, institutionalized 
[emphasis mine] identity, and universal jurisdiction is specifically designed to 
escape the tyranny of episodic and politically motivated investigations and 
selective justice’.64 Similarly, in 2012, expressly clinging to Finnemore and 
 
58 Liste (n 33) 4. 
59 See Heikki Patomäki, ‘Rethinking Global Parliament: Beyond the Indeterminacy of 
International Law’ (2007) 13 Widener Law Review, 375 for an analysis of the potentially anti-
democratic implications of the (radical version of the) indeterminacy thesis. 
60 Liste (n 33) 1.  
61 Ibid, 2. 
62 Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The 
United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality’ (2012) 18(1) European Journal 
of International Relations 103, 104. 
63 Wiener (n 1) 35.  
64 Thakur & Weiss (n 4), 44. See also Ramesh Thakur and Vesselin Popovski, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute: The Parallel Erosion of Sovereignty and Impunity’, in 
Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo (ed) The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and 
Jurisprudence 2007 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, Vol. 1) 39, 55. 
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Sikkink’s norm life-cycle, Michael Contarino, Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and 
Kevin Mason argued that ‘[t]o the extent that ICC actions help to delineate and 
define both the norm’s content and the appropriate international mechanisms 
for its application, the ICC may help advance norm cascade and 
consolidation’,65 and ‘the ICC is well-positioned to play a critical role, through 
its actions and jurisprudence, in clarifying the meaning and boosting the 
enforcement of R2P’.66 A year later, in 2013, Contarino and Negrón-Gonzales 
offered a more critical reappraisal of the ICC’s potential, focusing on ‘the 
Court’s inherent enforcement weaknesses and the political constraints it 
faces’.67 Nonetheless, they did not take the further step of channelling that 
effort into a revised understanding of norm development. In the same year, 
Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim argued that the ‘justice cascade is nested 
in a larger norm cascade around accountability for past human rights 
violations’,68 and ‘[m]any critics of the ICC or the specialized courts have not 
understood the role of these courts as backup institutions in a global system of 
accountability’.69  
 
65 Michael Contarino, MelindaNegron-Gonzales and Kevin T. Mason, ‘The International 
Criminal Court and Consolidation of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm’ 
(2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 275, 298. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Michael Contarino and Melinda Negron-Gonzales, ‘The International Criminal Court’, in G. 
Zyberi (ed) An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 411, 425.  
68 Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, ‘The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of 
Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations’ (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
269, 270. 
69 Ibid, 272. Similar arguments have been upheld by a broad array of outstanding scholars. 
See: Andrea Birdsall, ‘Creating a more “just” order - the Ad Hoc International War Crimes 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) 42(4) Cooperation & Conflict 397, 414-415; 
Richard Falk, ‘Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post- Westphalia’ (2002) 6 The Journal of 
Ethics 311, 341; Patrick Hayden, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal 
Justice: The Case of the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 51 Theoria: A Journal of Social 
and Political Theory 69; Eric K. Leonard, ‘Discovering the New Face of Sovereignty: 
Complementarity and the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 27(1) New Political Science 
87,104; and Carmen E. Pavel, Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and the Limits 
of State Authority (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015) 43; Ralph Jason, Defending 
the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and Its Vision 
of World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Leyla N. Sadat, ‘The Evolution of 
the ICC: From The Hague to Rome and Back Again’ in Sara B. Sewell and Carl Kaysen, (eds) 
The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and 
International Law (Lanham, Md; Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 31, 41. 
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Admittedly, in accordance with the voices above, the claim that the 
Rome Statute opens up an unprecedented scope for international authority is, 
in several respects, hard to rebut.70 In defiance of  the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 2.7),71 the Rome Statute 
affirms that if domestic courts fail to genuinely prosecute those guilty of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes,72 the ICC will prosecute 
them in lieu of the state itself. Importantly, no exception is contemplated for 
representatives of state power, including heads of state or government (Article 
27), who, as Richard Falk has put it, ought no longer to be above international 
law, not even in the way in which they treat their own citizens.73 What is more, 
although the ICC’s jurisdiction arises from the delegation of jurisdiction by the 
states parties, the scope of the latter is worth of attention,74 having the Court 
been empowered to carry out both autonomous and binding decision-
making.75 In fact, the Prosecutor is formally able to investigate both situations 
and cases without political direction. Furthermore,  the Court is the ultimate 
judge of whether a case is of sufficient gravity to warrant the attention of the 
Court, and whether the territorial state has genuinely exercised (or is 
genuinely exercising) jurisdiction over a case (Article 17 of the Rome Statute). 
Accordingly, in a dispute over jurisdiction between the territorial state and the 
ICC, the latter has authority to override the territorial state’s claims and seize 
jurisdiction.76 In other words, ‘[w]here genocide, war crimes or crimes against 
 
70 Madeline H. Morris, Democracy, global governance and the International Criminal Court, 
in Ramesh C. Thakur and Peter Malcontent, From Sovereign Impunity to International 
Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo, JPN: United Nations 
University Press, 2004) 187. 
71 Article 2.7 of the UN Charter grants to states the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
acts within their jurisdiction. 
72 At the end of 2017, the 16th Assembly of States Parties also activated the ICC jurisdiction 
with respect to the crime of aggression, with effect from 17 July 2018, on the basis of the 
definition and ratification process previously agreed at the Kampala Review Conference in 
2010. However, for an account of the limits of this achievement, see section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3 
in the present study. 
73 Falk (n 69) 341. 
74 Morris (n 70) 188. 
75 See: Karen J. Alter, ‘Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding Vs. Other-binding 
Delegation’ (2008) 71(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 37; Sibylle Scheipers, Negotiating 
Sovereignty and Human Rights: International Society and the International Criminal Court 
(Manchester, GBR: Manchester University Press, 2010), 52; Michael Zürn Martin Binder and 
Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International authority and its politicization’ (2012) 4(1) 
International Theory 69, 88.  
76 Morris (n 70) 189. 
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humanity are alleged, there is now to be an authority higher than the state’.77 
Such supranational authority is further enhanced by the Court’s jurisdiction 
over non-party nationals. Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute, in fact, allows the 
ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party (i.e. non-consenting) 
states if the state where the crime is alleged to have occurred is a state party 
(or has consented to the Court’s jurisdiction).78 Moreover, the ICC can 
intervene irrespective of any consent for cases referred by the UN Security 
Council (Article 13(b)). A final consideration relates to Article 127, on state 
withdrawal. Albeit state-parties may withdraw from the Rome Statute, the 
withdrawal takes effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification. It 
follows from here that state withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect 
any cooperation with the Court in connection with investigations and 
proceedings initiated prior to the date on which the withdrawal became 
effective; nor does withdrawal from the Rome Statute prejudice the continued 
consideration of any matter which was already under the attention of the Court 
prior to that date. It may, hence, be argued that  membership to the Rome 
Statute implies ‘sovereign costs’,79 insofar as it entails the generation of rules 
or decisions that states cannot veto ex post.   
The common normative structure and commitments of ICC and R2P 
are also clear.80 Indeed, as pointed out above, since 2005 there is even an 
 
77 Ibid, 188.  
78 Diane Marie Amann, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State’, in Ige F. 
Dekker & Wouter G. Werner, (eds) Global Governance and International Legal Theory 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 185, 193. 
79 See Kal Raustiala, ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’ 
(2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 841-847.  
80 See: Kirsten Ainley, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: 
Counteracting the Crisis’ (2015) 91(1) International Affairs 37; Fatou Bensouda, ‘ICC 
Prosecutor-Elect Fatou Bensouda Talks Court’s Role in R2P’, The Stanley Foundation, 20 
January 2012, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suJIXSsGzL0 (last visited 30 
September 2018); Aidan Hehir and Anthony Lang, ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the 
Efficacy of the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2015) 26(1) 
Criminal Law Forum 153, 160; International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
(ICRtoP), ‘The RtoP and the ICC. Complementary in Prevention, Assistance and Response’, 
ICRtoP, 14 March 2012, available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
topics/4036-icrtop-blog-post-the-rtop-and-the-icc-complementary-in-prevention-
assistance-and-response (last visited 30 September 2018); Kurt Mills, ‘R2P: Protecting, 
Prosecuting, or Palliating in Mass Atrocity Situations?’ (2013) 12 Journal of Human Rights 
340; Selena Lucent and Michael Contarino, ‘Stopping the Killing: The International Criminal 
Court and Juridical Determination of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 560, 563-564; James Pattison, The Alternatives to War: From 
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express overlapping between the protective jurisdiction of the international 
community under R2P and the Court’s jurisdiction, meaning that R2P is 
meant to be triggered (only) by the risk that the crimes enumerated in the 
Rome Statute may be committed.81 Add to this that the 2009 UN Secretary 
General’s report on implementing R2P has further reinforced the R2P-ICC 
synergy. The report has elaborated three pillars, with these stressing, 
respectively, the state’s primary responsibility to protect its population, the 
preventive commitment of the international community, and the 
responsibility of the international community to react to a state’s manifest 
failures. The same report has mentioned the ICC under pillar three, in addition 
to pillar one (the Rome Statute being presented as a key step in fulfilling the 
state’s primary responsibility to protect).82  
Taking the commonalities between R2P and the ICC further, several 
prominent commentators have deemed the Court well-equipped to overcome 
the collective actor problem that hinders the implementation of R2P more 
broadly. While the latter is contingent on a coincidence of major powers’ 
interests,83 as Jason Ralph has noted, the nature of the ICC as a permanent 
judicial institution entrusted with the residual responsibility to prosecute has 
been celebrated as a crucial change of course.84 In other words, many have 
regarded the Court as apt to deliver concrete and impartial action by putting 
“real people in real jails”, and discriminating among the range of states 
according to legal criteria.85 
 
Sanctions to Nonviolence (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018) 197-198; Jason G. Ralph, 
‘The International Criminal Court’, in Alex Bellamy and Tin Dunne (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 638; Rod 
Rastan, ‘The Responsibility to Enforce: Connecting Justice with Unity’, in Carsten Stahn and 
Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 163. 
81 Orford (n 43) 1007.  
82 See UN Secretary General, Implementing              the              Responsibility to Protect, 12 
January 2009, available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf (last 
visited 30 September 2018). 
83 See Ralph (n 80) 638. See also Orford (n 43)  1008. 
84 See Ralph, ibid. 
85 See: Hehir & Lang (n 80) 179; Lucent & Contarino (n 80); Heather Roff, Global Justice, 
Kant and the Responsibility to Protect: A Provisional Duty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013) 123; and Fernando Tesón, ‘The Vexing Problem of Authority in Humanitarian 
Intervention: A Proposal’ (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal 763. 
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In light of all the above, the entry into force of the Rome Statute has 
raised hope - more than any prior international regime - that the weak and 
arbitrary nature of the ‘Hobbesian order established by the politics of States’86 
had been left behind. However, today, more than 15 years since its 
establishment, the path forward for the ICC has proved much bumpier. 
Indeed, the blind spots and complicities of the Court have become a popular 
topic, especially, even though not exclusively, within legal scholarship.87 
Critical questions about the R2P/ICC relationship are also being raised from 
both legal and International Relations (IR) perspectives.88 And yet, the 
attention for the Court’s arduous course decreases dramatically as we move 
from the domain of empirical studies to normative inquiries about the current 
status and prospects of sovereignty. To put it differently, claims that the ICC 
represents the cutting-edge of normative change can be formulated precisely 
to the extent they struggle – if not avoid altogether – to make sense of the 
Court’s lived practice. Lamented by Allen Buchanan already in the early 2000s 
as a general predicament in normative international theory, such a ‘lack of 
institutional focus’89 has its deepest roots in the assertion of a moral theorizing 
which purposely abstracts from the particular and the limits of practice. 
Today, after 15 years, the same lack of institutional focus is still a major source 
 
86 Sadat (n 69) 41. 
87 See, in particular, Christine Schwöbel-Patel (ed) Critical Approaches to International 
Criminal Law. An Introduction (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). For further reference, see: Adam 
Branch, ‘Neither Liberal nor Peaceful? Practices of “Global Justice” by the ICC’, in Susanna 
Campbell, David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam (eds) A Liberal Peace? The Problems and 
Practices of Peacebuilding, edited by (Zed Books, 2011) 121; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Three Dangers 
for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual Project’ in (2001) 12 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 195, 197; Christian M. d. Vos, Sara Kendall and 
Carsten Stahn (eds), Contested justice: The politics and practice of the International Criminal 
Court interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
88 See, in particular, David Chandler and Frédéric Mégret. See David Chandler, ‘Born 
Posthumously: Rethinking the Shared Characteristics of the ICC and R2P, in (2010) 21 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 5, 7; and Frédéric Mégret, ICC, R2P and the Security Council’s 
Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’ (2012) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 21. For 
further reference, see: Andrea Birdsall, ‘The Responsibility to Prosecute and the ICC: A 
Problematic Relationship?’ (2015) 26(1) Criminal Law Forum 51, 72; Benjamin N. Schiff, 
‘Lessons from the International Criminal Court for ICC/R2P’ (2012) 21 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 101; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice’ (2004) 28(3) International Security 5. 
89 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 22. However, for an account of 
the limits of Buchanan’s approach see Peter Sutch, ‘Normative IR Theory and the Legalization 
of International Politics: The Dictates of Humanity and of the Public Conscience as a Vehicle 
for Global Justice’ (2012) 8(1-2) Journal of International Political Theory 1. 
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of slippage in the sovereignty as responsibility debate. Indeed, within the 
latter, the classical practice-norm gap has found a staunch ally and established 
toolkit in the dominant positivist understanding of norm development, and it 
is further fuelled by the official “anti-political” framing of R2P - expressly 
designed by its creators to avoid ‘the toxic politics of previous approaches to 
interstate intervention’.90 The overall result is a dominant analytic template 
that avoids a critical question: whether/under which conditions is it possible 
for sovereignty as responsibility to be institutionalized and still retain a critical 
stance vis-à-vis power.  
What this dissertation tries to do is to reverse this entire concoction 
altogether, by reconceptualizing norm development as inextricably tied to the 
institutions that bring norms to life.91 However, it is important to highlight 
that such a theoretical move does not stand in isolation, but is in line with a 
new, rising post-positivist agenda critical of the practice-norm gap. In 
particular, so-called “norm contestation” is sparking growing interest, 
especially with respect to the role of local actors - and hence cultural and 
institutional diversity - in the co-constitution of global norms. Some change of 
course is even noticeable within the more recent R2P literature. Edward Luck 
has been one of the first R2P scholars to express doubts as to the ‘certain, 
sequential, chronological, and unidirectional’92 conventional life-cycle (but, 
then, he reiterated that Finnemore and Sikkink’s life-cycle ‘succeeds 
admirably’93 in simplifying complex processes). Jason Ralph, in an article 
published in 2018, has invoked the rise of a ‘pragmatic constructivist ethics’.94 
Most recently, Aidan Hehir has expressly sought to offer a post-positivist 
constructivist account of R2P in a book-length treatment currently in press.95  
 
90 Brown (n 36) 425.  
91 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2006) 2 Journal of International Law and International Relations 
121, 134. 
92 Edward Luck, ‘Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experience’, in Robert I. 
Rotberg (ed) Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages (Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, DC, 2010) 108, 110. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Jason Ralph, ‘What Should Be Done? Pragmatic Constructivist Ethics and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2018) 72(1) International Organization 173. 
95 Aidan Hehir, Hollow Norms and the Responsibility to Protect (Springer International 
Publishing, in press). 
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This dissertation builds on this momentum, while also charting its own 
distinctive trajectory. In particular, research on norm contestation has so far 
been primarily interested in the relationships between global and local 
norms.96 Accordingly, the emphasis has been placed on issues of “cultural 
feedback” and “cultural validity” as opposed to the “formal validity” that 
emerges from institutionalization;97 or, on how international norms are 
implemented within domestic politics.98 The present study is motivated by a 
different concern. The focus is placed on how interests and power - notably, 
the relative power of relevant actors during norm negotiation and 
implementation - “reconstitute” norms through institutional practice.99 
Furthermore, the effort of theoretical reconsideration is not limited to norm 
development. In other words, the dissertation seeks to re-orientate the whole 
set of  questionable and in some respect contradicting foundations upon which 
the sovereignty as responsibility debate is premised. These include the concept 
of sovereignty, as well as the specific model of sovereignty assumed as the 
benchmark for assessing change.  
Summing up, the analysis unfolds from an unusual perspective – at the 
intersection between normative international theory and the politics of 
international criminal law. From there, it addresses two major sequential 
questions: firstly, it asks how the overarching system negotiated by states at 
the Rome Conference affects the selection of situations and cases before the 
Court and their outcomes; secondly, it explores how the selection of situations 
and cases and their outcomes, in turn, “feed back” to the norm of sovereignty 
institutionalized through the Court’s practice. The outcome is an innovative 
and carefully-informed study, both theoretically and empirically. By digging 
into under-explored areas of knowledge between disciplines, it provides a 
 
96 Caroline Fehl, ‘Navigating Norm Complexity. A Shared Research Agenda for Diverse 
Constructivist Perspectives’, PRIF Working Paper No. 41, available at 
https://www.hsfk.de/en/publications/publication-search/publication/navigating-norm-
complexity/ (last visited in September 2018). 
97 Welsh (n 18) 381-382. 
98 See Betts and Orchard (n 20).  
99 See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer And Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘Chapter 1: Introduction: 
Why Study International Court Authority?’, in Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer And Mikael 
Rask Madsen (eds), International Court Authority (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018) 4, 
6.                                                                                                
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more accurate understanding of normative change and, notably, a well-
grounded picture of the current status of sovereignty and its prospects.  
A final caveat needs to be addressed. While it may already sound 
obvious at this point, the endeavour undertaken by this study is different from 
a “truth-telling” mission aimed at uncovering how “politics infiltrates the legal 
process”. The latter approach, in fact, would reinforce precisely what this study 
intends to dispel - a dichotomic view of ideas, norms, and law and institutions, 
on the one hand, and power and interests, on the other. Rather, the ensuing 
analysis delves into the “conditions of possibility”100 of sovereignty as 
responsibility by addressing the mediations that occur in the process of 
negotiating normative “ideals” and their concrete manifestations.101 With this 
in mind, institutionalization is brought back to centre stage. Importantly, it is 
also assumed that legalization102 - as a particular from of institutionalization - 
is no exception to the inevitable reconstitution of norms ‘through interaction 
in a context’.103 Legalization is, thus, reconsidered in its dialectic relation with 
politicization. Accordingly, the hope that the ICC would sublimate the political 
element of international society into serene legal puzzle-solving104 is put aside. 
Instead, (international criminal) law is understood as a ‘process of articulating 
political preferences into legal claims that cannot be detached from the 
conditions of political contestation in which they are made’.105 It also follows 
that, contrary to much research that quickly dismisses the role of state power 
and interests, the present study looks at states as central actors that still 
coordinate and legitimize the work of other bodies carrying out governance 
 
100 Sara Kendall, ‘Commodifying Global Justice: Economies of Accountability at the 
International Criminal Court’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 113. 
101 Lydia Morris, ‘Cosmopolitanism - beyond the “beautiful idea”’ (2012) (20)2 Irish Journal 
of Sociology 51. 
102 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
Duncan Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401. 
103 Antje Wiener, ‘The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological 
and Normative Approaches to ‘Interaction’’ (2007) 10, 1 Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 47, 49.  
104 Mégret (n 87) 210. 
105 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17(2) 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, 198-199. See also: Chimni, ‘Third World 
Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8(1) International Community Law 
Review 3; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International 
Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); Anne Orford, Florian 
Hoffmann, and Martin Clark, The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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functions.106 States, in other words, are regarded has having a crucial impact, 
e.g. on questions of institutional design as well as their practical outcomes,107 
including states that may appear sceptical or openly resistant to the 
establishment of a given international institution (such as the USA vis-à-vis 
the ICC).108 Judicial institutions are not immune, notwithstanding the fact 
that justice is something which a wide array of stakeholders are struggling and 
competing to define. Indeed, even once established, international institutions 
– without exception for judicial ones - necessarily operate within political 
restraints.109 It could hardly be otherwise, for states carry the crucial function 
of providing institutions with ongoing political and material support. Finally, 
it is important to highlight that, as also noted by Finnemore and Goldstein, a 
focus on power is inherently tied to the analysis of inequality.110 Again, this 
may sound obvious, but much IR has diverted attention from this,111 including 
- if not especially - the fact that international law’s impulse to reform may be 
easily placed in the service of existing inequalities.112 A basic part of the puzzle, 
therefore, is to understand to what degree the ICC, acclaimed as the most 
accomplished step towards setting a “principle of legitimate difference” as a 
Grundnorm for international society,113 really ‘upgrades the role of law in 
structuring relations among participants in international life, thereby 
diminishing the influence of unequal power, wealth, and capabilities’.114 To 
 
106 Guy Fiti Sinclair, ‘State Formation, Liberal Reform and the Growth of International 
Organizations’ (2015) 26(2) European Journal of International Law 445, 450. 
107 See Christopher Rudolph, Power and Principle: The Politics of International Criminal 
Courts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 2017) 59-60. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Political constraints on international courts’, in Cesare Romano, Karen J. 
Alter Yuval Shany (eds) The Oxford handbook of international adjudication (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 484, 501. 
110 Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, ‘Puzzles about Power’, in Martha Finnemore and 
Judith Goldstein, Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 3, 14. 
111 Finnemore & Goldstein, ibid. See also Nico Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of 
Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order’ (2005) 16 
European Journal of International Law 369, 372. 
112 Sinclair (n 106) 447. See also Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
113 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 247–50. See also Buchanan (n 90) 35; and Peters (n 42) 513–544.  
114 Falk (n 73) 346.  
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this end, in the pages ahead the experience of the ICC is dissected by locating 
it within a political arena shaped by uneven power relations.  
 
 
1.4 Methodology and Structure of the 
Dissertation  
Within-case analysis is the main methodological strategy employed, and it 
covers the full range of situations and cases brought before the ICC up to the 
time of writing.115 Fostering in-depth understanding and description, within-
case analysis allows us to discern how the disclosed processes and patterns fit 
with those predicted in the literature, and to develop theoretical propositions 
that apply to other cases.116 The comprehensive analysis of (i) the Rome 
Statute, (ii) strategic and policy documents, as well as statements and other 
public communications, issued by the Court’s organs, in particular by the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and (iii) case law has been complemented by 
(iv) field-research carried out in the Netherlands between August 2016 and 
January 2017. Following what has been termed an ‘ethnographic turn within 
international relations’,117 the field-work was geared towards gaining a greater 
proximity to the Court’s everyday life, and hence a deeper understanding that 
was potentially able to unsettle prior findings. To this end, the field-work has 
encompassed the attendance to a broad range of events – notably, the Court’s 
public hearings, the fifteenth annual session of the Assembly of States Parties 
(ASP),118 as well as workshops, seminars, exhibitions, etc. organized either by 
the Court or other relevant bodies. Finally, I have also had the opportunity to 
carry out conversations - held in the form of semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews - with a number of experts (14). Following the submission of 
approximately 60 interview requests to either organs of the Court (e.g., Office 
of the Prosecutor, judicial divisions, etc.) or professionals in close proximity to 
 
115 30 September 2018. 
116 Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe (eds), ‘Within-Case Analysis’, in 
Encyclopaedia of case study research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010, Vol. 1-
0). 
117 Betts & Orchard (n 20) 19. 
118 This was held at the Hague between 16 to 24 November 2016. 
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the Court itself (e.g., members of the ICC Defense Counsel, NGOs’ 
representatives and international criminal law practitioners), the 14 
interviewees have been selected on the basis of their privileged vantage point 
on the activity of the ICC, in addition to their willingness to be interviewed, as 
well as with a view to professional and geographical diversity. In light of the 
roles held by the interviewees and, hence, in order to protect them from public 
exposure, all the interviews have taken place under a confidentiality 
agreement and have not been recorded. The interview guide, containing a 
broad outline of the questions, is attached as an annex to the dissertation (See 
Annex I). The resulting notes are made available in Annex II, where they 
appear redacted from all identifying information and coded according to 32 
emerging themes listed at the beginning of Annex II. References to the 
interviews and their corresponding codes are made in the text of the 
dissertation. 
The ensuing analysis unfolds in three main parts. Chapter 2 aims to re-
orientate the foundations on which the claim that sovereignty is undergoing 
profound change hinges. These include the concept of sovereignty and the 
model of sovereignty assumed as a benchmark for assessing change, in 
addition to the understanding of norm development. The central part develops 
the case of the ICC. Both the analysis of the Rome Statute (Chapter 3) and the 
Court’s practice in its first fifteen years of activity (Chapter 4) illustrate a full-
blown short-circuit: between the Court’s potential to hold power to account, 
on the one hand, and the institution’s profound entanglement with the very 
power it is meant to constrain, on the other. This short-circuit, in turn, ends 
up institutionalizing a norm of sovereignty that radically cuts against the 
normative aspirations of sovereignty as responsibility. The concluding chapter 
(Chapter 5) discusses the above-mentioned findings in light of the theoretical 
framework laid out in Chapter 2, and, while drawing special attention to 
questions of delegation to international institutions, it advances a critical 
reconsideration of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility itself.
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Chapter 2 - Sovereignty and the Life-Cycle 
of Norms Revisited 
 
 
 ‘[S]overeign equality and inequality alike rest on the decisions of states to recognize 
certain formal (in)equalities and then participate in institutions that constitute and 
reproduce these (in)equalities’  
Jack Donnelly1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The claim that sovereignty is undergoing a major transformation hinges on a 
set of questionable - and in some respect contradicting - foundations. These 
are the result of an inadvertent collusion of “normativistic” and 
“descriptivistic” fallacies. To begin with, such an argument has been greatly 
facilitated by the relatively recent “linguistic turn” in the social sciences.2 This 
has enabled theorists to define sovereignty as a ‘bundle of rights, duties, and 
competencies’3 whose conceptual redefinition, hence, amounts to change tout 
court. At the same time, though, there is a tendency to turn to the contested 
and contingent nature of sovereignty on a selective basis. In other words, the 
“new” norm is framed as a ground-breaking departure from a de-historicized 
and reified model of sovereign equality, i.e. Westphalian sovereignty,4 thus 
forgetting that the exercise of sovereignty is, in fact, typically subject to a 
 
1 Jack Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and 
International Society’ (2006) 12(2) European Journal of International Relations 139, 147. 
2 Jens. Bartelson, ‘Sovereignty Before and After the Linguistic Turn’, in Rebecca Adler-Nissen 
and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds) Sovereignty, Self-defense, and the Disciplining of 
States. Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 33. See also Jens Bartelson, ‘The Concept of 
Sovereignty Revisited’ (2006) 17 The European Journal of International Law 463, 464.  
3 Tanja E. Aalberts-Meeuwsen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Sovereignty beyond Borders’, in 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), Sovereignty, Self-defense, and 
the Disciplining of States. Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in 
Europe and Beyond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 129, 131. 
4 See The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001), 11, according to which sovereignty has 
shifted from a Westphalian emphasis on the ‘absolute rights of state leaders, to respect for the 
popular will and internal forms of governance based on international standards of democracy 
and human rights’. 
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normative order dictating states’ evolving range of rights and responsibilities.5  
It goes without saying that even more neglected is the intimate relationship 
between the qualifications of and restrictions on sovereignty operating at any 
given time and the existing international distributions of power. In addition, 
the Westphalian model of sovereign equality is also the taken-for-granted 
template for several critiques of sovereignty as responsibility. These, for their 
part, by emphasizing the corrosive effects of supranational authority on the 
society of sovereign equals, inspire nostalgia for an order that may never have 
existed outside our theoretical categorizations.6 Finally, the claim that a new 
norm of sovereignty is on the rise is supported by an understanding of norm 
development that goes back to the norm life-cycle developed in 1998 by 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink.7 Albeit commendable in several 
respects, the model advanced by the two constructivist scholars yields to an 
inexorable “win or fail” trajectory that falls short of accounting for the role that 
practice and especially institutions play in the configuration of normativity. In 
summary, the sovereignty as responsibility debate is premised on a 
combination of “normativistic” and “descriptivistic” flaws – about (i) the 
concept of sovereignty, (ii) the model of sovereignty as an assumed benchmark 
for assessing change, and (iii) the development of norms in international 
society – which this chapter aims to re-orientate. 
 
 
 
5 See on this point, Luke Glanville, ‘The Myth of “Traditional” Sovereignty’ (2013) 57 
International Studies Quarterly 79, 88; and Cynthia Weber and Thomas J. Biersteker 
‘Reconstructing the analysis of sovereignty: concluding reflections and directions for future 
research’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 278, 283. 
6 See Jen Bartelson, ‘From Empire to Sovereignty - and Back?’ (2014) 28 Ethics & 
International Affairs 251, 261. 
7 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’ (1998) 52 International Organization 887.  
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2.2 Sovereignty: Beyond the Norm/Fact 
Incommensurability 
To start with, I suggest that the concept of sovereignty does not sit easily with 
either the normative-legal or the pure fact approach.8 Accordingly, the debate 
should be reset from a purely normative understanding of sovereignty9 to a  
reconceptualization receptive of the liminal nature of the concept. Let it suffice 
for now to recall the paradoxical possibility that, precisely when illegality 
becomes extreme, then ‘it can convert itself into a new standard of legality’.10 
Successful revolutionary movements are a clear example of how sovereignty 
originates from a “founding transgression”, in that, as Frantz Fanon has put 
it,11 they negate the entirety of the law in order to institute a new one.12 Hence, 
what this section proposes is a shift towards the concomitant acknowledgment 
of the normative and the factual side of sovereignty. The normative side 
qualifies sovereignty as a socially constructed  - and thus historically grounded 
- claim to supreme ordering (or regulatory) power. Here, “supreme” refers to 
the relative place on a scale. It connotes, in other words, a relationship between 
a superior and a subordinate.13 At the same time, the normative side of 
sovereignty stands in conjunction with a factual side. This pertains to two 
central features that the definition of sovereignty as merely a discursive claim 
tends to obfuscate. Firstly, claims to sovereignty do not arise in a political 
 
8  Hent Kalmo, ‘A matter of fact? The many faces of sovereignty’, in Hent Kalmo and Quentin 
Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested 
Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 114. See also Hent Kalmo and 
Quentin Skinner, ‘Introduction: a concept in fragments’, in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner 
(eds), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1, 4. 
9 See, for example, Cristina Gabriela Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) 26. 
10 Kalmo, ibid, 114. See also Jeremy Moses, ‘Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A Realist critique 
of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 39 Review of International Studies 113. Moses has 
noted that liberal theory, in particular, notions of “popular sovereignty” that claim to 
distribute power amongst the people, has ‘served to disguise the continued existence of a 
sovereign power that is not itself subject to the law that is made and enforced in its name’ 
(ibid, 126). See also Bartelson (n 2), who has argued that sovereignty is an incoherent concept, 
encompassing both the political power constituting and enforcing the law, and the law 
restraining that very power (ibid, 468). 
11 Frantz Fanon, The wretched of the earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc, 2005).  
12 Arjun Chowdhury and Raymond Duvall, ‘Sovereignty and sovereign power’ (2004) 6(2) 
International Theory 191, 200. 
13 See H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 106. 
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vacuum; namely, their content necessarily stems from an existing 
configuration of power. Secondly, any such claim raises the question of the 
material capabilities on which the enforcement of the claim itself depends.14 
Summing up, any attempt to portray sovereignty as either a discursive claim 
or an empirical attribute or state of affairs will inevitably leave something 
important amiss, thereby offering a distorted account. Instead, it is preferable 
to reset the foundations of the debate on a more well-rounded understanding, 
which, while remaining far from discarding the force of sociological dynamics, 
also revives questions about the power through which the content of any claim 
to sovereignty is both established and enforced. 
Given the complexity of the issue, a set of caveats needs to be addressed, 
and some further theoretical reasoning is necessary. Firstly, it bears 
emphasising that reckoning with the factual reality of sovereignty - alongside 
its normative dimension - shall by no means amount to thinking of sovereignty 
in terms of “absolute power”. Rather, to the extent that the factual side of 
sovereignty refers to the material capabilities of an entity to enforce its claim 
to supreme ordering power, it is also an essentially relative condition.15 As 
Michel Foucault has suggested in another context, it is a mistake to conceive 
power merely as something that can be possessed, or somehow contained. 
Instead, power is something that circulates through networks, discourse, 
knowledge, attitudes, bodies, etc.16 Perfectly epitomising this nature of power, 
sovereignty has an inescapable relational or societal aspect.17 This is attested 
 
14 Michael Keating, ‘Sovereignty and Pluri-national Democracy: Problems in Political Science’, 
in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 191, 195. The power 
through which sovereignty is enforced is similar to what Held and Gareth have labelled as 
autonomy. According to the authors, autonomy is ‘the actual power the nation-state possesses 
to articulate and achieve policy goals independently’. In their view, autonomy differs from 
sovereignty, for the latter is ‘the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory’ and is eroded 
‘only when such an entitlement is displaced by forms of ‘higher’ and/or independent authority 
which curtail the rightful basis of decision-making within a national framework’. See David 
Held and Schott Gareth, Models of Democracy (Cambridge, UK/Malden MA, USA: Polity 
Press, 2006) 307-308. 
15 Wouter Werner and Jaap De Wilde, ‘The endurance of sovereignty’ (2001) 7(3) European 
Journal of International Relations 283, 301. 
16 See: Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–
1976 (Verso, 2004), 27-29; Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, Volume 1:  An 
introduction.  (London: Penguin, 1980) 93; and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Border politics: the 
limits of sovereign power (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) 81. 
17 Tanja. E. Aalberts, Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law (Hoboken: Taylor 
& Francis, 2012) 16-17. 
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by the fact that states’ internal sovereignty is a corollary of states being 
recognized as sovereign by other states.18 In other words, the scope and 
meaning of sovereignty is, ‘bound up with the development of international 
law as a whole’.19 It follows that sovereignty endows states with certain rights 
and powers, but also puts them under the obligation to respect the rights of 
other states.20 Under this light, sovereignty may be appreciated as a political 
entity’s externally recognized right to exercise certain rights to rule.21  Indeed, 
at a closer look, one can also hardly fail to notice that the social recognition of 
a state as sovereign constitutes a particular identity that is endowed with 
certain rights, even if their exercise is constrained in practice.22 A number of 
the world’s 190-odd states are, in fact, ‘problematic sovereigns in some way’.23 
For instance, many states that are universally recognized do not have effective 
domestic sovereignty. While so-called “failed states” are the extreme case,24 
weak domestic sovereignty vis-à-vis portions of the territory or certain policy 
 
18 Bartelson (n 6) 259.  
19 Wouter G. Werner, ‘State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse’, in Ige F. Dekker 
and Wouter G. Werner (eds), Governance and International Legal Theory (Leiden, NLD: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 125, 156. On the relationship between sovereignty and 
international law, see also Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1960), in particular Chapter 19 on sovereignty. According 
to the author, sovereignty is ‘not at all inconsistent with a decentralized, and therefore weak 
and ineffective international legal order; indeed, it is the source of such decentralization, 
weakness, and ineffectiveness’ (ibid, 288). 
20 Werner ibid. 
21 Ibid, 132. As Werner has put it, ‘the concept of sovereignty is used to attribute a status (the 
status of “sovereign and independent statehood”) and to endow entities with this status with 
certain basic rights and powers (their “sovereign rights”)’ (ibid). See also Friedrich Kratochwil, 
‘Leaving Sovereignty Behind? An Inquiry into the Politics of Post-modernity’, in Richard Falk, 
Mark Juergensmayer, and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 127. In line with Werner, Kratochwil has suggested that 
sovereignty ‘has to be understood as a status ascription bounded by institutional rules rather 
than as a possession of certain palpable capabilities’ (ibid, 143).  
22 Weber & Biersteker (n 5) 279.  
23 Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, ‘Puzzles about Power’, in Martha Finnemore and 
Judith Goldstein (eds), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 3, 4.  
24 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Recognition: organized hypocrisy once again’ (2013) International 
Theory 170, 172. See also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Conclusion: vocabularies of sovereignty: the 
powers of a paradox’, in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments: 
The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 222. According to Koskenniemi, ‘[i]t is one of the major paradoxes of sovereignty 
that, while its core sense points to the possession of absolute and endless power, in practice, 
sovereignty may even be linked with the complete absence of any such power’ (ibid, 232). 
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areas or sectors of the population is a common reality.25 What is more, even 
strong states face trade-offs in managing different aspects of sovereignty, on 
the one hand, and power, on the other.26 In other words, maximizing 
sovereignty/autonomy does not necessarily amount to maximizing power. By 
the same token, reductions in sovereignty/autonomy do not necessarily result 
in reductions in power, for greater power can paradoxically require greater 
receptivity to reduced autonomy, and hence sovereignty compromises. If we 
go further down this line of thought, we may even concede that sovereignty, 
like all authority, is always contingent and negotiated with the collectivity that 
grants the “sovereign” certain limited rights to command.27 In fact, we have  
had centuries of disaggregating sovereignty into several forms.28 Consider the 
paradigmatic case of decolonization. As a result of the latter, entities with 
limited ability to enforce rules over their territory and/or to maintain a 
monopoly of the means of violence were recognized as sovereign states by the 
international community, and successfully assumed the right to speak for the 
populations they were largely unable to govern.29 More generally, a variety of 
instances of hybrid sovereign relations continue to exist in the world today, 
where ruling authorities may grant some sovereign rights to another entity  
(another state or an international organization) because of the perceived gains 
resulting from the transaction,30 or because the restrictions are imposed from 
the outside.31 In particular, strong states may explicitly threaten sanctions in 
 
25 See Thomas Risse, ‘Limited Statehood: A Critical Perspective’, in Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne 
Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. Levy, and John D. Stephens (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Transformations of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 162.  
26 Etel Solingen, ‘Three Scenes of Sovereignty and Power’, in Martha Finnemore and Judith 
Goldstein (eds), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 105, 128-129. 
27 David A. Lake, ‘Authority, Coercion, and Power in International Relations’, in Martha 
Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary 
World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 55, 63. 
28 David A. Lake, ‘Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield’ (2007) 
2 Review of International Organizations 219, 219. 
29 See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Risse (n 25) 162; and 
Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in 
International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 73. See also Lake (n 27) 61-62; and Oona A. Hathaway, ‘International Delegation 
and State Sovereignty’ (2008) 71(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 115, 138. 
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response to uncooperative behaviour;32 but also, weaker states may yield to 
pressures simply because the costs deriving from their defection would be too 
high. Finally, we can be even more audacious and move beyond the level of 
anecdotes to reveal how systematic patterns of deviance may be.33 While the 
analytical and substantial importance of hierarchy in international society is 
too often overlooked,34 we may acknowledge that the qualifications of and 
restrictions on sovereignty operating at any given time are both the product of 
existing hierarchies and the medium of their continued survival. This also 
means that, albeit in a basic epistemic sense sovereignty is a particular way of 
making sense of world - i.e. it is before politics - moving beyond the epistemic 
dimension, sovereignty looms as a process of framing the polity precisely by 
means of enabling specific forms of politics.35 Finally, with this in mind, we 
may further refine the normative side of sovereignty in terms of a practical 
discourse that justifies certain relations of power by recasting them into a set 
of rights, responsibilities, and limitations concerning the exercise of power 
itself. 
I have just argued that sovereignty is not only inherently relational, but 
also that it can even be disaggregated; that is, divided between several 
institutions,36 hence giving rise to complex constellations of power.37 And yet, 
albeit “sovereignty” is not synonymous with “absolute power”, the 
acknowledgement of the sociological dynamics38 should not be at the expense 
of the likewise crucial acknowledgment of the factual side of sovereignty. 
Indeed, to develop a theory of sovereignty (as responsibility) without also 
addressing the factual side as well is ‘akin to trying to climb a ladder that has 
 
32 Hathaway, ibid. 
33 David A. Lake, ‘The new sovereignty in International Relations’ (2003) 5,3 International 
Studies Review 303, 320.  
34 See Edward Keene, ‘International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice of 
Intervention’ (2013) 39 Review of International Studies 1077; and Janice Bially Mattern and 
Ayse Zarakol, ‘Hierarchies in World Politics’ (2016) 70(3) International Organization 623, 
625.  
35 Neil Walker, ‘The Variety of Sovereignty’, in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds) Sovereignty, Self-defense, and the Disciplining of States. 
Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 21, 23. 
36 See Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 3. 
37 This point is illustrated at more length at the end of this section. 
38 Ibid, 30. 
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only one side’.39 This is what Jeremy Moses has already suggested in his 
attempt to offer a critique of R2P ‘from a de facto sovereignty perspective’.40 
The view advanced here, however, also differs from Moses’ critique in some 
important respects.  
 
Figure 1. Sovereignty                                                                                                                                                            
 
According to Moses, in line with classical political realism, sovereignty is 
primarily defined in terms of coercive power, and thus as an (indivisible) 
attribute which an institution either enjoys or not.41 By contrast, as Figure 1 
above suggests, I deem it more appropriate to frame coercion within a broader 
and multifaceted understanding of sovereignty. This is at odds with a purely 
normative understanding; and yet, it eschews the reductionist approach 
typical of more traditionally realist views.42 More to the point, while coercion 
 
39 Moses (n 10) 132.  
40 Ibid, 127. 
41 Ibid, 114. See also David Chandler, Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1997–2017 
(Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan 2017), 76-77.  
42 See Stephen D. Krasner, ‘New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions of Power’, 
in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds), Back to Basics: State Power in a 
Contemporary World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 339. According 
to Krasner ‘traditional realist approaches, which emphasize compulsory power, illuminate 
some interactions but obscure others’ (ibid, 355-356). 
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is, admittedly, the component through which sovereignty most tangibly 
projects itself, it is also precisely (only) one dimension of sovereignty itself. A 
further point of contention pertains to the factual side itself. As illustrated in 
the figure above, the factual side of sovereignty is not merely about coercion, 
but also about authority, which in turn entails different - albeit largely 
overlapping - dimensions, such as legal and political authority. The distinctive 
element of authority, in contrast to coercion, is that it claims to be legitimate. 
In other words, authority is a kind of power that can plausibly connect to the 
consent of the addressee in a way that coercion cannot.43 At the same time, 
though, coercion and authority are deeply intertwined. In fact, if we confined 
our conception of coercion to the power that passes through the barrel of a gun 
and imposes one’s will against resistance, we would be unable to distinguish 
between the robber and the police.44 Similarly, while authority rests on a 
moment of consent, an addressee of authority might later disagree with its 
exercise. Accordingly, albeit emanating from consent, authority must also be 
able to constrain.45 The reconceptualization advanced here also entails the 
following crucial implication: the normative and the factual sides do not 
necessarily covary. This opens up the possibility that a shift may be taking 
place at the normative level - because of the critical “norm entrepreneurship” 
of relevant agents, without being matched by a corresponding one at the 
factual level - due to the reluctance of critical actors. Similarly, one may expect 
authority and coercion to covary, in line with the intimate relationship 
between the two pointed out above; and yet, this is often not the case, given 
the competing pressures through which change usually has to make its way. 
Nor do the different dimensions of authority, albeit largely overlapping, 
necessarily covary either.  
To the extent that such a reading of sovereignty makes it possible to 
unpack the different layers of sovereignty and their mutual relationships, it 
also opens the door to a more elaborated understanding of change as far 
 
43 Ingo Venzke, ‘Between Power and Persuasion: On International Institutions' Authority in 
Making Law’ (2013) 4(3) Transnational Legal Theory 354, 359. 
44 Ibid, 358. 
45 Ibid, 372. See also Peter M. Blau, ‘Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority’ (1963) 
57 American Political Science Review 305, 313. 
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sovereignty is concerned. Focusing on the Rome Statute, for instance, we may 
be able to see that the latter is caught within several “misalignments”. On the 
one hand, states have delegated to the Court an inventive mixture of legal and 
political authority. That is, the OTP is empowered to decide whether to 
investigate or prosecute formally without political direction, and the Court is 
the ultimate judge as to the gravity of crimes and whether states are willing 
and able to genuinely investigate and prosecute. On the other hand, states 
themselves have retained their primacy as political actors, including their 
monopoly on coercion (see Chapter 3). And yet, the limited achievement of the 
Court (see Chapter 4) seem to suggest that to successfully redefine sovereignty 
so as to deny states exclusive jurisdiction over their territory would require 
compromising a greater share of their internal sovereignty.46 Such an upshot 
is also entailed by a dynamic understanding of authority, which distinguishes 
between the delegation of authority and its exercise. In other words, as pointed 
out above, authority needs to persist even if/when, in defiance of the founding 
moment of consent, it is not met by the agreement of the addressee.47 As 
shown in the following chapters, this is exactly where the delegation of 
authority from states to the ICC finds its limit, or “frontiers”, as the title of this 
dissertation suggests. Indeed, the Court’s questionable performance lays bare 
that separating authority from power is often highly idealized and ineffectual, 
even in the context of a judicial institution.48 As further discussed in Chapter 
4, this is especially true in the context of criminal law, whose duty-imposing 
nature presupposes a vertical system in which a superior gives orders to an 
inferior and threatens sanctions for non-compliance. 
In the final analysis, the view just outlined is in clear defiance of the 
R2P report’s assumption that the recharacterization does not entail a transfer 
or dilution of state sovereignty.49 At the same time, though, the classical realist 
 
46 Janice E. Thomson, ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between 
Theory and Empirical Research’ (1995) 39, 2 International Studies Quarterly 213, 225. 
Bartelson (n 6) 259. 
47 Venzke (n 43) 364.  
48 Ibid, 373. 
49 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001), para 2.14, available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents (last 
visited 30 September 2018). 
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framing of sovereignty as an “all or nothing” type of affair is also discarded in 
favour of a reinterpretation in terms of ongoing struggles to resituate 
power.50 This takes up Foucault’s idea that unless we are looking at it from a 
great height and a very great distance, power is never something that can be 
exclusively localized in the hands of some, and which all the others are merely 
devoid of and subject to.51 Hence, it goes without saying that the theoretical 
move proposed herein remains evasive on the longstanding question of final 
authority. And yet, this is exactly the point. Think of the messy separation of 
the lines of authority in the Rome Statute.52 It is true that the ICC does not 
have the power to compel state compliance with its orders. In addition, state 
parties can always withdraw from the Rome Statute. At the same time, though, 
state withdrawal becomes effective only one year after the notification of 
withdrawal, thus leaving unaffected any investigation opened before the 
effective date of withdrawal. What is more important, non-compliance by 
certain states, such as, e.g., a state failing to cooperate with the Court by 
obstructing the collection of evidence or offering protection to an ICC suspect, 
is insufficient to fully undo the final and legally-binding nature of the Court’s 
decisions. The Rome Statute, in fact, envisages that external states may 
pressure resistant states (even non-party states, under certain conditions)53 to 
comply with or give effect to the Court’s request, against the consent of the 
resistant states themselves. In other words, if the system of surrogate 
enforcement envisioned by the architects of the Rome Statute was consistently 
applied, the balance of power would shift from non-compliant states to the 
Court. As if this were not enough, the Rome Statute is also a stark reminder 
that we live in a world where the territorial differentiation into distinct states 
is increasingly challenged by a functional differentiation into issue areas.54 
 
50 See Robert B. J. Walker, ‘Polis, Cosmopolis, Politics’ (2003) 28 Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political 267. According to Walker, ‘it is a great mistake to assume that our futures lie either 
with the polis or with the cosmopolis. We confront, rather, ongoing struggles to resituate and 
politicize sites of political authority’ (ibid, 284). 
51 Foucault (n 16) 19. 
52 Antonio Franceschet, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Provisional Authority to Coerce’ 
(2012) 26(1) International Affairs 93, 94. 
53 The ICC can intervene irrespective of any consent for cases referred by the UNSC; and, in 
the absence of a UNSC referral, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction if either the territorial 
state or the state of the suspect’s nationality has accepted its jurisdiction. 
54 Bartelson (n 2) 474. See also Amitai Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ (2006) 50(1) 
Orbis 71. 
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While conventional definitions of sovereignty still run along the lines of “the 
highest supreme authority to issue and enforce laws within a certain territory”, 
their explanatory currency is out of phase vis-à-vis a fragmented international 
system that consists of functionally defined polities.55 The latter, in fact, do not 
claim supreme authority over all matters within a territory, but only as far as 
the functions that fall under their asserted competence are concerned. As 
Heikki Patomäki has put it: 
When the state is understood as a trans-historical universal notion, 
there is no reason to reduce it to one particular instance such as 
territorial nation-state. Different overlapping forms of modern state 
authority can coexist within the same space.56 
So, for instance, it is plausible for the European Union to claim sovereignty 
over a range of competences that were previously within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of its member-states, to the extent that such a claim does not 
seriously question the continuing sovereignty of the member-states 
themselves vis-à-vis their remaining areas of territorial jurisdiction.57 
Importantly, the fact that non-state polities (even the most mature and “state-
like” ones, such as the EU) remain discursively ambiguous about their claims 
to authority (and even purposely shy away from such sovereignty jargon) is 
surely an element to consider; but it should not be overestimated.58 After all, 
it is not hard to see why these kind of polities may have an interest  in formally 
keeping a low profile. Consider the paradigmatic case of international courts. 
If these shook off their legalist feathers, they would be confronted with the 
hard (though, arguably, no less liberating in the longer run) task of re-
establishing their legitimacy along radically new lines. It follows that while 
recognition as sovereign is a crucial aspect of sovereignty itself, the lack of 
formal recognition should not make us blind to the power wielded by organs 
 
55 Jef Huysmans, ‘Discussing Sovereignty and Transnational Politics’, in Neil Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 209, 219. 
56 Heikki Patomäki, ‘The Anarchical Society as Futurology’, in Madeline Carr, Adam 
Humphreys and Hidemi Suganami (eds.). The Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary 
Challenges and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 253, 256. 
57 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 3, 23-24.  
58 Ibid, 27. 
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other than the state.59 Regrettably, the failure to appreciate this point has 
already established a juncture where the apparently antithetic positions of 
traditional realists and post-sovereigntists converge: the former insisting on 
the continuing states’ monopoly of coercion, and the latter being  dismissive 
of the conceptual currency of sovereignty vis-à-vis emergent patterns of 
political authority.60 Hence, there is a need for the conceptual structure of 
sovereignty to be adjusted so as to make sense of the latter, no longer as an 
“absolute” and “unitary” or “indivisible” attribute, but in non-exclusive terms.  
 
 
2.3 The Westphalian Model of Sovereign Equality 
Discarded Once and for All 
The understanding of sovereignty outlined above also offers a way out of the 
‘de-historicization’61 and ‘reification’62 of the model of sovereign equality 
assumed as a benchmark for assessing change. Following those who have 
already attempted to discredit the still popular myth of Westphalia, the 
paragraphs below suggest that by portraying sovereignty as responsibility as a 
radical break with a previous norm of equality and non-intervention, the 
dominant narrative ends up obscuring the continuities (and discontinuities) 
with previous forms of inequality and intervention. It is impaired, in other 
words, by what Noam Chomsky has summarized as ‘the rattling of a skeleton 
in the closet: history, to the present moment’.63 
 
 
2.3.1 The Peace of Westphalia 
To start with, neither the provisions of the treaties signed in Westphalia, nor 
 
59 Ibid, 189.  
60 See on the same point Richard Bellamy, ‘Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-
Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights within the EU’, in Neil Walker 
(ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 167, 189. 
61 Glanville (n 5) 88. See also Weber & Biersteker (n 5) 283. 
62 Glanville, ibid. 
63 Noam Chomsky, ‘The Skeleton in the Closet: The Responsibility to Protect in History’, in 
Philip Cunliffe (ed.) Critical Perspectives on R2P: Interrogating Theory & Practice (London: 
Taylor & Francis, 2011) 11. 
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the ensuing order, support the claim that the Peace of Westphalia constitutes 
a paradigm shift towards sovereign equality and non-intervention.64 A first 
basic consideration is that the Peace of Westphalia consisted of two bilateral 
treaties: one between Sweden and the German Emperor and the other between 
France and the German Emperor. This already casts doubt on the conventional 
portrayal of the Peace of Westphalia as a treaty between sovereign states 
acknowledging their exclusive spheres of authority. Secondly, while the 
treaties did not explicitly mention sovereignty, they reaffirmed the 
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted for a further 158 years, 
until 1806. In fact, although the estates of the Empire were given new rights65 
and often functioned as independent units after 1648, they still recognized the 
Emperor as their overlord, sent representatives to the Diet, paid common 
taxes, and even raised a joint army.66 In addition, it is true that the principle 
of “cuius regio, eius religio”, enshrined in the treaties, granted rulers in the 
Empire the right to choose the religion of their subjects. Nonetheless, before 
regarding this as crucial evidence for the end of the medieval system of 
overlapping authorities, we should also consider that not only had the same 
principle already been proclaimed by the Peace of Augsburg (1555); but in 
1648 the rule of “cuius regio, eius religio” was actually mitigated by the 
provision of protections for minorities and equality guarantees (for Catholics 
and Protestants).67  
Moreover, it was not until the mid-18th  century that Emeric de Vattel 
clearly articulated for the first time the right of non-intervention.68 Yet, even 
 
64 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Stéphane Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of 
International Law. The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004); Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the 
Origins of Sovereignty’ (1999) 3 The International History Review 569, 574; Andreas 
Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’ (2003) 55 
International Organization 253; Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘The Westphalian Myth and the Idea of 
External Sovereignty’, in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds) Sovereignty in Fragments: 
The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 64; Bruno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of 
Modern International Relations, Vol. X. (New York: Verso, 2003). 
65 The estates obtained a territorial right of superiority within their own dominions. In 
addition, even though they had been making alliances with outside powers long before 1648, 
their right to do so was formally acknowledged by the treaties.  
66 Croxton (n 64) 574. 
67 Beaulac (n 64) 204.  
68 Emmerich de Vattel, Droit des Gens (London [Neûchatel], 1758). 
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then, he balanced the right of non-intervention with the claim that tyrannical 
and oppressive states were illegitimate and should be denied protection from 
external interference.69 In this respect, Vattel’s formulation was actually 
receptive of rising ideas of popular sovereignty, which tied the mutual 
recognition of claims to sovereign authority to the capacity of sovereign 
representatives to secure the “rights of man”.70 Finally, and crucially, the 
explicit formulation of the sovereign prerogative to non-intervention did not 
actually end intervention. In fact, albeit sovereignty - and popular sovereignty, 
in particular - entails ‘a logic that points towards legal and political equality’,71 
it has always been accompanied, in practice, by a substantial element of 
hierarchy.72 
In Europe, while the French Revolution and Napoleon brought an end 
to the Holy Roman Empire, the ‘revolutionary rhetoric of equality was almost 
immediately contrasted with French hegemonic ambitions’.73 Napoleon 
‘carved up, annexed, reconfigured, partitioned, and sold territory as if it were 
a personal possession.’74 After the Napoleonic Empire was defeated, the 1815 
Congress of Vienna restored the Austrian Empire and expanded the Russian 
one. In 1867 the Austrian Empire became the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, 
and, since 1871, the monarchs of Germany had also styled themselves 
emperors. Add to this that the dissolution of the European Empires after 
World War I was followed by Hitler’s attempt to unify Europe by force of arms. 
What had changed from earlier times was the basis on which the claim to 
hierarchic rights was made: from dynasticism to a new form of legitimized 
hierarchy based on the idea that great powers have special rights as well as 
 
69 Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2014) 6-7. 
70 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract and Discourses (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 
1913). Contrary to conventional wisdom, constraints on sovereignty were contemplated even 
by earlier ideas of absolute sovereignty, which subjected the authority of sovereigns to moral, 
juridical, and divine responsibilities. 
71 Barry Buzan, ‘Universal Sovereignty’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne (eds) The 
Globalization of International Society (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) 227, 235.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Peter Stirk, ‘The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality’ (2012) 38 Review of 
International Studies 641, 651.  
74 Kalevi J. Holsti, ‘The Decline of Interstate War: Pondering Systemic Explanations’, in Raimo 
Väyrynen, (ed) The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 135, 137. 
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responsibilities.75 As Gerry Simpson has seminally noted, after 1815, the 
international order was premised on a strong form of “legalized hegemony”. 
According to this, great powers regarded themselves, and were recognized by 
others, as having ‘managerial responsibility for international order’.76 This 
practice continued through the League of Nations and the UN, both 
embodying a ‘hybrid structure with sovereign equality recognized in a general 
assembly of all members, and the legalized hegemony of the great powers in a 
smaller council’.77  
Allegedly Westphalian norms applied even less – actually did not apply 
at all - to the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world. It is the 
bitterest irony of all, indeed, that precisely at the time when popular 
sovereignty was taking root in Europe and sovereign equality is conventionally 
held to have been gaining its full momentum, nearly all the rest of the world 
was coercively subjected to a European standard of civilization and 
intervention.78 European intervention in the rest of the world culminated in a 
phenomenon of tremendous proportions: by the beginning of the 20th century, 
more than the 80% of the world's surface was under European colonial rule.79 
As again eminently captured by Simpson, the abstractions of “Christianity”, 
‘“civilization”, “family membership”, and “savagery”’ were ‘the substance of 
“effectiveness”, “territory”, and “statehood”’.80 Accordingly, the world beyond 
Europe was arrayed along a spectrum of ‘divided sovereignty’,81 from outright 
colonies, to a handful of non-Western countries nominally independent but 
subjected to unequal extraterritorial treaties (e.g. Japan, China, the Ottoman 
 
75 Buzan (n 71) 235. 
76 Gerry Simpson, Great powers and outlaw states: unequal sovereigns in the international 
legal order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also Sibylle Scheipers, 
Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: International Society and the International 
Criminal Court (Manchester, GBR: Manchester University Press, 2010), 22. 
77 Buzan (n 71) 236. 
78 See Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, ‘Eurocentrism, “civilization” and the “barbarians”’, in 
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth 
Century: Setting the Precedent (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015) 31 for a 
more comprehensive account of the standard of civilization dating the “civilized–barbarians” 
dichotomy as back as to the ancient Greeks. 
79 Ibid, 233-234. In the words of Buzan, ‘Western countries were now able to dominate, and 
to occupy if they wanted, almost anywhere’ (ibid). 
80 Gerry Simpson, ‘The Globalization of International Law’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Tim 
Dunne (eds) The Globalization of International Society (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) 265, 274. 
81 Buzan (n 71) 227.  
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Empire, Egypt).  
In conclusion, the international order that emerged from the Peace of 
Westphalia is better understood as one in which the Empire remained a key-
actor, and medieval hierarchies were recast so as to guarantee the right of the 
more powerful to intervene in the affairs of others,82 notably beyond Europe. 
It follows that, especially by acknowledging the historical weight of 
colonialism , we can see that, for much of the world, inequality and 
intervention have actually been the norm rather than the exception.83 What is 
more, at least from the 19th century, responsibility has been clearly construed 
as ‘the counterpart of special rights’,84 these being directly correlated with 
material capabilities. This also means that, while being renegotiated 
throughout history,85 the concept of responsibility has served as one of the 
main concepts through which international hierarchy has been conventionally 
legitimated. So, for example, the forms of criminal behaviour that justify 
infringing on the rights of its members in any particular international society 
reflect and institutionalize specific hierarchies.86 The ensuing analysis shows 
that ‘an implicit standard of civilization’87 was even reaffirmed as a result of 
decolonization. Indeed, sovereignty itself, while being the favoured aspiration 
of anti-colonial movements, has been a primary effect of empire. This has not 
only left behind its maps, clients, and racial classifications (e.g. some nations 
acquired sovereignty through decolonization and many others did not),88 but 
most crucially the existence itself of post-colonial states reflects the structural 
power of the West. 
 
82 Piirimäe (n 64) 65.  
83 Jessica Whyte, ‘Always on Top: Sovereignty, the “Responsibility to Protect” and the 
Persistence of Colonialism’, in Jyotsna G. Singh and David D. Kim (eds) Postcolonial World. 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017) 308, 311.  
84 Ian Clark, ‘Hierarchy, Hegemony, and the Norms of International Society’, in Christian 
Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne (eds) The Globalization of International Society (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2017) 248, 249. 
85 Ibid, 248. 
86 Donnelly (n 1) 147. See also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ 
(2002) 6, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 1, 17-18. 
87 Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘Rethinking the Principle of (Sovereign) Equality as a Standard of 
Civilisation’ (2014) 42 Millennium 767, 788-789. 
88 Simpson (n 80) 280.  
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2.3.2 The United Nations and Decolonization 
The supposedly traditional principle of “sovereign equality” was only firmly 
formalized in international law in the UN Charter in 1945.89 It is also popular 
to suggest that the same principles were universalized over the following two 
decades through the process of decolonization. Does this mean that the era of 
“Westphalian sovereignty” finally arrived, three centuries later, with the 
establishment of the United Nations and the ensuing process of 
decolonization? Both the UN Charter’s qualification of sovereignty and the 
resulting international order present ‘a series of puzzles and paradoxes’90 that 
point towards a more prudent conclusion.  
In the first place, it remains unclear to what extent a norm of equality 
‘can mitigate the inequalities resulting from asymmetrical power relations’.91 
On the one hand, in the post-WWII era, the normative presumption in favour 
of equality apparently discredited principled arguments for hierarchy,92 
including – if not especially - the notion that states were externally 
accountable for the treatment of their populations.93 The UN General 
Assembly declarations regularly asserted that differences in state capacity 
could never serve as justification for the unequal treatment of sovereign 
equals, as most notably confirmed by the UN General Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 
1960. According to this, ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
 
89 The exact phrase “sovereign equality” first appeared in the Moscow Declaration (October 
1943), in which the governments of the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, and China agreed ‘[t]hat 
they recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general 
international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving 
states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’. See Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism 
in International Law’, 125. 
90 Brad R. Roth, ‘Sovereign Equality and Non-Liberal Regimes’ (2012) 43 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 25, 26. 
91 Lora Anne Viola, Duncan Snidal and Michael Zürn, ‘Sovereign (In)Equality in the Evolution 
of the International System’, in Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. 
Levy, Frank Nullmeier and John D. Stephens (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Transformations 
of the State (Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014) 222. 
92 See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty (2009) 20 European Journal of 
International Law 513.  
93 Luke Glanville, ‘Sovereignty’, in Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 151, 157. See also Anne 
Orford, ‘Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility 
to Protect’ (2009) 30(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 981, 1002. 
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virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development’, and ‘inadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext 
for delaying independence’.94 And yet, albeit the Declaration was passed in the 
General Assembly by a vote of 89 to 0 (with 9 abstentions, however none of 
the colonial powers rejected it),95 one can hardly ignore that ‘in the post-WWII 
the discrepancy between the doctrine of equality and the real distribution of 
powers was as great, if not greater, than ever’.96 Not to mention that despite 
the proclaimed equality of its members, the UN notoriously rests on the 
institutionalization of their political inequality,97 as most clearly attested by 
the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members.98 Similarly, the 
letter of the Charter has not restrained powerful states from intervening in the 
internal affairs of other countries. So, during the Cold War, the interference of 
the two super-powers was systematically pursued over nearly the entire world 
- albeit intervention for human protection purposes was, admittedly, very 
rare.99 This does not mean that great powers could use their capabilities in a 
totally unrestricted way. If they fully shattered the fiction of sovereign equality, 
they would have undermined ‘the fundament of international order as such’.100 
Nonetheless, the broad point is that, even in its “golden age” – between the 
end of WWII and the 1980’s – sovereign equality was undercut by the 
persistence of ‘great power prerogative’,101 ‘cultural and economic markers’,102 
 
94 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.  
95 Chandler (n 41) 79.  
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states and the sovereign rights of non-intervention, that post-colonial societies could be 
guaranteed the rights to self-government’ (ibid). 
97 See Frederick Cowell, ‘Inherent Imperialism. Understanding the Legal Roots of Anti-
imperialist Criticism of the International Criminal Court (2017) 15(4) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 667, 672. 
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and ‘civilizational residues’.103 In other words, the distribution of sovereignty 
resulting from decolonization has, in fact, inscribed some extraordinarily 
resilient hierarchies into the fabric of global society.104 
The picture just outlined becomes even more vivid - and complex - if we 
bring into play the relationship between the principle of sovereign equality and 
human rights. Since 1945, we have been confronted with the 
institutionalization of both the principle of sovereign equality and an 
increasingly popular understanding of sovereignty that subordinates equality 
to the protection of fundamental human rights. This is attested by the growing 
relevance of international human rights,105 especially after 1989-90, when 
‘deference to sovereignty has been increasingly seen as a backward obstacle 
against humanitarian objectives’.106 Many authoritative observers have 
pointed out that qualifying sovereignty and human rights as clearly 
differentiated, or even mutually antagonistic regimes, misunderstands their 
inherent connection.107 Such an approach would, in fact, disregard at least two 
crucial factors, namely that, since the emergence of popular sovereignty, 
sovereignty has been increasingly justified on the grounds of individual rights, 
and that decolonization was about the universalization of the right to 
sovereign independence.108 The same line of thought has been expressly 
endorsed by the ICISS in the R2P report. According to this, ‘the globalization 
of the post-1945 sovereignty and human rights regimes occurred through 
complementary rather than competing processes’.109 However, while on the 
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even without Security Council authorization’ (ibid, 36). 
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one hand one can hardly deny that the trajectory of sovereignty and human 
rights are deeply intertwined, on the other hand this framing of the 
sovereignty/human rights relationship sounds too apologetic. Most crucially, 
it neglects the fact that human rights have become a part of the calculus of 
everyday legitimation practices. More specifically, they grant legitimacy to 
‘claims and acts of power that constitute global politics’,110 including, of course, 
the basic norm of sovereignty. As the most widely referenced standard of 
civilization,111 they have in fact been crucial to enabling the framing 
sovereignty in terms of a sliding scale of “capacities”, as opposed to self-
government and non-intervention. In this guise, the idea of human rights has 
underpinned a variety of forms of intervention, ranging from e.g. the inclusion 
of human rights clauses in the EU trade and association agreements112 to 
military interventions, such as the more recent NATO intervention in Libya in 
2011 to “protect Libyan civilians” or the earlier U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 
(which the United Stated sought to recast in humanitarian terms after the 
justification premised on the possession of weapons of mass-destruction by 
the Iraqi regime fell apart). 
The reading of sovereign equality offered by Tanja Aalberts lends itself 
particularly well to a more disenchanted understanding of the complex 
interplay between human rights and sovereign equality. According to this, 
‘sovereign equality is not just a liberal right to individuality, but by the same 
token operates as a norm to be equally sovereign, that is to say, to be a 
sovereign of a similar - i.e. liberal - kind’.113 In other words, being a sovereign 
equal recoils to the validation of equality on the basis of an ‘underlying meta-
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in Christian Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne (eds) The Globalization of International Society 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2017) 185, 200. 
112 See Hartmut Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession 
Politics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 13(2) European Journal of 
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value of legitimate (or “normalized”) statehood’.114 These arguments calls to 
mind the critique of the disciplinary and normalizing tendencies of liberalism 
advanced by Max Stirner already in the 19th century.115 Stirner was a German 
anti-statist philosopher that inspired many anarchists of the late 19th and the 
20th centuries. One of the philosopher’s fundamental insights was that the 
discourse of political liberalism, while apparently being about rights and 
individual freedom from political oppression, impels a compelling form of 
subjectivity.116 At the domestic level, such subjectivity amounts to the creation 
of the “bourgeois citizen”.117 The underside of political liberalism is, to put it 
differently, a rational, normative, and legal absolutism.118 This denies 
difference and inequality by establishing allegedly universal norms and legal 
rules that exclude certain identities119 and are, ultimately, meant as ‘the great 
civiliser of all’.120 Moving further along those lines, we may recast 
decolonization in terms of a process of expanding this specific form of 
subjectivity of the liberal state, as a collective counterpart to the liberal 
individual subject. So, as Aalberts has put it, after decolonization, we can 
identify the imposition of an implicit “standard of – liberal – civilization” ‘as 
the paradoxical outcome of the universalization of the principle of sovereign 
equality’.121 Similar views have also been advanced by several other critical 
observers, in particular, but not exclusively, by TWAIL scholars.122 The latter, 
in fact, have firmly challenged the alleged neutrality of the doctrine of 
sovereignty and international law as a whole, by placing the ‘distinction 
between the civilised and the uncivilised’123 at their very core. 
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Against the backdrop just outlined, the progressive emphasis on human 
rights and the expanding international criminal law regime can, hence, be 
understood as a component of that conception of international order that 
Simpson has labelled as “liberal anti-pluralism”,124  and which the end of the 
Cold War has provided with fresh, undisguised impetus.125 From here, it also 
follows that contemporary calls for a ‘normativized practice of conditional, 
provisional recognition’126 should no longer appear to be game-changing as 
such. Instead, they should be re-evaluated against a persisting backdrop of 
core/periphery relations and West’s assumed position of superiority. This 
conclusion is also confirmed by the analysis of the ICC case in the following 
chapters, insofar as crucial factors of continuity between the “old” and the 
“new” order are brought to light. In particular, it is shown that, while 
expectations were high for the Court’s ability to finally “square the circle” 
between the primacy of states and human rights, the ICC is, instead, the 
institution on which the persisting schizophrenic role of states as supporters, 
breakers, and enforcers has most powerfully backfired.127 
 
 
2.3.2.1 (In)equality 
Summing up, even in the golden era of sovereign equality, sovereign equals 
were ‘unequally equal’,128 with weaker states being traditionally subject to 
compulsory, institutional, structural, and even productive powers.129 These 
conclusions firmly challenge the conventional framing of sovereignty as 
responsibility as a radical break with a previous order of equal sovereigns. 
What is more, they are an invitation for mainstream theories of international 
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society more broadly to carefully reckon with the deeper normative meaning 
of inequality. This is not to say that the scholars of the English School, for 
example, did not contemplate the idea of an order beyond Europe based on 
colonial and imperial systems until the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, 
lines of inquiry such as the “expansion of international society” and the 
potential “revolt against the West” following decolonization were in fact 
promoted by the very founders of the English School.130 With respect to 
international inequality more broadly, it should also be recalled that Hedley 
Bull’s expressly ranked “great power management” among the fundamental 
institutions of international society. According to Bull, order has to be 
managed; and, given the greater capacities of the most powerful states, this 
“responsibility” inevitably falls disproportionately on their shoulders.131 What 
is more, this very research project is greatly indebted to Barry Buzan and 
Cornelia Navari’s insights about how normative change is inescapably tied to 
the distribution of power, as discussed more thoroughly in section below. But 
while the awareness of the link between power inequalities and the normative 
fabric of international society surfaces here and there, and even provides 
important cues, it is not hard to see that the study thereof has quite remained 
on the fringes of orthodox theories. Instead, the latter have been centred on a 
pattern of peaceful co-existence between equal and mutually independent 
sovereign states that negotiate the rules of international society.132 Admittedly, 
in recent times, some progress has been made. This advancement has been 
owed especially to the growing influence of critical scholarships, notably Post-
Colonial Studies and TWAIL. As a result, historical narrations of international 
society have been readjusted so as to include more careful accounts of the 
period of formal colonial rule.133 And yet, it is interesting to note how the effort 
at critical revaluation usually stops at the threshold of decolonization. The 
latter is, in fact, commonly inscribed as the process that finally ‘delegitimated 
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the normative basis of colonialism and ushered in a pluralist society’134 and 
made sovereign equality ‘more or less universal’.135 In other words, 
decolonization is seen as marking the advent of ‘shared practices’136 ‘rooted in 
values held commonly by the members of interstate societies’;137 and little 
regard is paid to the ‘dynamic of difference’,138 the civilising impulse and 
mechanisms of exclusion that governed the extension of sovereignty to 
decolonial states139 and still persist to this day. In other words, what is still 
eluding mainstream theories of international society is a firm effort to bring 
the subject of inequality from the fringes to the core of the concepts of 
sovereignty and sovereign equality itself. This means rethinking the latter  as 
a principle that structurally accommodates inequality; that is, as a hegemonic 
norm of normalized sovereignty against which external recognition as a 
sovereign “equal” is contingent on some set of criteria reflecting the 
institutional structures and interests of dominant states.140  
 
 
2.4 Norm Development in International Society 
Challenging neorealism and neoliberalism’s determinism on matters of 
agency,141 constructivism has stressed the socially constructed nature of the 
world we live in and the individual-level mechanisms that drive change, thus 
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being in line with the broader “linguistic turn” in the social sciences. Against 
this backdrop, norm development is understood to go through a three-stage 
process. In the first stage, “norm emergence”, norm entrepreneurs introduce 
a new idea into significant arenas, attempting to persuade others to adopt the 
idea. The second stage, called “norm cascade”, can occur only once the 
previous stage has reached a “tipping point”, that is, after a critical number of 
states have endorsed the emergent norm. In many cases, the “norm cascade” 
is facilitated by the institutionalization of the norm in specific sets of rules or 
organizations. In the final “internalization” stage, the norm becomes an 
accepted rule of behaviour.142 At the same time, Finnemore and Sikkink have 
acknowledged that completion of the life-cycle is not an inevitable process, and 
many emergent norms fail to reach a ‘tipping point’.143 While this model has 
rapidly established itself as the toolbox for the analysis of international norm 
development, several aspects thereof deserve a more careful appraisal. 
 
 
2.4.1 Constructivism and Norm Development: Strengths 
and Shortcomings  
A key premise of constructivism is that international organizations (IOs) 
respond not only to other actors pursuing material interests in the 
environment, but also to normative, cultural, and institutional forces that 
shape how organizations see the world and conceptualize their own 
missions.144 This is an important step ahead of economic approaches to IOs. 
Economic approaches are interested in why IOs are created in the first place, 
and generally understand the environment wherein organizations operate as 
socially thin and ‘devoid of social rules, cultural content, or even other actors 
beyond those constructing the organization’.145 Accordingly, competition, 
exchange, and the promotion of efficiency are the dominant environmental 
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characteristics driving the IOs’ formation and behaviour.146 In open defiance 
of this perspective, constructivists emphasize that we must attend to 
normative and cultural factors and their role in determining outcomes,147 and 
the diversity of powerful non-state agents and ‘autonomous institutions’,148 
that is, independent from the states that may have created them.149 In 
particular, from a constructivist perspective, social norms ‘shape or constitute 
the basic features of politics that most IR theory takes as given - what states 
want and even who or what states are’.150 They ‘involve reconfigurations of 
interests and even actors in ways that cannot be accommodated within the 
agent-oriented perspectives that dominate political science and economics’.151 
They ‘are “constitutive” in the sense that they constitute, create, or revise the 
actors or interests which agent-oriented approaches take as given’.152 Put in a 
nutshell, the overarching objective of the constructivist agenda has been to 
challenge neorealism and neoliberalism’s determinism on matters of agency 
by placing the constitutive power of social norms back onto the research 
agenda.153 
Having said that, constructivism has also promised to account for both 
‘agency and politics’154 by remaining vigilant of the pressures which agency is 
subject to. Hence, the attention to IOs’ everyday outcomes and the questions 
of whether they really do what their creators intend them to do, or what they 
claim to do, or whether they do it efficiently.155 Indeed, it may even be argued 
that constructivism’s concern with normative, cultural, and institutional 
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forces makes it well-placed to investigate features that other approaches 
cannot, and thereby escape ‘uncritical optimism about organizational 
behaviour’.156 In particular, constructivists have explicitly committed 
themselves to exploring how intentionality may be “filtered” through 
organizational practice in ways that change norms and their effects in ways not 
intended or anticipated.157 Along these lines, constructivist scholars have 
conceded that the “fit” of new normative claims within existing normative 
frameworks may influence the likeliness of their influence (so called, 
“adjacency claim” or “path dependence”).158 From here it follows that 
environments favour and even select organizations for reasons other than 
efficient or responsive behaviour.159 It has also been acknowledged that 
tensions and contradictions among norms leave room for different 
arrangements and outcomes.160 Indeed, social institutions have been regarded 
as being continually contested.161 The role of states in striking bargains to 
reshape IOs has also been raised;162 so has IOs’ propensity for dysfunctional, 
even pathological, behaviour. Drawing on the study of bureaucracies, 
constructivists have, hence, agreed with realists and neoliberals that there may 
be occasions when overall organizational dysfunction is, in fact, functional for 
certain members, and IOs often engage in policies not because they are strong 
and have autonomy, but because they are weak and have none.163 In other 
words, constructivists have recognized that power asymmetries may influence 
IOs’ operation and effects,164 and deviance may even be normalized.165  
In view of the above, the constructivist agenda appears adequately set 
to explore not only the structuring power of norms – long overlooked by 
realists and liberals alike - but also their constructed nature. Having said that, 
I am going to show that Finnemore and Sikkink’s popular norm life-cycle has, 
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nevertheless, yielded to a far less sophisticated trajectory. In particular, I am 
referring to the fact that their three-stage model has ended up emphasizing 
agency and the structuring power of norms at the expense of a more complex 
process of the mutual constitution of structure and agency, whereby norms are 
in fact constructed in the first place.166 Let me explain this more clearly. As 
already anticipated in the Introduction to this dissertation, in order to 
successfully challenge neorealism and neoliberalism’s determinism on 
matters of agency, it is not enough to shift the focus from “structural 
constraints” to “normative, cultural and institutional forces”,167 as if a clear 
separating line could be drawn between the two. Rather, the challenge is to 
hold on to the recursive nature of the relationship between agency and 
structure as the source from which – and not from either structure or agency –
social reality more conceivably originates. To be sure, Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s norm life-cycle attends to the mutual constitution of structure and 
agency, to a certain degree. It concedes that, at the emergence phase, ‘efforts 
to promote a new norm take place within the standards of “appropriateness” 
defined by prior norm’168 (these standards of appropriateness being precisely 
what is being contested).169 It also acknowledges that, in most cases, for an 
emergent norm to move towards norm cascade, it must become 
institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations.170 
Institutionalization, in turn, requires political support and resources from 
relevant actors, which may be granted on the basis of pressures for conformity 
or desire to enhance international legitimation, among other things.171 It even 
matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are, in fact, crucial  to a 
norm’s adoption; namely, without their support the achievement of the norm 
goal would be compromised.172 What is more, norms upheld by states viewed 
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as successful and desirable models are more likely to become prominent and 
diffuse (consider, for example, Western norms).173 Finally, norm consolidation 
may stop at any time, presumably if the required support and resources are 
lacking, or if the emerging normative claim hardly fits within the existing 
normative framework.174 Having said that, Finnemore and Sikkink’s critical 
focus largely drops on the threshold of institutionalization and organizational 
practice. This is, indeed, quite surprisingly, considering constructivism’s own 
declaration of intent. And yet, whether inadvertently or not, 
institutionalization is confined to a positivist view in which IOs fall back into 
the role of neutral fora. As Finnemore and Sikkink have put it: 
institutionalization contributes strongly to the possibility for a norm 
cascade both by clarifying what, exactly, the norm is and what 
constitutes violation (often a matter of some disagreement among 
actors) and by spelling out specific procedures by which norm leaders 
coordinate disapproval and sanctions for norm breaking.175  
What these words imply is a “win or fail” dichotomy in which norms merely 
either proceed all the way from emergence to internalization or not, with no 
reference to the everyday organizational practices that bring norms to life.  
To counter the criticism being voiced here, one could argue that 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s foundational contribution should be seen has having 
set the groundwork, perhaps rudimentary in some respect, for a toolbox that 
has been meaningfully refined over the following decades. And yet, we would 
still have to confront two major facts. Firstly, we could not avoid noting that 
even more recent works have refrained from problematizing 
institutionalization. For instance, in 2013, at a time when the ICC was already 
being subject to intense scrutiny and critique, Sikkink and Kim argued that 
‘[t]he justice cascade is nested in a larger norm cascade around accountability 
for past human rights violations’,176 and ‘[m]any critics of the ICC or the 
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specialized courts have not understood the role of these courts as backup 
institutions in a global system of accountability’.177 A further decisive aspect is 
that, regardless of whether the constructivist toolbox has become more 
sophisticated over time, Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life-cycle today 
remains the model of norm development - employed not only within the 
closest constructivist circle, but by scholars all across IR. 
 
 
2.4.2 Beyond Critique: Norm Development Re-Apprised 
Constructivism and, in particular, the “return to norms” held ‘immense 
promise for shaking up the IR research agenda and opening up exciting new 
avenues for inquiry’.178 For decades, IR research had been divorced from 
political theory on the grounds that what “is” in the world and what “ought to 
be” are and must be kept separate.179 At the end of the 90’s, in line with a 
progressive renaissance of normative political theory,180 constructivism 
instead promised a bloom of empirical research on norms aimed precisely at 
showing how ‘people’s ideas about what is good and what “should be” in the 
world become translated into political reality’.181 However, my claim is that the 
conventional constructivist account will continue to fall short of fulfilling its 
commitment as long as it streamlines institutionalization as an end-point, 
rather than delving into the latter as a creative juncture. Against this backdrop, 
the remaining part of the chapter seeks to update the conventional trajectory 
from “norm emergence” to “internalization”, so as to reflect a more complex 
configuration. At the same time, it should be clear from the onset that this 
endeavour is far from incompatible with constructivism. Instead, it is a post-
positivist qualification of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life-cycle that 
emphasizes aspects that the latter has left underdeveloped, such as the 
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intuition that ‘intentionality is always filtered’.182 More to the point, building 
on the growing research agenda on norm contestation, the proposed 
reconfiguration brings the recursive nature of the relationship between agency 
and structure to the forefront of the analysis - notably, the “reconstitution” of 
norms as part of institutional practice - by linking current debates in 
normative theory and empirical international studies. However, while 
research on norm contestation tends to focus on issues of “cultural feedback” 
and “cultural validity” as opposed to the “formal validity” that emerges from 
institutionalization,183 the effort undertaken here concentrates on how power 
reconstitutes norms, referring in particular to the relative power of actors 
during norm negotiation and implementation. To this end, the ensuing 
analysis builds on the recent work of post-positivist constructivist scholars184 
by engaging with different theoretical perspectives, such as Anthony Giddens’ 
structuration theory and the English School of IR. 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Structuration Theory and the Dual Quality of Norms 
Crucial to the idea of structuration, as developed by Giddens in the 1980s, is 
the “theorem of the duality of structure”. This posits that the constitution of 
agents and structure are not two independently given set of phenomena; 
rather, the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the 
outcome of the practices they recursively organize.185 Let me explain this more 
clearly. Human agency is frequently defined only in terms of intentions; and, 
indeed, there are certain acts that cannot occur unless the agent intends 
them.186 However, agency is more thoroughly understood as referring not to 
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the intentions that people have in doing things, but to their capability to do 
those things in the first place.187 Capability in turn implies power, which, 
within complex social systems, ‘presumes regularized relations of autonomy 
and dependence between actors in the context of social interaction’.188 An 
agent can, thus, be defined as “one who exerts power to produce an effect”.189  
From this triad of agency-capability-power it follows that agency necessarily 
implies some level of reproduction of the conditions that have made agency 
possible in the first place.190 This is so even in the most radical forms of social 
change.191  In other words, the moment of the production of action is also one 
of “reproduction”. In sum, structure is by no means “external” to agents, nor 
it is to be equated with constraint, but is always both constraining and 
enabling.192 More recently, building upon structuration theory, Antje Wiener 
has argued that ‘norms entail a dual quality’,193 namely ‘they are both 
structuring and socially constructed through interaction in a context’.194 They 
are ‘stable and structuring’,195 serving as standards or reference frames for 
behaviour on the one hand, and are ‘flexible and constructed’196 through social 
interaction on the other. By reducing institutionalization to a moment of 
clarity and stabilization, it is precisely this constructed dimension of norms 
that Finnemore and Sikkink’s model overlooks, along with the recursive 
quality of the relationship between agency and structure from which the 
constructed nature of norms derives.197 
 
 
 
187 Ibid, 9. 
188 Ibid, 16. 
189 Ibid, 9. 
190 Ibid, 26. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid, 25. 
193 Wiener (n 166) 49. 
194 Ibid.  
195 Ibid, 51. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid, 63. See also Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, ‘Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: 
The CSCE, Norms and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post-Cold War Europe’ (1999) 53(3) 
International Organization 505, 510-511; and Antje Wiener, ‘Constructivism: The Limits of 
Bridging Gaps’ (2003) 6, 3 Journal of International. Relations and Development 252, 254; 
and Pourmokhtari (n 123) 1783-1784. 
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2.4.2.2 The English School and the Relationship between 
“Primary” and “Secondary Institutions” 
The argument that agents reproduce the conditions that make their actions 
possible in the first place can be further illustrated and developed by appealing 
to the English School’s insights into the relationship between “primary” and 
“secondary Institutions”. 
As captured in the title of Bull’s book, “The Anarchical Society”, the 
central tenet of the English School is that the international system has evolved 
“institutions” that govern the interrelations of its units and signal its social 
dimension, despite its anarchical or decentralized structure.198 English School 
theorists have also distinguished between “primary” and “secondary 
institutions”. Secondary institutions are the institutions commonly identified 
as such, e.g. the UN, the World Bank, the ICC, etc. While these are (for the 
most part) consciously designed by states,199 primary institutions are a mix of 
norms, rules, and principles ‘constitutive of both states and international 
society in that they define the basic character and purpose of any such 
society’.200 As such, they undergo a historical pattern of rise, evolution, and 
decline.201 Barry Buzan has also pointed to a close relationship between the 
type of primary institutions an international society has (or how it interprets 
any given institution), and where that international society is located on a 
“pluralism-solidarism” spectrum.202 Finally, according to the English School 
scholar, primary and secondary institutions can be theorized as blocks in a 
‘nested hierarchy of international institutions’.203 This entails that the material 
institutions consciously designed by states (secondary institutions) are 
 
198 Bull (n 131). 
199 Buzan (n 136) 166.          
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid, 161. Pluralism is about the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention restricting 
‘international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence’ (ibid, 8). Solidarism ‘defines 
international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions 
among states, where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition, but also 
on cooperation’ (ibid, 49). Finally, world society is a third analytical concept that ‘takes 
individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the 
focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states-
system at the centre of IR theory’ (ibid). International system, international society, and world 
society ‘are in continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are 
in relation to each other’ (ibid, 10).  
203 Ibid, 187.  
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“nested” inside the basic constitutive norms, rules, and principles of 
international society (primary institutions).204 Through his nested hierarchy, 
Buzan has sought to offer a reconsideration of the debate about constitutive 
and regulatory rules, this having failed, according to the English School 
scholar, to address the question of hierarchy within constitutive rules, or 
primary institutions in Buzan’s terms.205 To this end, Buzan has distinguished 
between “master primary institutions” - that is, primary institutions that 
‘stand alone’206 - and “derivative primary institutions”207 that are unable to do 
so. According to this categorization, as shown in Table 1 below, sovereignty is 
a master primary institution; non-intervention and international law are 
derivative primary institutions nested in sovereignty; and, the ICC is a 
secondary institution nested in international law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204 Ibid, 182. 
205 Ibid, 184. 
206 Ibid, 182. 
207 Ibid. 
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Table 1. Buzan’s nested hierarchy of international institutions208                                                                                     
PRIMARY INSTITUTIONS SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS 
 (examples of) 
 
Master Derivative 
 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Non-intervention 
 
International law 
 
UN General Assembly 
 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), ICC 
 
 
 
TERRITORIALITY; 
DIPLOMACY 
 
Boundaries 
 
Diplomats; Diplomatic 
language 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 
Arbitration 
Some peace-keeping operations (PKOs) 
 
Embassies 
 
 
UN, Most intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), Conferences/Congresses 
 
International Court of Arbitration 
 
 
 
 
 
BALANCE OF POWER 
Alliances 
 
War 
 
Great power 
management 
 
Anti-hegemonism 
 
Guarantees 
 
Neutrality 
 
NATO 
 
UN Security Council 
 
 
 
 
 
EQUALITY OF PEOPLE 
Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian 
intervention 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
UN Human Rights Council (HRC), European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) 
 
 
INEQUALITY OF 
PEOPLE209 
 
Colonialism 
 
 
 
 
208 Buzan (n 136) 187. 
209 Following the original table compiled by Buzan, “colonialism” and “dynasticism” are the 
only primary institutions derivative of “inequality of people” listed in the table above, and no 
secondary institution at all is mentioned. This is indicative of the English School’s limited 
attention to the role of inequality in shaping the institutions of international society. In 
contrast, it may be argued that the institutionalization of political inequality between states – 
and, hence, largely between people as well, may actually be regarded as a likely – perhaps even 
necessary - outcome of the operation of virtually all international institutions. See on this 
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Dynasticism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADE 
 
Market 
 
Trade liberalization 
 
Financial liberalization 
 
 
Protectionism 
 
Hegemonic stability 
 
 
 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) 
 
 
 
NATIONALISM 
Self-determination 
 
Popular sovereignty 
 
Democracy 
Some PKOs 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
STEWARDSHIP 
Species survival 
 
 
Climate stability 
Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) 
 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol, Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
Montreal Protocol 
 
 
Buzan himself, however, has warned us to regard the table above more as a 
‘preliminary’210 grid aimed at stimulating the debate than as a way of closing 
it off. In particular, the author has explicitly contemplated that drawing any 
distinction between master and derivative primary institutions in a definitive 
way is difficult, and lends itself to endless dispute,211 and the readers may 
 
point Viola, Snidal, & Zürn (n 91). According to the authors, this may be due to several reasons. 
First, powerful states accept the authority of international institutions only if they can be sure 
that the institutions will enable them to maintain their privileged status. To this end, they 
demand ‘special privileges regarding the deployment of institutional authority’ (ibid, 230), e.g. 
weighted voting rights and vetoes. Furthermore, ‘the material resources—financial and 
military—for the enforcement of emerging norms remain primarily in the possession of 
powerful states’ (ibid, 232). Accordingly, ‘the implementation of institutional decisions will 
tend to be selective, and therefore unequal, in at least two ways: it will be based on the 
willingness of powerful states to act, and it will exhibit a bias against enforcing laws on 
powerful states and their allies’ (ibid). 
210 Buzan (n 136) 184. 
211 Ibid. 
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hence find the dispositions in the table ‘controversial’.212 For example, from 
where I stand, Buzan has not made explicit to what degree his own idea of a 
nested hierarchy between primary institutions is compatible with a logic of 
mutual constitution between them.213 Such logic is, instead, more clearly 
embraced in the present study, according to which, as suggested earlier on in 
this chapter, the scope and meaning of sovereignty is ‘bound up with the 
development of international law as a whole’.214  
At the same time, notwithstanding the potential disagreement with 
Buzan in that respect, I fully endorse Buzan’s argument that primary 
institutions “contain” secondary ones, and the implications ensuing from that. 
International law, for instance, may be regarded as the container of the 
‘potentially endless particular laws about a wide variety of specific issues that 
can be built up within it’,215 namely secondary institutions, which in turn can 
be analysed as an empirical reference of change in both international law and 
sovereignty (given their intimate connection). In other words, it is following 
Buzan’s nested hierarchy of international institutions that the present work 
analyses the ICC as empirical reference of change in sovereignty. Furthermore, 
it does so in line with the specifications provided by another leading English 
School scholar, Cornelia Navari.216 These can be summarized as follows. The 
claim that secondary institutions are “contained” in primary ones implies that 
secondary institutions draw a significant inheritance from primary ones; an 
inheritance which, in turn, constrains the secondary institutions’ room for 
manoeuvre, and ultimately their ability to catalyse fundamental change. In 
other words, as Navari has put it, we may reasonably expect that at each round 
of renegotiation of any primary institution, this, nevertheless, inevitably 
instantiates a balance of power resulting from a previous round of 
negotiation.217 Such balance of power, in turn, cannot but impinge on the 
 
212 Ibid. 
213 See ibid, 176. According to Buzan: ‘the idea of a “primary” or “master” institution implies 
that one deep practice essentially generates or shapes all of the others. The idea of two layers 
of primary institutions implies that some are ‘deeper’ than others’ (ibid). 
214 Werner (n 19) 156. 
215 Buzan (n 136) 182. 
216 Cornelia Navari, Modeling the Relations of Fundamental Institutions and International 
Organizations. Paper given at the 8th PanEuropean Conference on International Relations, 
Warsaw, 18-21 September 2013. 
217 Ibid. 
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secondary institutions that are achieved. As a result, secondary institutions’ 
entanglement with prior rounds of negotiation and the established balance of 
power implies that their margins for manoeuvre are always compressed in the 
tight, grey area between old and new, continuity and change. This pattern is 
clearly discernible when looking at the Rome Statute more closely. The latter 
is both largely a re-enactment of pre-existing international human rights and 
humanitarian law, 218 and, more to the point, is deeply entangled with the very 
norm of sovereignty that it seeks to rearrange, as Chapter 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation will thoroughly describe.  
Summing up, the idea of nesting excludes – if only semantically – the 
plausibility of incommensurable leaps from primary to secondary institutions. 
Hence, the conclusion that the ability of secondary institutions to bring about 
change in primary institutions should be carefully framed and delimited. 
 
 
2.4.2.3  Summary: Defying Linearity                                
The linear trajectory from “norm emergence” to “internalization” should, in 
sum, be updated to reflect two levels that the “win or fail” dichotomy neglects. 
The first level is about how agency cannot be separated from the conditions 
that make it possible in the first place. Hence, it is of crucial importance to 
observe how the existing distribution of power among international actors 
impinges both on norm negotiation and institutional designs in particular, as 
well as on norm implementation. This also means that the constructivist 
emphasis on IOs’ autonomy should be tempered by the fact that IOs’ room for 
manoeuvre is directly related to the states that create and make them 
operational through funding and enforcement. The second level is about how 
the agents’ choices and their outcomes feed back to the normative structure - 
or, in other words, “reconstitute” norms. The result of these two levels together 
is that ideational factors, agency, and intentionality are set and diluted in a 
more complex framework. More to the point, the life-cycle of a norm is not 
merely liable to stop at any time; instead, it also potentially opens itself to 
 
218 Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ (2008) 21(4) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 21 925, 961.  
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substantial diversions. Indeed, unintended results may even be normalized, 
especially if deviance is crucial for obtaining the support of critical actors, with 
fateful consequences for the expectations of the relevant actors.  
Following the thus updated norm life-cycle, the next chapter will 
explore, firstly, how the overarching system negotiated by states at the Rome 
Conference affects the selection of situations and cases brought before the ICC, 
and their outcomes; and, secondly, how the selection of situations and cases 
and their outcomes, in turn, “feed back” into the norm of sovereignty 
institutionalized as part of the Court’s practice.
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Chapter 3 – Shaping Sovereignty as 
Responsibility at the ICC (Part I): The 
Rome Statute 
 
 
The powers of the court are not as strong as many had hoped [...], the issue is now to 
ensure that future proposals will not result inadvertently in sheltering the very 
perpetrators of the crimes described in the statute.  
Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes1 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: Between “Sovereignty-
Limiting” Rationale and “Sovereignty-Based” 
Operation 
The ICC is the first permanent court for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and aggression. While the road to Rome spans 
over more than a century,2 its first predecessors were the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, set up by the Allies in the aftermath of World War II to try 
Axis war criminals. Several decades later, in the early 1990s, they were 
followed by two other ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). Both the ICTY and the ICTR were established by the UN 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was only in 
1994 that the International Law Commission (ILC) presented a version of a 
draft statute for a permanent international criminal court to the UN General 
 
1 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court: The Negotiating Process’ (1999) 93(1), The American Journal of International Law 2, 
12. 
2 Efforts to create a global criminal court can be traced back to 1872, when, Gustav Moynier, 
one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, invoked the 
establishment of a court in response to the crimes perpetrated during the Franco-Prussian 
War. Similarly, a few decades later, in 1919, the drafters of the Treaty of Versailles envisaged 
a court to try the Kaiser and German war criminals of World War I. 
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Assembly. From 1996 to 1998 a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of the ICC (PrepCom) met several times to discuss major substantive issues 
and finalize the draft statute. This was opened to final discussion and 
deliberation at the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, known as the “Rome 
Conference”. Convened by the UN General Assembly, the Conference took 
place from 15 June to 17 July 1998 in Rome, Italy. More than 160 governments 
participated, in addition to more than 200 NGOs. At the end of the five weeks 
of intense deliberations,3 120 nations voted in favour of the adoption of the 
Rome Statute; 7 nations voted against; 21 countries abstained. The Statute was 
then opened for signature and ratification. At the time of writing, 123 countries 
are states parties to the Rome Statute. Out of these, 33 are African states, 19 
are Asia-Pacific states, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 28 are from Latin 
American and Caribbean states, and 25 are from Western European and other 
states. States such as the United States and Israel have signed the Rome 
Statute, but not ratified it. Russia had signed it, but withdrew its signature in 
2016. China, India, Pakistan and Turkey are, in contrast, among the states that 
have not even signed the Rome Statute.  
While a reconstruction of the Rome negotiations falls outside the scope 
of this chapter, the paragraphs below focus on the provisions finally enshrined 
in Statute – notably, on issues of institutional design and the mechanism for 
the selection of situations and cases that ultimately emerged in Rome. More to 
the point, it is argued that the Rome Statute ends up relocating the 
“unwillingness” and “inability” of states to investigate and prosecute to the 
ICC, as long as it places the Court in the pressing need to enlist state power to 
its cause.4 To put it differently, the Rome Statute is built around a basic tension 
 
3 See Kirsch and Holmes (n 1) 3. Kirsch and Holmes have noted that, as the conference began 
its work, ‘the task awaiting the negotiators was daunting’, and the draft statute that emerged 
from the PrepCom ‘was riddled with some fourteen hundred square brackets, i.e. points of 
disagreement’ (ibid), ‘with any number of alternative texts’ (ibid), which the conference could 
not have possibly resolved systematically within the time available. Following the Rome 
Conference, a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) was charged with completing the 
negotiation of subsidiary and complementary documents, i.e. the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE); the Elements of Crimes; the Relationship Agreement between the Court and 
the United Nations; the Financial Regulations; and the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the ICC. 
4 Frédéric Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist 
Toolkit’, (2012) 21 Finnish yearbook of international law 21, 34. 
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- between “sovereignty-limiting” rationale and “sovereignty-based” operation5 
- which crucially impinges on the Court’s own “ability” and “willingness” to 
investigate and prosecute.  
 
 
3.2 The Institutional Architecture of the Rome 
Statute: Kowtowing to State Sovereignty 
 
3.2.1 A Consent Regime 
 A crucial difference between the ICC and its predecessors is that the previous 
international criminal tribunals were imposed on states by international 
bodies or powers. The Rome Statute, instead, is a treaty; that is, a voluntary 
agreement. In these circumstances, ‘states negotiating the treaty had to decide 
to what extent they were willing to give up their sovereign right to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over their own territory and their own nationals 
regarding certain crimes’.6 It is, hence, unsurprising that jurisdictional issues 
were at the centre of heated debates throughout the drafting process. Even in 
Rome they ‘remained subject to many options as long as possible’.7 One of the 
major points of contention during the Conference was precisely whether the 
Court would operate on a restrictive consent basis and with strict Security 
Council control (as the 1994 Draft Statute had envisaged). On this and other 
issues, participating states coalesced into several groups. The “like-minded 
group” (LMG) was the most organized.8 It was composed of middle powers 
and developing countries. Several of these had directly suffered from some of 
the crimes encompassed by the draft statute, and the group as a whole 
favoured a strong and independent court.9 Germany and South Korea played 
leading roles in the LMG. Germany put forth the proposal of a court with 
 
5 Bruce Broomhall, International justice and the and the International Criminal Court: 
Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 2. 
6 Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity. An Introduction to the Role of National Courts 
and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes (The Hague: International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 2016) 7. 
7 Kirsch and Holmes (n 1) 8. 
8 Ibid, 4. 
9 Ibid. 
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universal jurisdiction. South Korea, slightly mitigating the German proposal, 
advanced the idea of a court able to exercise jurisdiction if any of four states - 
the territorial state, the state of nationality of the accused or the victim, and 
the custodial state - were party to the Rome Statute. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum sat the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5). They 
envisaged a strong role for the Council vis-à-vis the court and wanted its 
jurisdiction to be carefully delimited. In particular, the United States 
vehemently opposed the idea of a Court that could exercise its jurisdiction 
against the consent of the state of nationality without prior political sanction 
by the Security Council. The United Kingdom and France, although initially 
allied with the US and the other P-5, changed sides and joined the LMG by the 
end of the conference. Given the striking disagreements between delegations, 
in addition to the wide-ranging implications of the matter under debate, the 
final package was completed only on the final day of the conference.10 What is 
more, since the positions of some delegations had actually proved to be 
irreconcilable, the consensus approach to adoption was thwarted and the 
delegates were called to vote. The LMG supported the final package (albeit 
having concerns about certain aspects); other blocs were split, and countries 
were left to determine their own positions.11  
According to the set of provisions finally approved, the ICC can 
intervene irrespective of any consent for cases referred by the UN Security 
Council (Article 13(b)). Furthermore, in the absence of a UNSC referral, any 
state party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed; or, 
alternatively, the OTP can proceed on its own initiative, provided that, in both 
instances, either the territorial State or the state of nationality of the suspect 
are party to the Rome Statute (Article 12(2)). This means that Article 12(2) 
allows the Court to reach over third-party nationals, when they commit crimes 
on the territory of one or more member-states, without requiring UNSC’s 
authorization. It is also important to recall that in a dispute over jurisdiction 
 
10 Ibid, 11. 
11 Ibid.   
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between the territorial state and the ICC, the Court has the authority to 
override the claims of the territorial state and seize jurisdiction.12  
Considering the above, and as already illustrated in Chapter 1, the Rome 
Statute may be regarded as opening up an unprecedented scope for 
international authority. Unsurprisingly, the provision of the Court’s potential 
reach over third-party nationals without prior political sanction has been at 
the heart of the US rejection of the Rome Statute.  Having said that, the scope 
of the ICC’s supranational authority shall not be exaggerated. To start with, in 
fact what has emerged from the Rome negotiations is largely a consent regime 
based on territoriality and nationality.13 In particular, the breadth of the ICC 
jurisdiction is mostly determined by states’ decisions to accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court (Article 12(1)) as well as their decisions to withdraw (Article 127). 
This means that, absent a Security Council referral, the Court’s jurisdictional 
reach is limited to those situations occurring on the territory of state parties, 
or in which the state of nationality of the accused is party to the Rome Statute. 
However, state parties are also free to withdraw from the Rome Statute if their 
discontent with the Court’s decisions were to prevail. Furthermore, as Chapter 
4 will show, states have been particularly reluctant to refer situations other 
than ones taking place on their own territory. Out of the 11 referrals received 
by the OTP since 2002, only one has been submitted by a group of state parties 
concerning a situation in the territory of another state party (i.e. crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in the territory of Venezuela since 12 February 
2014), whereas the remaining ten have been referred by either the territorial 
states themselves (Uganda, DRC, CAR I, Mali, Comoros, CAR II, Gabon, 
Palestine) - so-called “self-referrals” - or by the Security Council (Sudan and 
Libya). Those figures clearly suggest that the power of referral held by state 
parties is severely constrained in practice, due to the political costs perceived 
by states, the Rome Statute thus being caught on the same hurdle that has 
 
12 See Madeline Morris, ‘Democracy, Global Governance and International Criminal Law’, in 
Petrus Adrianus Maria Malcontent and Ramesh Chandra Thakur (eds) From Sovereign 
Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo: 
New York: United Nations University Press, 2004) 187, 188. 
13 William W. Burke-White, ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International 
Criminal Law Enforcement’ (2002) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 17. 
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hampered the fate of universal jurisdiction.14 A comparable reluctance 
emerges also from the limited number of investigations opened proprio motu 
by the Prosecutor, as also argued in Chapter 4. Finally, a special note should 
be made of the ambivalent role of the Security Council, which, all things 
considered, remains far from tipping the scale in favour of genuine supra-
nationality. In other words, on the one hand the powers allocated to the 
Council may be crucial to extending the Court’s jurisdiction to situations 
otherwise out of its reach. On the other hand, the privilege granted to the 
UNSC to refer a situation to the Court, as well as to defer an investigation or 
prosecution for a renewable period of 12 months, is very similar to the veto 
power of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.15 Therefore, 
the political interests of any individual permanent member can prevent the 
Council from either referring a situation to the Court or going ahead with an 
investigation or prosecution, even in cases where the Court has genuine 
jurisdiction.16 What is more, a ‘special irony’17 of the Council’s referral-deferral 
authority, as Hans Koechler has put it, lies in the fact that ‘it is bound to the 
political will of states that are not even parties to the Rome Statute’18 (at the 
moment three permanent members out of five), who, ‘with their own and their 
allies’ leaders and personnel being shielded from the Court’s jurisdiction, can 
use the Court to advance their own political agenda’.19 Finally, the recent 
activation of the crime of aggression has even reinforced the role of the UNSC 
and, with it, the logics of sovereignty. Absent a UNSC referral, the ICC will have 
jurisdiction only when a state party perpetrates the crime against another state 
party, and only provided that both have ratified the aggression amendment. In 
addition to this, even those states that have ratified the aggression amendment 
(presently only 36 of the 123 states parties) can elect, at any time, to opt out of 
 
14 The author wishes to thank Jason Ralph for his helpful advice on this point. See Jason Ralph, 
Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and 
Its Vision of World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
15 Hans Köchler, ‘Global Justice or Global Revenge? The ICC and the Politicization of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2009) International Progress Organization Online Papers 1, 
6, available at http://i-p-o.org/koechler-ICC-politicization-2009.pdf (last visited 30 
September 2018). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, 5. 
19 Ibid. 
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the aggression jurisdictional regime. The Security Council, instead, has the 
power to refer both state parties (irrespective of ratification) and non-state 
parties to the Court. As a result, the most likely scenario of an aggression 
prosecution is not a situation involving states parties. Rather, the P-5 may 
unite to target a common enemy.20  
In short, the basic jurisdictional features of the Rome Statute laid out 
above already prompt a reconsideration of the expectation of a Court able to 
act unrestrainedly against the interests of states. Recent developments, 
discussed at more length in Chapter 4, seem to be adding other irons to the 
fire. Suffice it for now to recall the withdrawal of Burundi from the Rome 
Statute, which has unequivocally materialized the ultimate backlash that may 
emerge if states see their mandate being stretched too far beyond what they 
intend to accept.21  
 
 
3.2.2 The Role of State Parties in Financial Oversight: From 
the Withholding of Resources to the Steering of 
Prosecutorial Discretion  
State parties are also the financial patrons of the ICC, being the Court primarily 
funded through their contributions. As has already been poignantly noted in 
the literature, ‘the elective nature of their involvement produces a role akin to 
a shareholder evaluating an investment’.22 However, the broad point I am 
submitting here is not that state parties directly influence the decisions of the 
Prosecutor. A crucial consideration in this respect is that the Assembly of State 
Parties, the Court’s management oversight and legislative body, is not tasked 
with prosecutorial decisions, but with management oversight of the 
 
20 Alex Whiting, ‘Crime of Aggression Activated at the ICC: Does it Matter?’, Opinio Juris, 19 
December 2017, available at https://www.justsecurity.org/49859/crime-aggression-
activated-icc-matter/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
21 See David S. Koller, ‘The Global as Local: The Limits and Possibilities of Integrating 
International and Transitional Justice’, in Christian M. d. Vos, Sara Kendall and Carsten Stahn 
(eds) Contested justice: The politics and practice of the International Criminal Court 
interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 85, 102-103. 
22 Sara Kendall, ‘Commodifying Global Justice: Economies of Accountability at the 
International Criminal Court’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 113, 121. 
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“administration” of the Court (Article 112 of the Rome Statute).23 Indeed, the 
ICC involves a high degree of delegation; and the fact that the Court works in 
the service of its members may be denied – occasionally even vigorously - by 
some states parties themselves.24 At the same time, though, while the 
economies of the ICL are often overlooked, these play a critical role in shaping 
the activities of their respective courts. More to the point, international 
prosecutors do need resources to investigate crimes and build cases; therefore, 
states - state parties, in the case of the ICC - may meaningfully steer 
prosecutorial discretion by withholding the necessary financial resources.25 
The OTP itself has admitted that the scarcity of resources threatens the Office’s 
impartiality, by pushing it to prioritize investigations portending higher rates 
of success:  
Faced with resource constraints, the Office has had to make difficult 
decisions by not starting certain investigations or placing others on 
hold. This has damaged the Office’s ability to respond to evolving 
situations (e.g. Libya, Darfur, Mali),[26] and impacted negatively in 
terms of perception.27  
This statement certainly raises serious concerns. And yet, it is also hardly 
surprising, if we consider that on a per-situation basis the ICC has a small 
 
23 See Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘Financing the International Criminal Court’, in Dawn Rothe, 
James Meernik and Thordis Ingadóttir (eds) Realities of International Criminal Justice 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill 2013) 269, 288. According to O’Donohue, the ‘drafting history 
shows that the term “administration” was specifically selected to avoid a broader 
interpretation that could interfere with judicial independence’ (ibid). 
24 Frédéric Mégret, ‘In whose name? The ICC and the search for constituency’, in Christian M. 
d. Vos, Sara Kendall and Carsten Stahn (eds) Contested justice: The politics and practice of 
the International Criminal Court interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 23, 34.  
25 See Karen J. Alter, ‘Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding Vs. Other-binding 
Delegation’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 37, 45; and O’Donohue (n 23) 288. 
26 See OTP, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya 
pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’, 8 November 2017, paras. 46-48, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc (last visited 30 September 
2018); and OTP, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur 
pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)’, 20 June 2018, para. 42, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180620-otp-stat (last visited 30 September 2018). 
27 OTP, ‘Strategic Plan 2016 – 2018’, 16 November 2015, para. 35, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-otp_strategic_plan_2016-2018.pdf (last visited 
30 September 2018). In addition to the OTP’s public acknowledgement, several respondents 
to the interviews carried out for the purpose of this dissertation have expressly regarded the 
“scarcity of resources” as one of the most pressing problems the ICC faces (see Annex II, code: 
“scarcity of resources”). 
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fraction of the resources that were available to the previous ad hoc tribunals:28 
approximately EUR 147 million for ten situations and eight to ten preliminary 
examinations (in 2018), against the approximately USD 120 million allocated 
annually to each tribunal, both dealing with a single situation only. 
Accordingly, the ICC has not only had to select situations to pursue, but, within 
each situation, it has also to be more selective than past institutions.29 The ICC 
is also enormously under-resourced compared to domestic mass-atrocity 
investigations in Western Europe and the United States. These ‘usually have 
tens to hundreds of times more resources available to them than the average 
ICC investigation’,30 thus raising serious doubts as to whether the ICC actually 
has the resources needed ‘to conduct the kind of investigations that are 
necessary to respond to mass atrocity crimes’.31 
Since the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008, things have 
become even harder for the Court. At its seventh session, in 2008, the 
Assembly took the unprecedented step of cutting the ICC’s budget beyond the 
amount recommended by the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF),32  a 
group of 12 independent experts elected by the ASP and tasked with making 
“the relevant recommendations to the Assembly concerning the proposed 
programme budget”. Within two years, a group of the highest paying states - 
encompassing France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom - had 
adopted a common position of “zero-growth”, regardless of whether the 
Court’s activities would have increased, or other costs risen. This approach has 
been opposed by many state parties and NGOs,33 in addition, of course, to the 
Court’s organs themselves. In 2011, in his opening statement to the 10th ASP 
 
28 See Darryl Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot 
Win’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 323, 332-333. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Stuart Ford, ‘What Investigative Resources does the International Criminal Court Need to 
Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach’ (2017) 16 1 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 1. 
31 Ibid, 66. According to Ford, several cases at the ICC ‘were compromised by the lack of 
investigative resources’ (ibid), and ‘by increasing the ICC’s investigative resources, states can 
improve the Court’s likelihood of success and thereby derive greater benefit from membership 
in the Court (ibid, 70). Hence, ‘by focusing on the relationship between investigative resources 
and success, it may be possible to convince states that increasing the ICC’s investigative 
resources is in their own interests’ (ibid). 
32 O’Donohue (n 23) 280. 
33  Ibid. 
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session, the President of the ICC stated that imposing the proposed cuts ‘would 
be profoundly damaging to the Court’s ability to deliver fair and expeditious 
justice’.34 Yet, the 10th ASP session deliberated cuts beyond those 
recommended by the Committee. Downwards adjustments have continued 
until most recently. In 2017, the Coalition for the ICC’s key recommendations 
to the 16th ASP session reiterated the warning that ‘states Parties should 
oppose arbitrarily limiting the Court’s 2018 budget, which would undermine 
the Court’s ability to deliver fair, effective, and efficient justice’. 35 According 
to the Coalition, states ‘cannot expect and demand the Court to do more each 
year, while simultaneously reducing its resources’.36 Nevertheless, out of a 
proposed budget of EUR 151,475,700 million,37 EUR 147,431,500 million were 
allocated to the Court.38 In tandem with downwards budget adjustments, since 
2008 efforts have also ‘intensified to find efficiencies in the ICC’s work as a 
way to keep costs to a minimum and to establish more confidence in the ICC’s 
financial practice’.39 So, for example, since 2009 the ICC has been working 
with the CBF to improve its internal efficiency.40 Furthermore, since 2014 the 
budget has been explicitly linked to the OTP strategic plan ‘through the 
expected annual level of activities and the main improvement projects derived 
from the strategic plan’.41 And yet, such a link is problematic, for the lack of 
progress may also be due to states themselves failing to cooperate with the 
 
34  Ibid, 281. President of the ICC Judge Sang-Hyun Song, ‘Remarks to the Assembly of States 
Parties 10th session’, 12 December 2011, 4, available at https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10-ST-Pres-Song-Remarks-ENG.pdf (last 
visited 30 September 2018). 
35 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘Key recommendations and comments to the 
16th ASP session’, 20 November 2017, 5, available at 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/assembly-states-parties/asp-2017/key-
recommendations-asp-16 (last visited 30 September 2018).) 
36 Ibid. 
37 Assembly of States Parties, ‘Proposed Programme Budget for 2018 of the ICC’, ASP/16/10, 
11 September 2017, para. 1, available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ICC-
ASP-16-10-ENG.pdf  (last visited 30 September 2018). 
38 Assembly of States Parties, ‘Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the proposed 
programme budget for 2018, the Working Capital Fund for 2018, the scale of assessment for 
the apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing appropriations 
for 2018 and the Contingency Fund’, ICC-ASP/16/Res.1, 14 December 2017, para. 1, available 
at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ICC-ASP-16-10-ENG.pdf  (last visited 30 
September 2018). 
39 O’Donohue (n 23) 281. 
40 Ibid, 281. 
41 OTP (n 27) para. 36. 
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Court in the collection of evidence, or arrest and surrender suspects (as 
discussed in more detail in the section below). 
In conclusion, on the one hand the Rome Statute excludes oversight of 
the substance of the ICC’s prosecutorial or judicial functions; nor does it 
contemplate that the OTP and the judges’ decisions depend on the resources 
available. On the other hand, the ASP’s role in financial oversight and, in 
particular, the current trend towards the withholding of resources, sheds 
further light on the gap between the expectations and ‘practical realities’42 
faced by the Court in its work. Indeed, this becomes a pivotal issue especially 
at a time when the OTP might expand the number and geographic spread of 
its investigations, which is even more against the interests of states 
themselves. 
 
 
3.2.3 The Lack of a Reliable International Enforcement 
Mechanism 
A further ‘decisive structural weakness’43 of the system negotiated in Rome is 
that the Court does not have the power to enforce its own decisions. While 
criminal prosecution is inherently tied to the control over territory and 
persons, under the system established by the Rome Statute such control 
remains firmly in the hands of sovereign states.44 In other words, the ICC lacks 
both the authority to execute requests directly on the territory of a state 
without that state’s consent,45 and police powers (save within the limited 
confines of its premises). Therefore, state parties’ obligations to cooperate with 
the Court are essential to the Court’s ability to function,46 meaning that the 
 
42 OTP, ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation’, 2016, para. 49, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsdocuments/20160915_otp-policy_case-selection_eng.pdf (last 
visited 30 September 2018). 
43 Hans P. Kaul, ‘The ICC and International Criminal Cooperation: Key Aspects and 
Fundamental Necessities’, in Mauro Politi and Federica Gioia (eds) International Criminal 
Court and National Jurisdictions (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2008) 85, 86. 
44 Jackson Maogoto, ‘The Final Balance Sheet? The International Criminal Court's Challenges 
and Concessions to the Westphalian Model’ (2004) 7(1) Flinders Journal of Legal Reform 
261, 287. 
45 See ibid, where Maogoto also offers an overview of the exceptions to this general 
arrangement.  
46 Ibid, 284. 
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ICC relies on state cooperation for all matters related to the entry and presence 
of staff on the territory of states, the questioning of witnesses, the provision of 
official records, the interception of communications, the preservation of 
evidence, and the arrest and surrender of suspects.47 What is more, whereas 
several of the challenges faced by the ICC are common to the field of mutual 
legal assistance between states, the ICC is further disadvantaged due to the fact 
that it operates without the apparatus of the sister institutions that exist within 
each state, such as police, defence, intelligence, and border and immigration 
services.48 In line with this state of affairs, Philippe Kirsch, first president of 
the ICC, has described the overall system negotiated in Rome in terms of a 
two-pillar system: a judicial pillar represented by the Court itself; and an 
enforcement pillar that relies on states.49  
At the same time, though, the scope of states parties’ obligations to 
cooperate with the ICC on their own territories is precisely an issue of 
sovereignty.50 Hence, not surprisingly, Part 9 of the Statute on “International 
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” is one of the most complex of the Rome 
Statute.51 Indeed, while proponents of a strong ICC favoured a duty to 
“comply” with the Court’s orders, rather than an obligation of “cooperation”, 
Part 9 is also the least supranational section of the entire Statute.52 In 
particular, Article 86 requires states parties to “cooperate fully with the Court 
in its investigation and prosecution of crimes”;53 but the Articles that follow 
 
47 Rod Rastan and Pascal Turlan, ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’, in 
Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, Aimée Comrie and Akingbolahan Adeniran (eds) International 
criminal investigations: law and practice (The Hague, The Netherlands: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2018) 31. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Judge President of the ICC Phillipe Kirsch, ‘Address to the United Nations General 
Assembly, 1 November 2007’, 4, available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/754F8043-
22DB-4D78-9F8C-67EFBFC4736A/278573/PK20071101 ENG.pdf (last visited 30 September 
2018). See also Rod Rastan, ‘Comment on Victor’s Justice & the Viability of Ex Ante Standards’ 
(2010) 43 The John Marshall Law Review 569, 599.  
50 Maogoto (n 44) 282. 
51 Ibid, 283. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See Rastan & Turlan (n 47), where the authors have clarified that ‘the same duties also apply 
to non-Party States that have lodged a declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Court under Article 12(3)’ (ibid, 32). Furthermore, ‘a similar situation arises with respect to 
States that have been placed by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII 
obligations to cooperate fully with the Court, thereby binding the UN Member State so 
directed to cooperate. Such a State, even if not a Party to the Statute nor a State that has 
consented by an ad hoc declaration to be so bound, is subject to the Court’s cooperation regime 
by virtue of their membership of the UN Charter system’ (ibid). However, it bears emphasizing 
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are actually riddled with qualifications and exceptions.54 Hence, the resulting 
cooperation system is a compromise,55 a hybrid that, as judge Kaul has put it, 
contains ‘a mix of elements of vertical and horizontal criminal cooperation of 
both the supranational and inter-state model of cooperation’.56 This means 
that, although states parties have a general obligation to cooperate with the 
Court, in practice, there remains a lot of discretion.57 The Court, in fact, may 
not compel state compliance with its orders; the Rome Statute merely provides 
for consultations in cases of problems arising in the context of cooperation 
requests. Nor is the ICC allowed to sanction states directly for non-compliance. 
Rather, the Court can make findings of non-compliance and direct those to the 
ASP, or to the Security Council (in the case of a UNSC referral). As a further 
option, external states may pressure resistant states to comply, or even give 
effect to the Court’s requests against the consent of the territorial states.58 But, 
as the following chapter shows, whereas this scenario was meant to become 
standard practice by the architects of the Rome Statute, states have proved 
reluctant to fill in the gap of a dedicated law-enforcement agent.59  
As a result, on the one hand, in defiance of state-centric assumptions of 
world order, the Rome Statute gives the ICC the entitlement to ultimately 
decide on the “ability” and “willingness” of national authorities and to 
intervene accordingly - even in cases where states or the Security Council have 
not requested its intervention. On the other hand, states retain a general 
coercive authority within their own territory. This means that the ICC’s 
intervention will only become effective if states are “willing” and “able” to act 
 
that neither of the two UNSC referral-resolutions - Resolution 1593 on Darfur (Sudan) and 
Resolution 1970 on Libya - contained a general obligation for UN member states to cooperate 
with the Court. 
54 Maogoto (n 44) 282-283. See also Jerry Fowler, ‘Not Fade Away: The International Criminal 
Court and the State of Sovereignty’ (2001) 2 San Diego Journal of International Law 125. At 
the same time, as Fowler has noted, in ‘an art form solution, however, specific articles on 
surrender of suspects and other forms of cooperation require States to ‘comply with requests’ 
from the ICC’ (ibid, 146).   
55 Kaul (n 43) 87. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Steven C. Roach, ‘Introduction’, in Steven C. Roach (ed) Governance, Order and the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 1, 15. 
59 Rastan & Turlan (n 47) 31. See also Rod Rastan, ‘The Responsibility to Enforce: Connecting 
Justice with Unity’, in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 163, 165. 
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as the ‘proxy-enforcement arm of the Court’.60  As Rod Rastan and Pascal 
Turlan have put it:  
[i]n the absence of judicial powers to directly compel state cooperation 
under threat of penalty, and without the availability of the Security 
Council as a routine enforcement agent, compliance will tend to fall 
back on the discrete decisions of individual States or on the Security 
Council to uphold the law.61  
What is more, this state of affairs entails the paradoxical result that the same 
institutions that were deemed “unwilling” or “unable” are required to 
cooperate with the ICC in order to achieve effective investigations and 
prosecutions.62 It also follows that, while the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
in the absence of state consent is the most visible manifestation of the Court’s 
supranational authority, this is also the situation in which the Court’s 
intervention is most likely to remain symbolic. In fact, absent extraordinary 
international pressure or military intervention, the very unwillingness of the 
regime to prosecute will also prevent the ICC from securing custody over 
alleged criminals who remain under the regime’s protection.63 Finally, such 
tension is even magnified by the fact that the ICC operates in contexts where 
there has not yet been a transition, namely where local authorities are likely to 
be involved themselves in the crimes investigated by Court.64 This is a blatant 
difference between the former tribunals and the ICC. In the context of the 
Nuremberg tribunal, the obstacle of the sovereignty of the German state had 
been removed by its capitulation in May 1945.65 In Rwanda, the domestic legal 
system had collapsed altogether.66 In the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY could 
largely count on the NATO forces operating on the ground to enforce its arrest 
 
60 Rastan & Turlan, ibid. 
61 Ibid, 65.  
62 See Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 392; and Rod Rastan, ‘Testing Co-operation: The International Criminal Court 
and National Authorities’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 431, 455. 
63 Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, ‘Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2007) 39 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics 583, 630. 
64 Robinson (n 28) 333. 
65 Maogoto (n 44)  287. 
66 Ibid, 288. 
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warrants. In contrast, it remains unclear how a criminal justice system can 
operate alongside likewise operational national legal systems without 
considerable political difficulty.67 
As the above overview has just shown, the tensions between the ICC’s 
mandate and its reliance on the enforcement power of states are striking. The 
ICC is a territorially disembodied court devoid of independent executive 
power.68 Metaphorically, the Court is a child - especially if compared to 
domestic criminal justice systems, which, having evolved over many years, 
have the advantage of a territorial base and a police force. Moreover, in any 
state that adheres to the rule of law, the exercise of judicial power is normally 
separate from the legislative and executive branches.69 Yet, the Court is 
expected to act as an adult,70 and, actually, even achieve objectives the 
attainment of which would be a serious challenge even for the most powerful 
states.71 
 
 
3.3 Selecting Situations and Cases before the ICC: 
The Contours of the Problem 
While the institutional architecture outlined above already looks not very 
favourable for a strong and independent Court, the picture does not get any 
more encouraging if we look at the complex and controversial mechanism 
underlying the selection of situations and cases.  
Prosecutorial discretion is generally defined as ‘‘the authority not to 
assert power, or not to assert it to the full extent authorized by law’.72 Hence, 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 Philippe Sands, From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal 
Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 113. 
69 See Hans Köchler, ‘World Court without a World State: Criminal Justice under the Dictates 
of Realpolitik?’, International Progress Organization (IPO) Online Publications, 1 July 2012, 
available at http://i-p-o.org/Koechler-ICC-Realpolitik-IPO-OP-1July2012.htm (last visited 
30 September 2018). 
70 Sands (n 68) 113. 
71 Mirjan R. Damaška, ‘The International Criminal Court Between Aspiration and 
Achievement’ (2009) 14 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 19, 23. 
72 James A. Goldston, ‘More Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 8(2) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 383, 389.  
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prosecutorial discretion – to choose whether to launch investigations, to bring 
charges, to select who is to be charged and for which crimes – is an essential 
means of rationalizing the scarce resources and/or accommodating 
circumstances ‘in a manner which assures that crimes of greatest priority are 
investigated and prosecuted’.73 It follows from here that prosecutorial 
discretion is particularly relevant for an international criminal court whose 
jurisdiction extends over a great number of potential crimes and 
perpetrators.74 Therefore, the Prosecutor of the ICC enjoys broad autonomy 
regarding the selection of cases and the framing of the charges.75 The OTP, in 
fact, is not duty-bound to investigate and prosecute all crimes within the ICC 
jurisdiction, but it must focus its investigation and prosecution.76 This requires 
making choices relating to the selection of regions, incidents, groups, persons, 
counts, and charges. The Statute provides only limited guidance in this regard, 
leaving considerable margin for interpretation and prosecutorial policy.77 
Furthermore, the role of the judges in shaping the charges is more limited than 
at the ICTY. The ICC has no equivalent of the ICTY’s rule allowing judges to 
shape the number of incidents and counts the Prosecutor pursues at trial,78 
and the ability of the Courts judges to change the legal characterization of the 
facts is limited to those facts and circumstances described in the charges. 
Additionally, while all the other international and mixed courts possessed 
jurisdiction over a specific situation, the ICC must select not only which cases 
 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Carsten Stahn, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: 5 Years on, in Carsten Stahn and 
Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden-
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 247, 249. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 See Margaret M. deGuzman and William A. Schabas, ‘Chapter 2. Initiation of Investigations 
and Selection of Cases’, in Göran Sluiter, Håkan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, 
and Salvatore Zappalà (eds) International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 131, 147. deGuzman and Schabas have noted that according to 
the ICTY’s RPE, ‘when it is in the interests of a fair and expeditious trial, the judges may 
“invite” the Prosecutor to reduce the number of charges and may limit the number of crime 
sites and incidents about which the Prosecutor can present evidence’ (ibid, 138). Furthermore, 
after hearing the parties, the judges ‘may direct the Prosecutor to select the counts in the 
indictment on which to proceed’ (ibid). See Helen Brady, Matteo Costi, Håkan Friman, 
Fabricio Guariglia, Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, ‘Chapter 4. Charges’, in Göran Sluiter, Håkan 
Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, and Salvatore Zappalà (eds) International 
Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 381 for the 
argument that ICC Regulation 54 could be understood to provide the judges with similar 
powers.  
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to prosecute (i.e. which persons to indict and what charges to bring), but also 
the situations to investigate. These are identified through one of the three 
modes or “trigger mechanisms” set out in the ICC Statute: Security Council 
referral (Article 13(b)), state party referral (Article 14), and prosecutorial 
initiative (also said “proprio motu”) (Article 15). The latter mode of selection 
was one of the greatest and most controversial innovations of the Rome 
negotiations in 1998.79 In the initial draft statute prepared by the ILC, the 
jurisdiction of the Court was to be triggered by referral of a state party or the 
Security Council. Furthermore, not only did the OTP have no authority to 
initiate investigations in the absence of referral, but also the Office had no 
discretion to refuse to proceed (provided that referrals were adequately 
formulated).80 One of the most radical changes to the ILC draft was the 
recognition of prosecutorial discretion with respect to the selection of 
situations. According to this discretion, the OTP is able to act in situations 
where neither states nor the Security Council have requested intervention, and 
it may also refuse to proceed with situations that are referred by a state or the 
Security Council. In fact, neither a state party nor even a Security Council 
referral automatically triggers an investigation. This will only start when the 
Prosecutor finds that there is a “reasonable basis” to proceed.81 The existence 
of the latter is ascertained by the Prosecutor on the basis of the following 
parameters: jurisdiction, admissibility, and interest of justice. The 
jurisdictional test comes first and pertains to the existence of jurisdiction. The 
OTP has to determine whether the alleged crimes fall within both the Court’s 
subject-matter (or ratione materiae) and temporal (or ratione temporis) 
jurisdiction; that is, whether they respectively fall under the crimes listed in 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute (Article 12(1)), and have occurred after the date 
of entry into force of the Statute (Article 11). Furthermore, while the UN 
Security Council can refer any situation to the Court irrespective of any 
 
79 William A. Schabas, ‘Selecting situations and cases’, in Carsten Stahn (ed) The Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 365, 
370. 
80 Ibid. 
81 At the same time, though, as discussed further in the text, the Prosecutor’s decision is subject 
to a degree of judicial review by a Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), both in case of exercise of proprio 
motu powers and referral. 
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consent (Article 13(b)), the two remaining triggers are equally subject to 
limitations at the level of personal (or ratione personae) and (or ratione loci) 
jurisdiction. This means that in the absence of a UNSC referral, the OTP has 
to ascertain that the alleged crimes have been or are being committed either 
by a national of a state party (Article 12(2)(a)) or on the territory of a state 
party (Article 12(2)(a)).82  Having determined that one or more crimes falls 
within the ICC jurisdiction, it follows the admissibility test. According to this, 
the Court can effectively exercise its jurisdiction only if the “case” fulfils the 
admissibility criteria set out by Article 17, namely provided that: the alleged 
crimes are of “sufficient gravity” to justify the intervention of the Court, and 
they are not being, or have not been, genuinely investigated or prosecuted at 
the domestic level (complementarity). Finally, the Prosecutor has to decide 
whether the investigation would be against the interests of justice.  
We have just seen that the ICC Prosecutor uses prosecutorial discretion 
when deciding whether to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, as well as when the 
Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered, in order to decide whether to an open 
an investigation, whom to prosecute, and what charges to bring.83 At the same 
time, however, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to constraints 
under the Rome Statute. This follows a multi-layered model of accountability84 
that combines professional responsibility with elements of judicial review.85 
The latter is the strongest form of formal prosecutorial accountability, as it 
allows judges to assess or reverse prosecutorial choices, either proprio motu 
or through challenge by a participant.86 Indeed, while the selection decisions 
rest primarily with the ICC Prosecutor, as they do at the ad hoc tribunals, the 
Rome Statute - supported by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the OTP 
strategy and policy papers - subjects such decisions to even greater constraints 
and judicial oversight.87 In particular, Article 53 is meant to prescribe the 
 
82 Finally, a crime may also fall within the jurisdiction of the Court if it has been committed by 
a national of a state not party that has lodged a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court, or on the territory of a state not party that has lodged a declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court (Article 12(3)). 
83 In addition, as Goldston has noted, the Prosecutor uses discretion when deciding whether 
to challenge a state’s assertion of inadmissibility. See Goldston (n 72) 391. 
84 Stahn (n 75) 250. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid 264. 
87 See deGuzman & Schabas (n 78) 149; and Stahn (n 75) 250. 
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breadth and limits of prosecutorial discretion, and judicial review is provided 
for at several junctures, such as: (i) the decision to authorize the opening of a 
new investigation in the context of proprio motu proceedings under Article 15; 
(ii) the decision to grant a warrant or summons requested by the OTP after an 
investigation; (iii) the decision to confirm the charges against a suspect; (iv) 
the decisions on an admissibility challenge; (v) the decision not to investigate 
or prosecute. 
The situation just outlined is only a hint of the elaborate architecture 
for the selection of situations and cases established by the Rome Statute. The 
ensuing analysis illustrates the overall system in more detail, while teasing out 
some its most controversial knots. In particular, it shows that albeit the Rome 
Statute has extended the avenues for judicial review, the ICC Prosecutor still 
enjoys considerable leeway to develop policy principles on the basis of its 
charging discretion.88 In fact, such discretion applies not only to “interests of 
justice” determinations - the most clearly discretionary - and gravity 
considerations; but also to complementarity, often considered of a more 
technical nature.89 Hence, in open defiance of the belief that prosecutorial 
decision-making is merely about the application of the law,90 the chapter 
concludes that the Rome Statute establishes a system of broad and largely 
undefined prosecutorial discretion that lays the Court extraordinarily open to 
the powers and interests of states. 
 
 
3.3.1 Gravity and its Muddy Waters: Between Legal 
Minimum Threshold and Discretionary Criterion 
Gravity is of decisive importance for the exercise of prosecutorial powers,91  
but, like the “interests of justice” criterion, the Statute offers no indication at 
 
88 See Stahn (n 75) 257.  
89 See, for example, Maria Varaki, ‘Introducing a fairness-based theory of prosecutorial 
legitimacy before the International Criminal Court’ (2016) 27(3), European Journal of 
International Law 769, 776.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Stahn (n 75) 267. 
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all as to how to assess “gravity”, and several pivotal questions remain largely 
unsettled.92  
A first major point of contention is that, while determination of whether 
to initiate an investigation is made before any particular case has been 
identified, Articles 17 and 53 both address gravity solely at the level of 
individual “cases”.93 In 2006 the OTP sought to shed light on the matter by 
circulating a draft paper on the criteria for selection of situations and cases, in 
which it attempted to clarify the criteria taken into account when judging the 
gravity of cases, as well as situations.94 Under “Criteria for Selection”, the OTP 
indicated both quantitative criteria, such as the scale of the crimes, and 
qualitative ones, i.e. the nature of the crimes, the manner of their commission, 
and their impact. While this paper remained unpublished, the OTP further 
elaborated upon these four criteria in a draft paper on preliminary 
examinations released in 2010.95 This paper, however, was no longer speaking 
of both situations and cases, but only about situations.96 Three years later, the 
OTP released a fully-fledged policy paper on preliminary examinations. The 
2013 paper reprised the approach laid out in the 2010 draft, including the 
mixed qualitative-quantitative approach.97 The latter approach was confirmed 
by the Chambers in their decisions authorizing the opening of proprio motu 
investigations.98 In the same context, the judges clarified that the reference of 
Articles 17 and 53 to the admissibility of a “case” shall be interpreted to include 
 
92 See ibid. 
93 Ibid, 269. 
94 OTP, ‘Unpublished Policy Paper on Draft Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases’, 
2006, 4. 
95 See OTP, ‘Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’, 2010, para. 70, available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bd172c/pdf/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
96 Schabas (n 79) 371. 
97 OTP, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’, 2013, para. 9, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-
ENG.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
98 Situation in the Republic of Kenya ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya’, ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ICC-01/09-19, 31 March 2010, paras. 61-62;  Situation in the Republic of Côte 
D’Ivoire, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire’, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
ICC-02/11, 3 October 2011, paras 22-23; Situation in Georgia, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia’, ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I,  ICC-01/15, 27 January 2016, paras 51-56; Situation in Burundi,  
‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in Burundi’, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, ICC-01/17-X, 25 October 2017, 
paras 184-189. 
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the “potential cases” within the proposed situation’.99 In other words, the 
Chambers stated that, at the stage of preliminary investigation, gravity should 
be assessed against the backdrop of the likely set of cases of “potential cases” 
that would arise from the investigation of the situation.100  
The recent OTP’s decision on the closing of the Preliminary 
Examination in the Comoros situation (more commonly known as the Mavi 
Marmara situation)101 has, however, reopened the debate. The source of 
debate is the Prosecutor’s reference to the gravity of “any potential case” 
instead of “the potential case(s)”. As a careful commentator such as Kevin Jon 
Heller has noted, this wording may be interpreted as requiring the OTP ‘to 
investigate any situation in which there is at least one potential case that is 
grave enough to be admissible’.102 The OTP still needs to clarify its position. 
For example, the OTP may have referred to the gravity of “any potential case” 
instead of “the potential case(s)” merely because there is only one potential 
case in the whole situation.103 But, if the standard articulated in the Mavi 
Marmara decision is that the OTP  is bound to open a fully-fledged 
 
99 deGuzman & Schabas (n 78) 144. 
100 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Kenya Authorization Decision (n 98) paras. 41–50; ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber III, Côte D’Ivoire Authorization Decision (n 98) para. 18; ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I,  Georgia Authorization Decision (n 98) paras. 36-37; ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
Burundi Authorization Decision (n 98) para. 184.  
101 On 14 May 2013, a law firm acting on behalf of the Government of the Union of the Comoros 
referred to the OTP the situation concerning the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the Mavi 
Marmara, a humanitarian aid flotilla bound for Gaza Strip. On the same day, the Prosecutor 
announced the opening of a preliminary examination on the referred situation. After 
approximately three years of preliminary examination, on 6 November 2013, the Office made 
public its decision that the requirements for opening an investigation into the situation had 
not been met, because the potential case(s) that would likely arise from an investigation were 
of insufficient gravity. On 16 July 2015, following a request for review presented by the 
Government of the Union of the Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the OTP to 
reconsider its decision. See Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, 
the Hellenic Republic, and the Kingdom of Cambodia, ‘Decision on the request of the Union 
of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate an investigation’, ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/13-34, 16 July 2015. The Prosecutor appealed the decision of the Trial 
Chamber. However, on 6 November 2015 the Appeals Chamber decided by majority to dismiss 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I requiring the Prosecutor 
to reconsider the decision. On 29 November 2017, the OTP issued its final decision, 
announcing the closing of the PE in the Comoros situation. See Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
‘Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), 
dated 6 November 2014’, ICC-01/13, 29 November 2017, Annex 1. 
102 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘A Potentially Serious Problem with the Final Decision Concerning 
Comoros’, Opinio Juris, 1 December 2017, available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2017/12/01/33365/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
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investigation as long as even one potential case within a situation would be 
sufficiently grave, it is questionable that such an approach could ever be 
workable.104 In fact, within a broader situation being considered during a PE, 
there will always be at least one case of sufficient gravity.105 So, for instance, it 
is highly likely that each of the situations currently under preliminary 
examination contains at least one case of sufficient gravity (albeit 
complementarity issues may arise in some of them). In other words, the 
standard advanced in the Mavi Marmara final decision would warrant the 
opening of a formal investigation in all of the current preliminary 
examinations (provided the absence of genuine proceedings at the domestic 
level). However, given the OTP’s limited resources, such an approach would 
simply be ‘practically impossible’.106  
An interconnected point of contention is whether gravity should be 
assessed by looking merely at potential cases within each situation in some 
absolute sense, or, as suggested by Heller, by ‘comparing the gravity of 
different situations by examining all of the potentially admissible cases’.107 A 
plausible option may be to consider that both routes are available, provided 
that they are kept clearly separate. This is what Margaret deGuzman has 
propounded, suggesting that considerations of relative gravity should be 
applied merely as policy considerations (in order to determine whether to open 
a formal investigation), while playing no role in the assessment of gravity as a 
component of the admissibility test. According to deGuzman, the text of the 
Statute (“not of sufficient gravity to justify further action”) indicates that, for 
admissibility purposes, gravity should be treated as a threshold (‘a 
theoretically static line’)108 aimed at excluding only cases of de minimis 
conduct that do not “warrant trial at the international level”, and not as a 
relative determination. In other words, the ‘gravity of other cases or situations 
 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid See also Dov Jacobs, ‘ICC OTP closes preliminary examination in the Marvi Marmara 
incidents: some thoughts’, 30 November 2017,, Spreading the Jam. International Law, 
International Criminal Law, Human Rights and Transitional Justice, available at  
https://dovjacobs.com/2017/11/30/icc-otp-closes-preliminary-examination-in-the-marvi-
marmara-incidents-some-thoughts/ (last visited 30 September 2018).  
106 Heller (n 102). 
107 Ibid. 
108 Margaret M. deGuzman, ‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2009) 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1400, 1429. 
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unrelated to those in question should have no bearing on the gravity threshold 
determination’.109 The latter, instead, would entail a ‘relatively straightforward 
factor-based analysis’110 premised on the four main indicators contemplated 
by the mixed qualitative-quantitative approach officially laid out in 2013 and 
confirmed by the judges.111  
That being said, deGuzman has argued that while considerations of 
relative or comparative gravity should play no role for admissibility purposes, 
they may factor into the Prosecutor’s discretionary selection of both the 
situations and cases to pursue.112 The application of ‘situational gravity’113 has 
also been invoked by Heller, especially in light of the fact that the OTP can 
investigate only a limited share of the situations in which admissible crimes 
have been allegedly perpetrated. According to Heller, the application of 
situational gravity would also have the merit of extricating debates over case 
gravity.114 Consider the Mavi Marmara situation. Even if we assume that the 
attack on the Flotilla is sufficiently grave to be admissible, the overall 
situational gravity of the situation (which involves only one case), is, arguably, 
lower compared to other situations under preliminary examination (including 
the Palestine situation as a whole).115 However, given the decisive importance 
of situational gravity, Heller has suggested that the judges should be allowed 
to review all prosecutorial decisions not to pursue a situation based on the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary considerations of relative gravity,116 importantly, 
including decisions not to initiate investigations proprio motu due to a lack of 
reasonable basis, which, as discussed further below, according to a literal 
reading of the Rome Statute, are not covered by judicial review (proprio motu 
review of negative decisions based on interests of justice is the only form of 
review available in the context of decisions not to initiate investigations 
 
109 Ibid, 1457 
110 Ibid, 1404. 
111 Ibid, 1456. See also Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn, Barbora Hola, ‘The selection of 
situations by the ICC: An empirically based evaluation of the OTP's performance’ (2015) 15(1) 
International Criminal Law Review 1, 7. 
112 deGuzman (n 108) 1405. See also Jacobs (n 105). 
113 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute’, in Carsten Stahn and 
Larissa Van Den Herik (eds.), Future Directions in Criminal Justice (Den Haag: TMC Asser 
Press, 2010). 
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proprio motu).117 deGuzman and other commentators, however, have been 
sceptical about the practicability of this option, on the grounds that the judges 
do not actually have access to all of the information relevant to making 
selection decisions (indeed, providing them with such access might be 
incompatible with defendants’ rights),118 and it is thus unclear whether an 
increased judicial role in this respect would yield benefits in practice.119  What 
deGuzman has emphasized, instead, is that the assessment of gravity as an 
admissibility threshold and the exercise of the Prosecutor’s relative gravity 
discretion should not be conflated.120 In fact, the application of gravity as a 
selection criterion is not only a more complex matter than gravity threshold 
determinations, but also more controversial.  Nothing in the Rome Statute 
addresses whether or when the Prosecutor should consider relative gravity 
when selecting either situations or cases.121 Indeed, the Statute is particularly 
ambiguous about prosecutorial discretion to reject potential situations.122 
Added to this is the fact that the question of relative gravity is rarely susceptible 
to objective decision-making,123 and it generally requires the OTP to prioritize 
certain ICC goals, and thus gravity factors, over others. In relation to the OTP’s 
decision not to investigate the British soldiers in Iraq, deGuzman has pointedly 
noted that: 
the Prosecutor explicitly prioritized the number of victims over other 
factors such as the fact that the crimes were (arguably) committed as 
part of an aggressive war. This decision appears to privilege the 
legitimacy perspective of powerful Western States. The decision also 
suggests the Prosecutor does not view deterring wars of aggression as 
an important goal for the ICC, although this may change when a 
definition of aggression is added to the Statute. In contrast, in deciding 
 
117 Ibid. 
118 deGuzman (n 108) 1462. 
119 deGuzman & Schabas (n 78) 169. 
120 deGuzman (n 108) 1432-1433. 
121 Ibid, 1405-1406. 
122 Ibid, 1406. 
123 In the view of Dov Jacobs, it is gravity as whole – and not only relative gravity – that, given 
its own highly discretionary nature, should be removed from the formal admissibility test and 
applied merely in the context of the OTP’s discretionary decision whether to initiate a formal 
investigation. See Jacobs (n 105). 
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to focus the Court's resources on attacks affecting a relatively small 
number of peacekeepers in Sudan, the Prosecutor subordinated the 
number of victims to the impact of the crimes. Again, he appears to 
privilege the perspective of Western States that engage in most 
peacekeeping missions over that of local populations who may well 
question why the rape or murder of hundreds in their village is less 
pressing.124  
Hence, acknowledging that a heavy burden falls on the shoulders of the 
Prosecutor, deGuzman has agreed with Heller that ‘it might be preferable to 
relieve the Prosecutor of some of this burden’.125 In particular, considering that 
relevant audiences can reasonably differ about the ICC’s priorities, and that 
the selection of situations and cases strongly affects the Court’s sociological 
legitimacy, a more viable option may be to allow state parties and other openly 
political actors to give ‘additional input in the process’.126    
Given the uncertainties emerging from the Rome Statute and the 
ensuing interpretative controversies, it is not surprising that the OTP’s 
pronouncements and practices have not been exactly consistent over the years. 
With regard to situations, the Office has oscillated from pole to pole: from 
claiming it would proceed more or less automatically once the criteria of scale, 
nature, and impact of the crimes and their manner of commission are 
fulfilled,127 to the opposite argument that its selection decisions are required 
by the Statute’s gravity threshold for admissibility,128 passing through the 
occasional acknowledgment that some choices have to be made because of the 
scarcity of resources.129 Admittedly, though, in more recent years the OTP’s 
policy statements have excluded any official references to the prioritization of 
 
124 deGuzman (n 108) 1460.  
125 Ibid, 1465. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See Schabas (n 79) 371. Before the first Prosecutor took office, lawyers in the OTP had 
prepared a draft regulation that approached the question of situation selection in a manner 
that suggested the OTP would proceed with everything that was admissible; but the Prosecutor 
did not adopt the draft. 
128 See deGuzman (n 108)  1432. 
129 See OTP (n 94), where the OTP openly admitted that the policy of the Office was ‘to respond 
to serious situations, while maximising the use of its available resources’ (ibid, 11-12). 
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resources, and to considerations of feasibility more broadly.130 In the 2016 
paper on case selection and prioritization, the Office even expressly  affirmed 
‘the non-applicability of “feasibility” as separate legal factor for determining 
the opening of investigations’,131 while conceding that operational feasibility 
does, instead, become a relevant factor at the level of case prioritization, i.e. 
‘the process by which cases that meet the selection criteria are rolled-out over 
time’.132 And yet, given the scarcity of the Court’s resources, it is simply 
unthinkable that the OTP would convert all admissible situations into fully-
fledged investigations. Indeed, the OTP practice itself suggests that, rather 
than considering for prosecution all admissible situations, the Office actually 
conflates the gravity threshold for admissibility with the relative gravity 
discretion – notably, by treating the admissibility threshold as a relative 
analysis based primarily on the number of victims in each situation.133 So, in 
2006, in declining to pursue the situation of alleged British war crimes in Iraq, 
the Prosecutor argued that although there was a reasonable basis to believe 
British soldiers had committed war crimes, the situation did not meet the 
gravity threshold for admissibility, because the number of victims alleged was 
“of a different order” than that in other situations before the Court. Except 
that, for a decision to be inadmissible on the basis of the gravity threshold for 
admissibility, the Prosecutor should have explained, following deGuzman, 
why the potential cases involved were insufficiently grave to be admissible (for 
example, it might have been argued that ‘isolated individual murders in war 
are outside the purview of the Court’),134 rather than comparing the number of 
victims in different situations. Similarly, when assessing the scale of the 
alleged crimes in its 2017 final decision announcing the closing of the PE in 
the in the Mavi Marmara situation, the OTP reiterated that, ‘the total number 
of victims of the flotilla incident reached relatively limited proportions as 
compared, generally, to other cases investigated by the Office’.135 Moreover, 
 
130 The 2013 policy paper on preliminary examinations  nowhere suggested that the OTP 
makes a selection from among the eligible situations. See OTP (n 97). 
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the OTP’s efforts to distinguish the Mavi Marmara case from other cases - such 
as the Abu Garda and the Al Mahdi cases, characterised by a relatively limited 
scale of violence and yet deemed sufficiently grave - appear mostly subjective 
and result-driven.136 The Abu Garda and the Al Mahdi cases concerned, 
respectively, the allegation of a single attack against international 
peacekeeping forces involving a relatively low number of victims, and attacks 
on property protected the Rome Statute (Article 8(2)(e)(iv)).137 Nonetheless, 
both cases were considered sufficiently grave because of the nature and impact 
of the alleged crimes.138 In particular, when assessing the impact of the alleged 
crimes, the OTP expressly considered the message sent by their perpetrators 
to the broader the international community. Instead, in the Mavi Marmara 
case, the Prosecutor excluded any reference to the - arguably unequivocal - 
message that the Israeli government sought to send by attacking an 
international flotilla willing to break the illegal blockade in Gaza.139 
The OTP’s approach to case selection has been firmer. Contrary to the 
(untenable) claim that all admissible situations will be investigated, there is no 
such pretence as far as cases are concerned. In line with the practice of other 
national and international jurisdictions, the OTP adopted the policy of 
selecting persons “most responsible for most serious crimes”. It also specified 
that selection would focus on groups that are responsible for “the gravest 
crimes”. The “greatest responsibility” criterion cannot be found in the ICC 
Statute, but guidance is given in the Preamble and in articles 5 and 17 of the 
ICC Statute.140 In the 2016 paper on case selection and prioritization, the OTP 
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137 Ibid. 
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140 See also OTP (n 94). According to the OTP, the “greatest responsibility” criterion ‘may 
comprise commanders and other superiors if their effective subordinates are involved in the 
crimes, those playing a major causal role in the crimes, and notorious perpetrators who 
distinguish themselves by their direct responsibility for particularly serious crimes’ (ibid, 13). 
However, as the OTP has conceded, investigations may also include perpetrators lower down 
the chain of command when necessary for the entire case. It is also interesting to note that, 
while the rank or role of an accused person has been found not to be relevant to the gravity of 
a case, it was factored into the assessment of “situational gravity” in the PTC authorization 
decisions of proprio motu investigations. See Kenya Authorization Decision (n 98) para 198; 
Côte D’Ivoire Authorization Decision (n 98) paras. 205; Burundi Authorization Decision (n 
98) para 187. In contrast, in its request to the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision on the 
opening of an investigation in the Comoros situation, PTC I noted that the Prosecutor did not 
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also mentioned the role of potential charges (in addition to the gravity of the 
crimes141 and the degree of responsibility of alleged perpetrators), stating that 
the ‘Office will aim to represent as much as possible the true extent of the 
criminality which has occurred within a given situation, in an effort to ensure, 
jointly with the relevant national jurisdictions, that the most serious crimes 
committed in each situation do not go unpunished’.142 In the same paper, the 
OTP expressly conceded that, from among the cases selected within any given 
situation and across them, it will ‘prioritize those cases in which it appears that 
it can conduct an effective and successful investigation leading to a 
prosecution with a reasonable prospect of conviction’.143 This will be done, the 
OTP clarified, on the basis of identified strategic and operational criteria. The 
latter, in particular, take into account the ‘practical realities’144 faced by the 
Office in its work, and the vast scale, nature, and complexity of the OTP’s work 
compared to its circumscribed budget and limited resources.145 Operational 
criteria encompass: the quantity and quality of evidence; international 
cooperation and judicial assistance to support the Office’s activities; the 
Office’s capacity to effectively conduct the necessary investigations within a 
reasonable period of time; the potential to secure the appearance of suspects 
before the Court; the ‘impact and the ability of the Office to pursue cases 
involving opposing parties to a conflict in parallel or on a sequential basis’.146  
 
provide, in its evaluation of the gravity of the potential case(s), an analysis of the factor of the 
potential accused’s level of responsibility. See ICC, PTC I (n 101) paras. 22-23. 
141 OTP (n 42) paras 6 and 32. This paper reprised the mixed qualitative-quantitative approach 
laid out by the 2013 policy paper on preliminary examinations in relation to situations. See n 
94. Furthermore, as far as the impact of the crimes is concerned, the paper added that the OTP 
‘will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by 
means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land ’(ibid, para 41). 
142 Ibid, para 8. As Brady and Guariglia have pointed out, the OTP committed itself to paying 
particular attention to crimes that have been traditionally under-prosecuted, such as ‘crimes 
against or affecting children; rape and other sexual and gender-based crimes; attacks against 
cultural, religious, historical and other protected objects; and attacks against humanitarian 
and peacekeeping personnel’. See Helen Brady and Fabricio Guariglia, ‘An Insider's View: 
Consistency and Transparency While Preserving Prosecutorial Discretion’, 15 December 2016, 
International Criminal Justice Today, available at https://www.international-criminal-
justice-today.org/arguendo/an-insiders-view/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
143 See Brady and Guariglia, ibid. 
144 OTP (n 42) para 49. 
145 Brady & Guariglia (n 141). 
146 OTP (n 42) para 50. 
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The OTP has expressly justified the orientations just outlined on the 
grounds of prosecutorial discretion; that is, as policy choices outside the “legal 
threshold” that arise once the Article 17(1)(d) gravity threshold is passed, and 
are indeed needed to preserve flexibility. At the same time, one can hardly 
ignore that when gravity is interpreted less as a minimum requirement and 
more as a parameter for selecting and prioritizing situations and cases, the 
discretionary element is stronger.147 But the major problem is that the OTP has 
tended to conflate different inquiries by treating the Article 17(1)(d) gravity 
threshold as a selection criterion to compare the relative gravity of different 
situations and cases.148 In particular, this may have serious consequences for 
the reach of judicial review. In fact, as discussed more in detail in section 3.3.1 
below, one of the major shortcomings of the Rome Statute is that decisions not 
to proceed due to lack of reasonable basis are not covered by judicial review 
when taken in the context of  proprio motu investigations. The only form of 
review available in that respect is proprio motu review by the Chamber, 
uniquely of decisions taken “solely” on the basis of the “interests of justice”. It 
follows from here that the OTP may eschew judicial review if it refrains from 
invoking the “interests of justice”, while instead basing its decisions not to 
investigate or prosecute on broadly defined gravity considerations.149 In other 
words, by incorporating a highly discretionary determination into the 
“reasonable basis” analysis, the Prosecutor’s gains increased discretion not to 
proceed.150  
 
 
3.3.2 The Inescapable Ambivalence of Complementarity 
After illustrating several points of contention arising from the interpretation 
and application of gravity, the analysis turns now to complementarity. The aim 
 
147 Lovisa Bådagård and Mark Klamberg, ‘The Gatekeeper of the ICC - Prosecutorial Strategies 
for Selecting Situations and Cases at the International Criminal Court’ (2016) 48 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 639, 683. 
148 deGuzman (n 108) 1429. According to deGuzman, scholars sometimes also conflate these 
inquiries. She cites as an example William A. Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity’, 
in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 229, 229-234. 
149 Stahn (n 75) 270. 
150 deGuzman & Schabas (n 78) 144. 
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of this section is to illustrate that, contrary to prevailing understanding,151 both 
complementarity per se and its application are highly ambivalent.152 As a 
principle meant to strike a proper balance between effective prosecutions and 
safeguarding sovereignty, complementarity inconclusively affirms both the 
primacy of states and the supranational authority of the Court. This inherent 
ambiguity is compounded by statutory loopholes about the meaning of 
“unwilling” and “unable”, which leave complementarity exceptionally open to 
interpretation and strategic considerations. This line of thought has also been 
confirmed by several respondents to the interviews in Annex II (see code 20: 
“controversial application of (positive) complementarity”). 
Already in 1998, Immi Tallgren had envisaged that complementarity 
‘will remain open to contrasting interpretations from various viewpoints’,153 
and ‘linguistic indeterminacy will reopen the field for politics as soon as 
“application” begins’.154 To date, the prevailing interpretation of 
complementarity within the Court has been in terms of a so-called “two-step 
approach”, though not without problems. The “two-step approach” was 
expressly laid out for the first time by the Appeals Chamber in the Katanga 
case, when the defence presented the Court with its first chance to consider an 
admissibility challenge based on complementarity. The defence’s admissibility 
challenge was premised on the idea that the ICC case was inadmissible, 
because the DRC was manifestly “willing” to try Katanga at the time of his 
arrest, having charged him with crimes against humanity. In response to the 
defence’s admissibility challenge, the Trial Chamber II argued that the DRC 
authorities, by referring their situation to the ICC, had signalled that they had 
no intention of investigating or prosecuting Katanga, so the state was 
“unwilling” to do so. The judges explained that there were two kinds of 
unwillingness: unwillingness aimed at obstructing justice, and unwillingness 
aimed at ending impunity. According to the Trial Chamber, the DRC showed 
the second type, for the reason behind the DRC’s unwillingness was to enable 
 
151 See, e.g., Varaki (n 89) 776.  
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the ICC to try Katanga. In the appeal phase, the ICC Appeals Chamber again 
found that the case was admissible, but for different reasons. It argued that a 
case before the ICC may proceed in one of two circumstances:  not only (i) 
where domestic proceedings are vitiated by an inability or unwillingness to 
conduct them genuinely; but also (ii) where there is an absence of relevant 
domestic proceedings.155 Indeed, willingness or ability of the state should only 
be assessed if there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or if there have 
been investigations and the state decided not to prosecute. ‘It is only when the 
answer to these questions is in the affirmative’,156 the Appeals Chamber 
asserted, ‘that one has to look at the question of unwillingness and inability’;157 
‘to do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse’.158 Based on that 
reasoning, the judges found that the case was admissible due to the 
“inactivity” of domestic authorities.  
At the time of writing, more than ten years after that judgement, several 
of its aspects remain in question. A first critical consideration is that the “two-
step approach” has the advantage of accommodating cases that arrive at the 
ICC through state self-referrals.159 In particular, the ‘inactive gloss’160 on 
Article 17 allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction in cases of voluntary 
inactivity,161 such as the one signalled by domestic authorities referring their 
own situations to the Court. It also fits very nicely with the OTP’s strategy of 
inviting state self-referrals.162 Considering that the latter allows the Prosecutor 
to avoid the judicial review that would otherwise arise if the Office opened the 
investigations proprio motu, the overall result is a form of negotiated ad hoc 
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primacy. However, whereas the use of the two-fold test in the context of self-
referrals may be in line with pragmatic purposes (by allowing the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction in cases where the Court could rely on the support and 
cooperation of the relevant governments),163 it remains unclear whether the 
idea that a state might refer its own a situation was ever contemplated.164 In 
2009, in the Katanga case, the Appeals Chamber argued that there may be 
merit in the argument, elaborated by Trial Chamber II in the same case, that 
‘the sovereign decision of a State to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the 
Court may well be seen as complying with the “duty to exercise [its] criminal 
jurisdiction” as envisaged in the [...] Preamble’.165  In 2010, the defence in the 
Bemba case challenged this position, pointing to the risk that self-referring 
governments may attempt to manipulate the Prosecutor and ‘exploit the Court 
in order to eliminate their enemies’.166 Therefore, the defence also invited the 
OTP to reconsider its own policy of encouraging state self-referrals rather than 
more duly activating the Court jurisdiction on its own initiative.167 Similarly, 
in 2013, the defence of Laurent Gabgo contended that self-referrals jeopardize 
the basic principle of complementarity,168 which instead requires the 
prioritization of domestic proceedings, in particular, as a way to ‘involve the 
affected communities as part of the overall process of reconciliation and peace 
building’.169 Indeed, in line with the criticism raised by the Bemba and Laurent 
Gabgo cases, it may even be argued that by practically exempting self-referrals 
from complementarity assessments the Appeal Chamber fundamentally 
undermined the status of complementarity itself. We should not forget, in fact, 
that in the majority of ICC decisions addressing complementarity to date, the 
Court has not begun to assess states’ “willingness” or “ability” to conduct 
genuine proceedings. Rather, the Court has found that the inactivity of the 
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competent domestic authorities rendered those situations and cases 
admissible before the Court.170  
The decision to “export” the two-fold test from the context of the self-
referrals - where governments wanted the ICC to intervene - to others where 
local authorities claimed to be willing and able to investigate and prosecute, 
has not been without problems.171 Indeed, matched with the requirement that 
domestic investigation cover exactly the same acts under the OTP’s attention, 
known as the “same person/substantially the same conduct” test, the two-fold 
test has led to a jurisdictional regime which simply runs counter to the 
circumstances where the potential suspects are likely to be investigated or 
prosecuted domestically for different crimes or incidents.172 To explain my 
point better, let me illustrate the paradigmatic case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. 
On 1 May 2012, the Government of Libya challenged the admissibility of the 
case concerning the suspect, submitting a wealth of information about its 
ongoing proceedings, and expressing its “willingness” to investigate and 
prosecute the same suspect as the Court. Nonetheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
found that the evidence, taken as a whole, did ‘not allow the Chamber to 
discern the actual contours of the national case against Mr Gaddafi such that 
the scope of the domestic investigation could be said to cover the same case as 
that set out in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Court’.173 According to the 
dissenting opinion of judge Anita Usacka, this finding contained ‘numerous 
confusing aspects’.174 Firstly, ‘no further explanation was given as to why the 
material provided by Libya did not meet the “same person/substantially the 
same conduct” test’.175 Secondly, it was ‘unclear what the Pre-Trial Chamber 
meant with respect to terms such as “actual contours of the national case 
against Mr Gaddafi”, “scope of the domestic investigation”, and “means of 
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evidence of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value”’.176 Judge 
Usacka, in another dissenting opinion in the Kenyan situation, recalled that 
the ‘drafters of the Statute agreed to establish a high threshold when they 
drafted the legal and factual requirements for unwillingness and inability in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 17’.177 Hence, the ‘Court should not circumvent 
this threshold created by unwillingness or inability by requiring a State to 
prove e.g. the existence of a full-fledged investigation or prosecution of a case 
in order to establish that there is no situation of inactivity’.178 We may also add 
that the rigid standards required by the “two-step approach” appear especially 
problematic when weighed  against the flexibility accorded to the OPT when 
reaching complementarity determinations at the situation level. At the 
situation level, in fact, the Prosecutor is allowed not to open a formal 
investigation on the grounds that there are actual domestic proceedings 
concerning the wider regions and incidents under consideration, provided that 
proceedings relate to the potential categories of crime (e.g. most responsible) 
that are likely to form the object of the Court’s investigations.179 Such flexibility 
arises especially in the context of a proprio motu investigation, in which a 
Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed based on lack of reasonable basis eschews 
judicial review. On the other hand, in those instances in which the OTP has 
decided to open a fully-fledged investigation and brought a case before the 
judges, the requirement of a precise coincidence of criminality in form and 
substance makes impossible for domestic authorities to successfully challenge 
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its admissibility on the same grounds which, in principle, may allow the 
Prosecutor not to open a formal investigation. In this sense, the Appeals 
Chamber’s Katanga judgement has also ended up providing a crucial avenue 
for double standards in the Court’s practice. In this connection, judge Sang-
Hyun Song also noted that to ‘require that the national investigation cover 
exactly the same acts of murder and persecution would make the national 
investigators’ task impossible, and, as a result, the complementarity principle, 
an essential element of the Statute - featuring prominently in both its 
Preamble and first article - would almost certainly become redundant’.180 In 
fact, it is difficult to understand how national courts could predict the exact 
charges eventually brought by the Prosecutor, especially considering that the 
ICC often intervenes in situations of mass-atrocities, and that, within the ICC 
itself, there has been tension over specific charges.181 In its Article 19 
application relating to Mr Al Senussi, the Government of Libya submitted that, 
‘[w]hilst the “substantially the same conduct” test enumerated by the Appeals 
Chamber may be the correct test in principle, it remains to be precisely 
defined. In particular, it ‘needs to be interpreted to avoid the demand for a 
rigid correspondence between the incidents under examination by the state 
and the ICC’,182 particularly in light of the fact that the ICC intervenes in 
relation to conducts ‘stretching over a period of time and over varying 
geographical locations, […] committed […] through numerous individual acts 
by numerous people, within the context of a policy or plan’.183 In other words, 
a narrow interpretation and application of the “same person/same conduct 
test” yields the problematic outcome of rendering a case admissible even ‘if the 
relevant domestic proceedings address only a representative sample of the 
incidents under investigation by the ICC, or focus on different but equally, if 
not more, grave criminal conduct’.184 What is more, as the Government of 
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Libya pointed out, ‘the question of “inability” in the Libyan context and the 
Court’s admissibility decision will have far-reaching consequences’,185 for ‘[i]n 
the vast majority of situations, States emerging from mass atrocities will not 
possess a sophisticated or functional judicial system’.186 Indeed, ‘the purpose 
of transitional justice is to provide an opportunity for post-conflict judicial 
capacity building in the broader context of national reconciliation and 
democratization’.187 It was perhaps in the light of these and other similar 
considerations that the Court reversed itself in the Al-Senussi case, after 
arguably succumbing ‘to a false sense of entitlement’188 over the Gaddafi case. 
In other words, the Court found that the Libyan authorities were both willing 
and able to carry out proceedings against Al-Senussi.189 This was despite the 
fact that the factual situation was similar in both cases. As judge Usacka has 
put it, ‘at least some of the distinctions drawn by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
between the cases of Mr Al-Senussi and of Mr Gaddafi appear to be far-fetched 
and are not particularly convincing’.190 
All things considered, it is not hard to see that the “two-step approach” 
endorsed by the judges risks projecting the ICC as an institution eroding the 
pressure on states to discharge their responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute, by taking this over from the states themselves.191 More to the point, 
it looms as a crucial permissive condition of prosecutorial “hyperactivity” as 
far as case selection is concerned. In fact, on the one hand the decision to 
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initiate an investigation does sit with the OTP. It also bears recalling in this 
respect that judicial authorization only arises in the context of proprio motu 
investigations. Similarly, the application of “positive complementarity” also 
rests with the Prosecutor. This, in contrast to the admissibility rule, stresses 
the responsibility of states to investigate and prosecute, and thus envisages a 
Prosecutor actively supporting and inducing national proceedings.192 On the 
other hand, though, and specifically at the case level, the Rome Statute entitles 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to exercise some scrutiny. For instance, it is only after 
the PTC confirms the charges that a case is committed for trial.193 Indeed, the 
holding of a confirmation hearing before the opening of the trial is a unique 
feature of the Court. By the same token, judges are entitled to rule on 
admissibility challenges. And yet, judicial deference to prosecutorial 
“hyperactivity” has clearly prevailed so far. The next section further delves into 
the shortcomings of judicial review. More to the point, it paves the way for 
arguing that, as illustrated in Chapter 4, the combination of judicial deference 
to prosecutorial “hyperactivity” on the one hand, and prosecutorial inaction on 
the other, has led to a highly controversial application of both 
complementarity and gravity.194  
 
 
3.3.3 The Role of Judicial Review: Between Statutory 
Shortcomings, Missed Opportunities, and Inescapable 
Limits  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Rome Statute has expanded the avenues for 
judicial review in comparison to previous practice, the scope of judicial review 
remains a major matter of contention. This section calls attention to two issues 
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in particular. Firstly, the Rome Statute provides different levels of review 
according to the mechanism that has triggered the Court jurisdiction. More to 
the point, UNSC and state referrals enjoy a favoured position compared to 
Article 15 communications.195 Secondly, several of the triggers and modalities 
of review are open to interpretation. As a result, in practice, several 
manifestations of prosecutorial discretion have eschewed judicial review, 
especially in the area of prosecutorial inaction.196  
 
 
3.3.3.1 A Privileged Position for “Sovereign-Backed” 
Investigations 
A first basic consideration is that once the OTP has received a referral, by 
either the UNSC or a (group of) state(s), it must initiate an investigation unless 
it determines that “there is no reasonable basis to proceed”. In contrast, when 
the Prosecutor receives Article 15 communications (from either individuals or 
non-governmental organizations), the test is the same, but the starting point 
is reversed: the Prosecutor shall not seek to initiate an investigation without 
first concluding that there is a “reasonable basis” to proceed.197 In other words, 
the Rome Statute is premised on a heavy presumption that the Prosecutor is 
to open formal investigations in the context of “sovereign-backed” 
investigations. What is more, it provides a “fast track” for these.198  So, if the 
OTP has received a referral, its decision to open an investigation is final. But if 
the OTP wants to open an investigation proprio motu, it needs the 
authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. This requirement was included to ease 
concerns about the danger of an “unchecked prosecutor”.199 Article 15 is, in 
fact, one of the most delicate provisions of the Rome Statute,200 being the 
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product of extensive debates until the end of the Rome Conference.201 Both 
proponents and opponents of the idea of proprio motu investigations feared 
the risk of a “politicized” Court, and this concern prompted the drafters to seek 
a balanced approach that rendered the proprio motu trigger acceptable to 
those who feared it.202 As a result, unlike in referral situations, the OTP 
conducts its preliminary examinations knowing that it must present evidence 
to a panel of judges in order to be able to launch a fully-fledged 
investigation.203  
Procedural distinctions also apply when the Prosecutor decides not to 
seek a full investigation, or not to prosecute.204 Both the UNSC and member 
states are entitled to require the PTC to review the OTP’s decisions not to 
investigate or prosecute.  Whereas negative decisions are the only decisions 
subject to review in referred situations – i.e. as seen above, positive decisions 
do not require judicial authorization – this state of affairs is reversed in the 
context of proprio motu investigations. Senders of Article 15 communications 
are unable to challenge the OTP’s decisions not to investigate, and only 
decisions not to proceed based on the “interests of justice” may be subject to 
proprio motu review by the Chamber. It follows that the OTP’s decisions not 
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to proceed due to lack of reasonable basis eschew judicial review. It may also 
be noted that such a broad discretion over negative decisions is in stark 
contrast with the higher degree of judicial control required for decisions to 
proceed under Article 15.205  
Finally, Article 18 also distinguishes between the three triggers. It 
requires the Prosecutor to notify states about the opening of an investigation 
only when acting upon state referral or proprio motu. The omission of the 
Security Council trigger entails that, when the UNSC has referred a situation, 
states cannot challenge admissibility (at least, they cannot do so at an early 
stage).206 This has the effect of removing a significant hurdle for the OTP, 
which does not need to conduct a full admissibility assessment during the 
preliminary examination.207   
Summing up, state and even more UNSC referrals give rise to fast-track 
proceedings, requiring, respectively, no PTC authorization, and neither PTC 
authorization nor state notification. What is more, both states and the Security 
Council are entitled to require the PTC to review OTP’s decisions not to 
investigate or prosecute,208 meaning that while the OTP enjoys broad 
prosecutorial discretion when it affirmatively decides to pursue a situation 
referred by states and the Security Council, it faces, instead, enhanced scrutiny 
when it decides not to proceed in the context of a referral. This state of affairs 
is reversed in proprio motu investigations. These, in fact, require both PTC 
approval and state notification (the latter may lead to preliminary objections 
on admissibility, as in state referrals). That is to say, the OTP faces enhanced 
scrutiny when it affirmatively decides to pursue a proprio motu situation. 
Furthermore, contrary to states and the Security Council,  senders of Article 15 
are unable to challenge decisions not to proceed, and the PTC can review only 
when based on the interests of justice.209 This means that in proprio motu 
investigations, negative decisions due to lack of reasonable basis are  exempted 
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from judicial review, with the OTP thus exercising broad influence over 
decisions not to investigate.210 
 
 
3.3.3.2 The Limits of Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Inaction 
While the power not to act may, arguably, bear greater significance than the 
power to act,211 the Rome Statute provides only for limited power of judicial 
review of inaction.212 This is the result of diverging conceptions about the 
modalities of review during the Rome Conference, as well as specific issues of 
the feasibility of challenging and reviewing an inaction. Furthermore, some of 
the drafters may have assumed that the situations the ICC should investigate 
would be obvious, i.e. those resembling Nazi Germany or genocidal Rwanda. 
However, reality has turned out to be more complicated, and disagreement has 
actually arisen about when it is appropriate for the Court to act.213  
As seen above, decisions not to initiate investigations proprio motu due 
to a lack of reasonable basis are not covered by judicial review, and proprio 
motu review of negative decisions based on interests of justice is the only form 
of review available in the context of proprio motu investigations. In this 
regard, it should be noted that the OTP has thus far refrained from invoking 
the “interests of justice”. For example, the opening of an investigation in 
relation to Article 15 communications regarding the situation in Iraq was 
declined on the basis of “insufficient gravity”; therefore, there was no option 
for judicial review under Article 53.214 Decisions not to prosecute certain 
groups of persons, or certain crimes, also eschew judicial review. Indeed, ‘the 
most evident shortcoming’215 of the Statute may well be that it does not clarify 
what is meant by a decision not to prosecute. Article 53(2) uses the expression 
“not a sufficient basis for a prosecution”. However, it does not identify the 
relevant object of prosecution, albeit the wording leaves room for at least three 
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possible interpretations. Prosecutorial inaction may relate to (i) a decision not 
to prosecute a specific individual; (ii) a decision not to prosecute a certain 
group of persons or certain crimes in a given situation; (iii) a decision not to 
prosecute at all, that is the absence of any cases in a situation being 
investigated.216 This distinction has crucial implications for the exercise of 
judicial review.217 Interpretation (i) would open the door to the review of a vast 
number of ‘individualized and sensitive decisions’, 218 while, in contrast, the 
option of judicial scrutiny would be reduced to a bare minimum if a decision 
not to prosecute covered only scenarios of the complete absence of prosecution 
(proposition (iii)).219 Proposition (ii) is more balanced, for it would grant the 
judges the power to exercise scrutiny over selective prosecution, without 
involving the review of individualized decisions.220 In particular, as noted by 
Carsten Stahn, it would enable the judges ‘to address challenges of one-sided 
investigation or selective charging’,221 such as ‘the closure of the investigation 
or its limitation to specific historical incidents or crime patterns’.222 However, 
while the Rome Statute may arguably be interpreted so as to allow for judicial 
review of decisions not to prosecute a certain group of persons or certain 
crimes in a given situation,223 it does not expressly provide for it; nor have the 
judges moved in that direction. The PTC has, in fact, failed to interpret 
affirmative decisions pertaining to the persons being prosecuted and the 
selected charges as tacit prosecutorial decisions not to investigate, or 
prosecute other persons or other crimes. In other words, the judges have held 
that if no explicit negative decision is reached by the Prosecutor, the review 
foreseen in Article 53(3) is not triggered.224 As a result, judicial deference to 
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prosecutorial inaction has been just as dominant as judicial deference to 
prosecutorial “hyperactivity”. A further shortcoming in the system of judicial 
review set out by the Rome Statute is that the Prosecutor has no time limit for 
deciding whether to open an investigation.225 In fact, albeit fixed time limits 
may prove too rigid, especially in light of the complexity of the Court’s 
investigations, the complete absence of any time limit ‘creates legal 
insecurity’.226 Attention should also be called to a broader transparency 
dilemma.227 In fact, while Article 53 makes supervision formally dependent on 
the prior notification of a decision by the Prosecutor (both when triggered by 
the referring authorities or activated proprio motu by the Chamber),228 many 
aspects of prosecutorial decision-making are not publicly recorded.229 In 
particular, if the Prosecutor does not even seek authorization to open an 
investigation under Article 15, article 15(6) simply requires the Prosecutor to 
notify information-providers of inaction. To put it differently, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is not involved unless a request for authorization under Article 15 is 
made.230 Similarly, there is no available information on cases that have 
deselected or deprioritized.231  
A final consideration should go to the specific issues of feasibility of 
challenge and review that arise with regard to review of inaction. It cannot be 
overlooked that the PTC has no independent investigative powers at its 
disposal. These are exclusive to the Prosecutor, and extending them to the 
judges might arguably be incompatible with the rights of defendants. It should 
also be considered that, even if the judges could impose additional charges, the 
Prosecutor should only fail to adduce relevant evidence on the unwanted 
charges.232 As a result, no matter how sympathetic one may be about the 
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209. According to Guariglia, the PT Chamber, ‘refused to engage in an exercise of “judicial 
creation” of a non-existent Art. 53 (2) (c) decision, triggered by a third party’s disagreement 
with the prosecutorial choices made by the OTP’ (ibid). 
225 Stahn (n 75) 276. 
226 Ambos & Stegmiller (n 163) 422.  
227 Stahn (n 75) 271. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid,  272. 
231 Bådagård & Klamberg (n 146) 725. 
232 As already noted, different considerations apply to certain forms of prosecutorial 
“hyperactivity”. In particular, considering that it is only after the PT Chamber confirms the 
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prospect of a greater role for judicial review under the Rome Statute, the 
potential improvements that would follow should not be exaggerated. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusions: The Untenability of Pure 
Legalism 
The first part of the chapter has drawn attention to the Court’s dependence on 
the elective involvement of sovereign states to (establish and) accept its 
jurisdiction, and to give it access to the resources and tools which are needed 
to achieve successful investigations and prosecutions, chiefly financial 
resources and state cooperation. It has, hence, concluded that albeit the Rome 
Statute strives to bring about a paradigm shift in the normative fabric of 
international society, it does so while relying on a largely unchanged 
structure,233 that is, by placing some of its major functions at the disposal of 
states’ processes and decisions.234 The second part turned to the mechanism 
underlying the selection of situations and cases before the ICC. This has shown 
that, no matter how prosecutorial decision-making unmarred by pragmatic, 
strategic, and political considerations may sound appealing, such a perspective 
unduly simplifies what is at stake. In fact, statutory loopholes and 
uncertainties not only leave several pivotal questions unsettled in the first 
place, but also leave unanswered complex ‘questions of institutional strategy 
and policy, if not politics as such’,235 which inevitably arise when selecting both 
situations (either proprio motu and through referral) and cases. This view is 
corroborated by the interviews undertaken as part of the present study. These, 
in particular, have pointed to the weight of considerations of “effectiveness”, 
especially in terms of the OTP’s attraction to cases that can be successfully 
prosecuted (see Annex II, code 15: “(cost-)effectiveness”). Indeed, the OTP 
 
charges that a case is committed for trial, a less “deferential” role of the judges at the level of 
case selection may be more realistically invoked. 
233 Kenneth A. Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics. Embedding the 
International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding’ (2014) 12(3) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 437, 440.  
234 Broomhall (n 5) 151. By “states” is meant especially, but not uniquely, state parties to the 
Rome Statute. In fact, as illustrated in the text, non-states parties may also influence the Court.  
235 Goldston (n 72) 402.  
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itself has publicly clarified that the effectiveness of the institution depends on 
‘external critical resources factors’, such as cooperation and external relations, 
resources, and security.236 Furthermore, focusing on cooperation, the Office 
has conceded that the latter requires an ‘alignment of interests’237 between 
partners, and even admitted that the Office will prioritize those cases in which 
it can conduct an effective and successful investigation, leading to a 
prosecution with good prospects of conviction.238 The OTP’s own statements 
thus describe a Court that is itself more or less “willing” and “able” to 
investigate and prosecute depending on considerations of feasibility and 
political opportunity.239  
All these things considered, it may be concluded that the statutory 
provisions regulating the selection of situations and cases sit at the crossroads 
between the ‘idealistic vision of a global court designed to prosecute the cases 
that domestic jurisdictions cannot or will not prosecute’,240 and the pragmatic 
- when not plainly political - constraints of an institution placed in the pressing 
need to enlist state power to its cause.241 At the end of the Rome Conference, 
Kirsch and Holmes sought to warn us about the Rome Statute ending up 
sheltering the very perpetrators of the crimes it is meant to sanction.242 The 
following chapter shows that this warning has, in some important respects,  
become reality.      
 
 
 
 
236 OTP, ‘Strategic Plan 2016 – 2018’, 16 November 2015, para. 37, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-otp_strategic_plan_2016-2018.pdf (last visited 
30 September 2018). 
237 OTP, ‘Strategic Plan 2012 – 2015’, 11 October 2013, 28, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
238 OTP (n 42) 49. 
239 Nouwen (n 62). 
240 Phil Clark, ‘Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Uganda, in Phil Clark and Nicholas Waddell (eds) Courting conflict? 
Peace, Justice and the ICC in Africa (London: Royal African Society, 2008) 37, 39. 
241 Mégret (n 4) 34. 
242 Kirsch & Holmes (n 1) 12. 
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Chapter 4 - Shaping Sovereignty as 
Responsibility at the ICC (Part II): The 
Test of Institutional Practice 
 
 
[O]ne cannot avoid asking whether the states that established this permanent institution, 
which is aimed at the universality of criminal justice, have not put the cart before the horse. 
Hans Koechler1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: From Sovereignty as 
Responsibility to Irresponsible Sovereignty 
To date, about 15 years since the entry into force of the Rome Statute, 26 cases in 11 
situations have been brought before the ICC, as illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2. Four 
state parties have referred situations occurring on their territories to the Court: 
Uganda, the DRC, the CAR,2 and Mali. The UN Security Council has referred the 
situations in Sudan and Libya, both non-party states to the Statute. The Prosecutor 
has initiated investigations proprio motu in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Burundi. 
36 arrest warrants have been issued for 33 individuals and summonses to nine others, 
making up for a total of 42 publicly indicted people. Four convictions and two 
acquittals have been reached; three trials are ongoing, and one is in preparation; 13 
suspects have had their cases closed, and 15 remain fugitives (see Table 2). Finally, ten 
situations remain under preliminary examination: Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, Ukraine, and Venezuela, to which should be 
added the recent decision to open a preliminary examination into the alleged 
deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh (see Table 3). 
 
1 Hans Köchler, ‘The Illusion of Justice Under the International Criminal Court’, The Wire, 19 
June 2017, available at https://thewire.in/external-affairs/the-illusion-of-justice-under-the-
international-criminal-court  (last visited 30 September 2018). 
2 The Government of the Central African Republic has referred two situations to the Court, in 
Dec 2004 and May 2014. The ICC has opened an investigation into both of them. 
120 | P a g .  
 
The following analysis covers the full range of situations and cases brought 
before the ICC, as well as their outcomes. It shows that the tension between 
“sovereignty-limiting rationale” and “sovereignty-based” operation described in the 
previous chapter cuts utterly against the normative aspirations of sovereignty 
as responsibility, specifically by leaving the Court practically ill-equipped to 
break with a notorious pattern of hyper-protected sovereignty. 
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Table 1. ICC Situations3 
SITUATION OPENED SCOPE TRIGGER 
DRC Jun. 2004 War Crimes (WC) & Crimes against Humanity 
(CAH) since 1 July 2002 in the context of a non-
international armed conflict. Regional focus on 
Ituri region and Kivu provinces 
State referral  
(self-referral) 
(Apr. 2004) 
UGANDA Jul. 2004 WC & CAH since 1 July 2002 in the context of a 
conflict between national authorities and the 
Lord’s Resistance Amy (LRA). Regional focus on 
Northern Uganda 
State referral  
(self-referral) 
 (Jan. 2004) 
DARFUR Jun. 2005 Genocide, WC & CAH in Darfur, Sudan since 1 July 
2002 
UNSC referral 
 (Mar. 2005) 
CAR I May 2007 WC & CAH in the context of a conflict in CAR since 
1 July 2002, with the peak of violence in 2002 and 
2003 
State referral  
(self-referral) 
 (Dec. 2004) 
KENYA Mar. 2010 CAH in the context of 2007-8 post-election 
violence (PEV), with regional focus in six of eight 
provinces: Nairobi, North Rift Valley, Central Rift 
Valley, South Rift Valley, Nyanza Province, and 
Western Province 
Proprio motu 
(Mar. 2010) 
LIBYA Mar. 2011 WC & CAH in Libya since 15 February 2011. Regional 
focus throughout Libya in, inter alia, Tripoli, 
Benghazi, and Misrata 
UNSC referral 
(Feb. 2011) 
CÔTE 
 D’IVOIRE 
Oct. 2011 CAH in the context of 2010-11 PEV, mainly 16 
December to 12 April, but also 19 Sep. 2002 to 
present; throughout 
Proprio motu 
(Oct. 2011) 
MALI Jan. 2013 WC since Jan. 2012, mainly in Gao, Kidal and 
Timbuktu and in Bamako and Sévaré 
State referral  
(self-referral) 
 (July 2012) 
 CAR II Sep. 2014 WC & CAH in the context of renewed violence since 
August 2012, mainly between Séléka and anti-
balaka groups 
State referral  
(self-referral) 
 (May 2014) 
 GEORGIA Jan. 2016 WC & CAH between 1 July and 10 Oct. 2008 in the 
context of international armed conflict, in and 
around South Ossetia 
Proprio motu 
(Jan. 2016) 
BURUNDI Oct.  2017 CAH between 26 April 2015 and 26 October 2017, 
committed in Burundi or by nationals of Burundi 
outside Burundi. 
Proprio motu 
(Oct. 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘2017 at a glance’, (last updated on) 23 
November 2017, 3, available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/document/2017-glance 
(last visited 30 September 2018). 
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Table 2. ICC Cases per Trial Stage                                                                                                                                                            
SITUATIONS Nº OF 
CASES 
Nº OF CASES PER TRIAL STAGE Nº OF 
SUSPECTS 
Pre-Trial Trial Appeal Rep. Closed 
DRC 6 14 15 0 26 27 6 
UGANDA 2 18 19 0 0 0 5 
DARFUR 5 310 111 0 0 112 7 
CAR I 2 0 0 113 0 114 5 
KENYA 4 215 0 0 0 216 9 
LIBYA 3 317 0 0 0 0 5 
CÔTE 
D’IVOIRE 
2 118 119 0 0 0 3 
MALI 2 120 0 0 121 0 2 
(tot.) 26 1222 423 1 3  6  42  
 
4 The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura. 
5 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda. 
6 The Prosecutor v. Thoma Lubanga Dylo (sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment); The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment). 
7 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo (acquitted); The Prosecutor v. Callixte  Mbarushimana 
(charges not confirmed). 
8 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, formerly, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, 
Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. 
9 The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen. 
10 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali 
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”); The Prosecutor v. Omar Al-Bashir; The Prosecutor v. 
Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein. 
11 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda, formerly, The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus. 
12 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (charges not confirmed). 
13 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (sentenced for offences 
against the administration of justice). 
14 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (acquitted). 
15 The Prosecutor v. Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett. 
16 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, formerly, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (charges withdrawn); The 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, formerly, The Prosecutor v. 
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (charges vacated).  
17 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, formerly, The Prosecutor v. Muammar 
Mohammed Abuminyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi; The 
Prosecutor v. Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled; The Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf 
Al-Werfalli. 
18 The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo. 
19 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Goudé. 
20 he Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud. 
21 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (sentenced to nine-years imprisonment). 
22 11 suspects out of 12 remain fugitives. 
23 Three are the ongoing trails, since Abdallah Banda (Sudan) remains at large after voluntarily 
appearing before the ICC during the Pre-Trial stage of his case, on 11 September 2014 and the 
ICC does not try individuals in their absence. 
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Table 3. Preliminary Examinations (PEs) by Current Status  
CLOSED ONGOING CONVERTED TO FULL 
INVESTIGATION  
Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction 
 
Admissibility 
 
Comoros Gabon Afghanistan Burundi 
Honduras Palestine Colombia CAR I 
Korea Philippines Guinea CAR II 
Venezuela Ukraine Iraq/UK Cote d’Ivoire 
 Venezuela Nigeria DRC 
 Bangladesh/Myanmar  Georgia 
  Kenya 
  Libya 
  Mali 
  Darfur, Sudan 
  Uganda 
 
 
4.2 A Tilt Toward “Sovereign-Backed” Situations 
To start with, the data on the outcomes and duration of preliminary 
examinations suggests that the OTP may have articulated a preference for 
opening fully-fledged investigations in “sovereign-backed” situations; in other 
words, situations in which either the territorial state or the UNSC have 
expressly endorsed the ICC’s intervention through a referral to the Court. This 
claim is supported by the apparent disparities in the outcomes and duration of 
PEs initiated by state and UNSC referrals on the one hand, and by the OTP 
proprio motu on the other hand, as illustrated in Table 4 and Table 5 below.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 An earlier version of the two tables was already offered by David Bosco in 2017. See David 
Bosco, ‘Discretion and State Influence at the International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor’s 
Preliminary Examinations’ (2017) 111, 2 American Journal of International Law 395, 400-
401. 
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Table 4. Preliminary Investigations Initiated by the Prosecutor Proprio Motu  
SITUATION DATES DURATION STATUS 
 
Cote d’Ivoire May 2003–June 2011 8 years Full investigation 
Venezuela July 2003–Feb. 2006 2.5 years Closed 
Iraq/United Kingdom 2004–Feb. 2006; May 
2014–present 
>6 years Closed, then 
reopened 
Colombia 2004–present >14 years Continuing 
Afghanistan 2007–Nov. 2017 >11 years Waiting for PTC 
authorization 
Kenya Jan. 2008–Nov. 2009 <2 years Full investigation 
Georgia Aug. 2008–Oct. 2015 >7 years Full investigation 
Guinea Oct. 2009–present < 9 years Continuing 
Honduras Nov. 2010–Oct. 2015 <5 years Closed 
Nigeria Nov. 2010–present <8 years Continuing 
Korea Dec. 2010–June 2014 3.5 years Closed 
Ukraine Apr. 2014–present >4 years Continuing 
Palestine Jan. 2015–present <4 years Continuing25 
Burundi Apr. 2016–Oct. 2017 1.5 year Full investigation 
Philippines Feb. 2018–present <1 year Continuing 
Bangladesh/Myanmar Sept. 2018 –present < 1 month Continuing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 On 22 May 2018, the OTP received a referral from the Palestinian authorities regarding the 
situation in Palestine since 13 June 2014, with no end date. Following this referral, the 
preliminary examination opened in January 2015 will continue to follow its normal course. 
However, should the Prosecutor ultimately determine that the situation referred warrants an 
investigation as a result of this referral, the Statute does not require the Prosecutor to seek 
authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber in order to proceed with an investigation.  
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Table 5. Preliminary Investigations Initiated by State or UNSC Referral 
SITUATION DATES26 DURATION STATUS 
 
Uganda Jan. 2004–July 2004 6 months Full investigation 
DRC Apr. 2004–June 2004 <3 months Full investigation 
CAR I Jan. 2005–May 2007 >2 years Full investigation 
Sudan Mar. 2005–June 2005 <4 months Full investigation 
Libya Feb. 2011–Mar. 2011 2 weeks Full investigation 
Mali July 2012–Jan. 2013 6 months Full investigation 
Comoros May 2013-Nov. 2015; 
Nov. 2015-Nov. 2017 
4.5 years Closed, then 
reopened, and 
definitely closed 
CAR II May 2014–Sept. 2014 4 months Full investigation 
Gabon Sept. 2016–21 Sept. 
2018 
2 years Closed 
Venezuela27 Feb. 2018–present <1 year Continuing 
 
 
Looking at Table 4, we can see that preliminary examinations initiated by the 
Prosecutor proprio motu have rarely led to full investigations:28 only four out 
of a total of 16. Before the recent opening of investigations into Burundi 
(October 2017) and Georgia (January 2016), the Prosecutor had exercised the 
power to open an investigation proprio motu very cautiously - in only two 
situations. One of these, Côte d’Ivoire, may be considered functionally 
equivalent to a self-referral.29 The sitting government of Côte d’Ivoire, in fact, 
sought the ICC investigation through the use of an Article 12(3) declaration.30 
The other situation, Kenya, while being likewise far from the interests of major 
powers and their allies, is also characterized by relatively limited violence. 
Alleged crimes against humanity committed in the context of post-election 
 
26 In several situations, including Afghanistan, the OTP has disclosed only the date or period 
when the preliminary examination was “made public” rather than when it was opened, thus 
leaving uncertainty about when the Office has actually opened certain PEs. 
27 On 27 September 2018, the Office received a referral from a group of states parties - the 
Republic of Argentina, Canada, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Chile, the Republic 
of Paraguay and the Republic of Peru - regarding the situation in Venezuela since 12 February 
2014. This is the first referral submitted by a group of states parties concerning a situation on 
the territory of another state party. 
28 Ibid, 401. 
29 Bosco (n 24) 401. 
30 Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute enables a state not party to the Statute to accept the 
exercise of ICC jurisdiction. 
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violence in Kenya between 2007 and 2008 had resulted in over 1000 dead, 
600,000 displaced, and hundreds sexually assaulted. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision to authorize this investigation was not unanimous, as judge Hans–
Peter Kaul claimed that the violence was not part of a state or organizational 
policy, thus falling outside the ICC subject-matter jurisdiction.31 Furthermore, 
at a later stage, judge Anita Ušacka dissented from the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
application of “complementarity”. She argued that the Chamber had applied 
‘an unduly high burden’32 in its definition of “investigation” and “case”, 
thereby unnecessarily hastening the requirements of admissibility. In addition 
to Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, and Burundi, by the end of 2017 the OTP had 
requested judicial authorization to open a fully-fledged investigation into the 
situation of Afghanistan, which is currently under discussion in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.33  
Hence, while only 25% of the total PEs opened proprio motu have been 
converted into full investigations, the percentage increases to as high as 
approximately 70% when looking at those initiated by referral, i.e. seven out 
of ten. As illustrated by Table 5, only the Comoros examination - concerning 
the Israeli raid on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla registered to the Union of the 
Comoros and bound for the Gaza Strip34 - and the self-referred situation of 
Gabon have been closed,35 while the recently opened Venezuelan preliminary 
examination is still ongoing. As a result, referrals compose the striking 
majority of the situations before the Court. Out of a total of 11 situations, five 
 
31 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 
‘Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II's “Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang”, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-01/11, 15 March 2011. 
32 Charles C. Jalloh, ‘Kenya vs the ICC Prosecutor’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law 
Journal 269, 274. 
33 See section 4.2 below for a discussion about whether the current Prosecutor has set a “new 
course” in the Court’s prosecutorial policies. 
34 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, ‘Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) 
Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014’, ICC-01/13, 29 November 2017. For a 
discussion on the reasons put forward by the OTP in support of its decisions, see Chapter 3, n 
122. 
35 On 21 September 2018, the OTP concluded that the information available did not provide a 
reasonable basis to believe that the acts allegedly committed in Gabon in the context of the 
2016 post-election violence and the preceding election campaign amount to crimes falling 
under ICC jurisdiction. See OTP, ‘Situation in the Gabonese Republic, Article 5 Report’, 21 
September 2018, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/180921-otp-rep-
gabon_ENG.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
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are state self-referrals, (DRC, Uganda, CAR, Mali); two were referred by the 
UNSC (Sudan, Libya); and one amounts to a de facto self-referral (Côte 
d’Ivoire).  
Additionally, Table 4 and Table 5 show that the pace at which the final 
determination is made has also greatly varied between the two sets of 
situations.36 The average duration of a preliminary examination initiated by 
state or Security Council referral is around 13 months. In cases of referral by 
the UNSC, the OTP has moved exceptionally fast. The Darfur preliminary 
examination lasted about three months, while the Libyan one became a full 
investigation in a matter of days. Vis-à-vis such extraordinary speed, it has 
even been suggested that a UNSC referral may have the practical effect of 
creating a kind of jurisdictional primacy similar to that enjoyed by the ad hoc 
tribunals.37 By contrast, the average duration of a preliminary examination 
initiated by the OTP on its own initiative is around five years. In other words, 
clinging to “positive complementarity”, the Prosecutor has normally spent 
significant time and effort monitoring and encouraging domestic 
proceedings.38 Colombia is a case in point. Here, for around 15 years ,the OTP 
has been choosing to focus on the potential of the preliminary examination to 
bring about domestic prosecutions,39 albeit, by the Office’s own admission, 
there are substantial grounds to believe that the Colombian investigations and 
prosecutions do not actually satisfy Rome Statute requirements.40 It may also 
be noted that, as a side-effect of the OTP’s longstanding interaction with 
Colombian authorities, the latter have been placed in the position of asserting 
control over other parties in the ongoing power struggles over the shaping of 
the conflict narrative, thus solidifying their position as the “victor”.41 Indeed, 
the rhetoric of the duty to prosecute international crimes has ended up 
 
36 Bosco (n 24) 401. 
37 Michael A. Newton, ‘The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or 
Evisceration?’, (2010) 8 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 115, 131. 
38 Bosco (n 24) 401.  
39 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Beyond the “shadow” of the ICC. Struggles over control of the conflict 
narrative in Colombia in Contested Justice’, in Christian M. d. Vos, Sara Kendall and Carsten 
Stahn (eds) Contested justice: The politics and practice of the International Criminal Court 
interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 432. 
40 OTP, ‘2017 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’, 4 December 2017, paras. 144, 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-
PE_ENG.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
41 See Easterday (n 39) 454.  
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energizing a right-wing “law-and-order” agenda, for which the need to 
prosecute and punish the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) has served as a powerful rhetorical device.42  
Upholders of a legalist view of the Court – including several of the 
experts I have come across during the field-work – insist that disparities in the 
outcomes and duration of PEs are merely the direct result of differences in the 
gravity of the alleged crimes, or of whether a state has genuinely investigated 
them or is undertaking tangible efforts in that direction.43 So, in keeping with 
this line of thought, the OTP would have solicited state referrals precisely in 
situations that the Prosecutor had already determined to be grave enough to 
warrant Court involvement.44   
However, as already discussed at length in the previous chapter, 
determinations of both gravity and admissibility can hardly be regarded as 
“purely legal”. Not to mention that preliminary examinations are actually a 
complex stage of activity,45 informed by strategic assumptions about the 
Court’s interventions, targets, interests, and desired impacts.46 Instead, it 
 
42 See Mark Drumbl ‘Peace and Justice in Colombia – I Fought the Law and the Law Won’, 
Justice in Conflict, 15 October 2016, available at 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/10/15/peace-and-justice-in-colombia-i-fought-the-law-
and-the-law-won/ (last visited 30 September 2018).But also ICC fugitive Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi plans to run in Libya’s presidential elections. 
43 Ibid, 405. See also The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ‘Judgment on the appeal of 
the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the 
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”’, ICC, Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/09-02/11-
274, 30 August 2011. In an effort to rebut Kenya’s reference to the careful preliminary 
examination by the Prosecutor in relation to situations other than Kenya (e.g. Colombia and 
Afghanistan), the Appeals Chamber dismissed such reference as ‘unpersuasive’ (ibid, para 44), 
stipulating that ‘the proceedings in relation to those situations are simply at a different stage 
than the proceedings in the case at hand’ (ibid). 
44 See also Bosco (n 24) 402. 
45 Christopher Stone, ‘Widening the Impact of the International Criminal Court - The 
Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examinations in the Larger System of International Criminal 
Justice’, in Martha Minow, C. Cora True-Frost and Alex Whiting (eds) The First Global 
Prosecutor - Promise and Constraints (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015) 287, 
cited in Mark Kersten, ‘Casting a Larger Shadow: Pre-Meditated Madness, the International 
Criminal Court, and Preliminary Examinations’ in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 (Torkel Opsahl Academic 2018 
forthcoming). 
46 The OTP itself has acknowledged that ‘in the course of its preliminary examination activities, 
the Office will seek to contribute to the two overarching goals of the Rome Statute: the ending 
of impunity, by encouraging genuine national proceedings, and the prevention of crimes’. See 
OTP, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations’, November 2013, para. 16, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-
ENG.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
129 | P a g .  
 
appears more reasonable to argue that there may be, in fact, a range of possible 
explanations for the differences in outcomes and duration of PEs initiated by 
the OTP on its own initiative, on the one hand, and PEs initiated by referral, 
on the other.47 A first factor may be the “fast track” enjoyed by referred 
situations under the Rome Statute.48 As illustrated in Chapter 3, affirmative 
decisions to pursue a situation referred by either a state or the UN do not 
require judicial authorization, contrary to proprio motu investigations. In a 
‘context of limited resources and situations of comparable gravity’,49 such a 
procedural shortcut may lead to the OTP favouring referrals ‘as the path of 
lesser resistance from the judges’.50 The so-called “two-step approach” to 
complementarity, as described in Chapter 3, may also facilitate the move to a 
full investigation in the context of self-referrals, insofar as domestic inactivity 
is deemed sufficient to make the case admissible.51  
In addition to the above, there may be a further order of explanations, 
namely those departing from the domain of procedural requirements and 
pertaining, instead, to considerations of political opportunity and feasibility. 
Proprio motu investigations may be rarely converted into fully-fledged 
investigations because the absence of referral portends the lack of political and 
logistical support from key state actors, which, in turn, negatively affects the 
OTP’s own “ability” and “willingness” to prosecute in that context.52 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that, as shown in Table 4 
above, the OTP’s unwillingness to open proprio motu fully-fledged investigations 
peaks outside Africa, and all the more so in situations impinging on the 
interests of major powers and their allies. Of a total of 11 proprio motu 
investigations outside Africa, the one in Georgia is the only that has been 
converted into a fully-fledged investigation, three have been closed 
(Honduras; Korea; Venezuela), while seven (Afghanistan; Colombia; Iraq/UK; 
Bangladesh/Myanmar; Palestine; Philippines; Ukraine), i.e. about 65%, 
 
47 Bosco (n 24) 401. 
48 Ibid, 405.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 406. 
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remain at the stage of preliminary examination.53 Furthermore, among  the latter, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to Colombia, have been protracted as preliminary 
examinations exceptionally long after they have been made public. The OTP has 
justified this state of affairs as resulting from the application of the “legal” requirements 
of jurisdiction and admissibility. And yet, considering that Georgia is the only non-
African full ICC investigation, as well as the protracted length of preliminary 
examinations implicating governments of major states, it is hard not to suspect the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor may end up promoting unequal standards of justice in 
accordance with the existing international distribution of political power.   
At the opposite end of the spectrum to the proprio motu investigations 
that encroach upon the interests of great powers, we find African self-referrals. 
All but one of the latter have been converted into fully-fledged investigations, 
and what is more, even relatively swiftly. Nobody could doubt, in fact, that 
state self-referrals have been an ideal venue of intervention for the Court.  They 
not only provided the institution with its ‘first work’,54 but also, since the 
territorial states agreed with the Court’s intervention, they did so while 
promising state cooperation and enhanced legitimacy for the Court.55 It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that self-referrals have been warmly encouraged by 
the OTP itself. And yet, while being clearly in line with pragmatic purposes, 
self-referrals also stand in clear tension with the formal framework of 
complementarity, as already argued in Chapter 3. This has been clearly 
exemplified by the case of Uganda. The Ugandan judiciary, one of the most 
robust in Africa,56 was not “unable” to prosecute LRA commanders, except 
that it had failed to arrest them.57 Nor was it ‘‘unwilling’’ to prosecute, except 
that it wanted the Court’s intervention58 to externalize the political costs that 
 
53 In contrast, out of a total of five investigations opened in Africa by the OTP on its own 
initiative, three have been converted into fully-fledged ones (Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya), 
i.e. 60%, and two are ongoing (Guinea and Nigeria). 
54 Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 400. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Phil Clark, ‘Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Uganda, in Phil Clark and Nicholas Waddell (eds) Courting conflict? 
Peace, Justice and the ICC in Africa (London: Royal African Society, 2008) 37, 43. 
57 Adam Branch, ‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention’ (2007) 21(2) Ethics 
& International Affairs 179, 187.  
58 Ibid. 
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hindered domestic proceedings,59 and to use the ICC as ‘another instrument 
to defeat its enemy’,60 as made clear by the language of the referral itself: 
Having exhausted every other means of bringing an end to this terrible 
suffering, the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established 
ICC and its promise of global justice. Uganda pledges its full 
cooperation to the Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of 
LRA crimes, achievement of which is vital not only for the future 
progress of the nation, but also for the suppression of the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.61  
Following Museveni’s earlier attempts to brand the LRA as “irrational”, 
“religious fundamentalists”, or “terrorists”’, a referral to the ICC could now 
transform the LRA from enemies of the Ugandan government into enemies of 
the entire international community.62 Not to mention that the ICC itself has 
its own institutional interest in intensifying friend–enemy distinctions. Given 
the Court’s dependence on state cooperation, the more its suspects are widely 
recognized as “enemies of mankind”, the greater the likelihood that external 
states will mobilize to assist the Court, for instance by executing its arrest 
warrants.63 And yet, this is exactly the point. Lacking a police force or military 
capacity, the ICC was (and is) not any more able than the Ugandan 
government to arrest LRA rebels. Accordingly, it is far from surprising that all 
ICC Ugandan suspects have been at large since the issuance of the arrest 
warrants against them in July 2005, except for Dominic Ongwen. The latter 
was transferred into ICC custody in 2015 following his surrender to the US 
taskforce established to hunt down LRA fighters, “Operation Observant 
Compass” (no longer operational since the US military shut it down in March 
2017). What I am arguing here is that the ICC opened an investigation on 
 
59 Nouwen (n 54) 394. 
60 Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political. The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 941, 
949.  
61 See Government of Uganda, ‘Referral of the Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army’, Kampala, December 2003, para. 6, cited in Branch (n 57) 196 (footnote 14). 
62 Nouwen & Werner (n 60) 949-950.  
63 Ibid, 963.      
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grounds for which it was not properly equipped to address.64 According to the 
law professors Arsanjani and Reisman, ‘in strict legal terms, a voluntary 
referral such as the one by Uganda appears to fail to satisfy the threshold for 
admissibility set out in Article 17 of the Statute’.65 They have also suggested 
that the ‘innovative allowance of voluntary referral’66 ‘may take the ICC into 
areas where the drafters of the Rome Statute had not wished to tread’,67 such 
as into being manipulated by anti-democratic ruling elites.68 All this was not 
subject to critical reflection by the OTP, whose resolute approach, instead, 
gave the impression that the requirements of complementarity could actually 
be (easily) bypassed in favour of a ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’.69 It is also 
important to recall that the policy of inviting self-referrals allows the OTP to 
avoid the judicial authorization that would be otherwise necessary if the OTP 
had acted on its own initiative.   
As described at length in section 4.3.2 below, the OTP has also adopted 
a similarly resolved approach in the context of the two UNSC referrals - 
Resolution 159370 and Resolution 1970,71 respectively referring  the situations 
of Darfur (Sudan) and Libya to the Court. Albeit both resolutions contained 
striking political biases to the advantage of the UNSC permanent members 
and their allies,72 Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo spared them from even the 
slightest critical remark. Indeed, the OTP carried out both preliminary 
 
64 Phil Clark, ‘Grappling in the Great Lakes: The challenges of international justice in Rwanda, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda’, in Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth, 
Jeremy Farrall, Jeremy Matam Farrall (eds) The Role of International Law in Rebuilding 
Societies After Conflict: Great Expectations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
244, 265.  
65 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, ‘The Law-in-Action of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2005) 99(2) American Journal of International Law 385, 395. 
66 Ibid, 397. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Nouwen (n 54)120.  
70 UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) [on Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Darfur, Sudan], 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 
(2005), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/42bc16434.html  (last visited 30 
September 2018). 
71 UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) [on establishment of a Security Council 
Committee to monitor implementation of the arms embargo against the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya], 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6ce9742.html (last visited 30 September 2018). 
72 These are further discussed in section 3.2 below. 
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examinations at an exceptionally fast pace - faster than on any other 
occasion.73 
In conclusion, while the OTP has firmly insisted that it conducts the 
same type of preliminary examination regardless of the trigger mechanism, it 
appears that the Office has developed two quite different processes, one for 
state and UNSC referrals, and another for proprio motu investigations. For 
the former, it conducts a review clearly tilted towards opening a fully-fledged 
investigation.74 In the latter, the presumption appears to be inversed,75 and a 
far more painstaking scrutiny is applied. This section has also argued that 
considerations of political opportunity and feasibility – notably, the criterion 
of “sovereign backing” – are a decisive factor behind the disparities in the 
OTP’s approach to the two set of situations. To be sure, the relevance of such 
a criterion is easily understandable from a practical point of view; that is to 
say, the effectiveness of the Court’s interventions is inescapably tied to the 
“ability” and “willingness” of states to act as the “limbs” of the Court itself.76 
Nevertheless, this state of affairs paints a very different picture of the ICC from 
the one advanced by the vast majority of its supporters: from an institution 
expected to entail an unprecedented encroachment upon state sovereignty,77 
to one clearly unable to eschew the latter.    
 
 
4.3 Case Selection and the Court’s Blind Eye  
The criterion of “sovereign backing” has also come to the fore regarding whom 
to subject (or not) to ICC jurisdiction within selected situations. Focusing on 
situations that were referred to the Court, this section shows that the selection 
of cases in state and UNSC referrals has been vitiated by double standards and 
 
73 A UNSC referral, it bears recalling, does not automatically trigger an investigation (which 
can only start if and when the OTP finds that there is a “reasonable basis” to proceed). 
74 Bosco (n 24) 395. 
75 Ibid, 396. 
76 See Antonio Cassese, ‘On Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment 
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law' (1 998) 9 European Journal of International 
Law, who has seminally described the ICC as a ‘giant without limbs’ (ibid, 13). 
77 Sibylle Scheipers, Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: International Society and 
the International Criminal Court (Manchester, GBR: Manchester University Press, 2010), 52.   
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impunity gaps reflective of the interests of the referring authorities and their 
closest allies. 
 
 
4.3.1 Self-Referrals and the Hobbesian Turn Laid Bare 
State self-referrals are, as already pointedly noted by Darryl Robinson, 
perhaps the situations that have most unequivocally exposed the ‘tensions of 
independence versus dependence, coercion versus consensus, and 
effectiveness versus legitimacy’.78 Every time a state has referred itself to the 
ICC, in fact only individuals in the bad graces of their government, and in 
particular rebel forces, have been targeted for prosecution by the Court, 
despite evidence that the government authorities may have also committed 
crimes under ICC jurisdiction in virtually all the situations.79  This is shown in 
the table below, which classifies ICC defendants according to their status. 
Importantly, the table considers their status at the time when the (first) arrest 
warrant or summons to appear was sought by the OTP (or, as clarified below, 
shortly thereafter). Yet it should be noted that the ICC intervenes in volatile 
contexts of political turmoil and power struggles. Therefore, the status of a 
suspect may have been different at the time when the crimes are alleged to 
have taken place, or it may change after the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant 
or summons, or several changes may take place over time. However, focusing 
on the time when the (first) arrest warrant or summons to appear was sought 
enables us to capture the existing distribution of power within a given situation 
at the time when the OTP decided to intervene. Consider the paradigmatic case 
of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Between 26 October 2002 and 15 March 2003, 
Bemba helped the then CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé resist a coup 
attempt by François Bozizé, who later became president. At that time, which 
is the time when Bemba is alleged to have committed his crimes, he was the 
 
78 Darryl Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win’ 
(2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 323, 333. 
79 An exception has been the transitional government of CAR led by Catherine Samba-Panza. 
On 30 May 2014, the CAR interim president referred the situation of the country to the ICC in 
relation to crimes committed in the country since 2012, and which she has apparently not been 
embroiled with.  
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leader of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC). A few months later, 
Bemba gained a governmental position, being elected as vice-president of the 
DRC from July 2003 to December 2006. However, the OTP sought an arrest 
warrant against him only on 9 May 2008, when both Bemba and Patassé had 
become private citizens. A comparable turn of events (even if less convoluted) 
has taken place in relation to the Libyan suspect Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled. 
The ICC has indicted the latter for crimes allegedly perpetrated in the context 
of the 2011 civil war, as a Lieutenant General of the Libyan army and the head 
of the Libyan Internal Security Agency (ISA) under the Gaddafi regime. But at 
the time of the arrest warrant, 27 March 2013, the Gaddafi regime had been 
ousted, and Khaled, like Bemba, had become a private citizen. Other similar 
cases are the ones against Laurent Gbagbo and his inner circle in the Côte 
d'Ivoire situation. Gbagbo has been indicted by the ICC for crimes allegedly 
committed during the 2010/2011 post-electoral violence, when he was the 
country’s incumbent president. However, the arrest warrants against Gbagbo 
and his entourage were all sought by the OTP after Gbagbo’s rival, Ouattara, 
had assumed the presidency of the country and secured their arrest. The ICC 
investigation in Kenya has also focused on alleged crimes committed in the 
context of the post-electoral violence that erupted in the country between 2007 
and 2008. But, differently from the Ivorian situation, at the time of the 
summons/arrest warrants, all the Kenyan suspects were either government 
members (Uhuru Kenyatta and Francis Muthaura), members of parliament 
(Henry Kosgey and William Ruto), or individuals under the protection of the 
government (Joshua Sang, Mohammed Hussein Ali, Walter Osapiri Barasa, 
Paul Gicheru, and Philip Kipkoech Bett). Finally, specific classificatory 
difficulties arise with regard to the status of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi in the Libyan situation. Technically, they 
were all top-ranking officials of the Gaddafi regime at the time when the OTP 
sought their arrest warrants (16 May 2011). At the same time, however, the 
regime appeared close to falling apart under pressure from the joint action of 
Libyan rebels and a NATO military operation, which had begun earlier (23 
March). Shortly thereafter, in fact, the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
was recognized by the UN as the representative of Libya (16 September), thus 
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officially replacing the Gaddafi government. Muammar Gaddafi was captured 
and killed on 20 October 2011. On 23 October, the NTC declared “the 
liberation of Libya” and the official end of the war. Summing up, Muammar 
Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi were ousted from 
power only four months after the OTP had requested their warrants of arrest. 
What is more, considering that the regime was already apparently under 
assault by both domestic and international forces when the OTP submitted its 
request, the three Libyan suspects are listed as “rebel forces & private citizens” 
for the purpose of the table below. 
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Table 6. ICC Defendants per Status and Trial Stage  
                               
  REBEL FORCES & PRIVATE CTIZENS 
 
STATE ACTORS & PROTÉGÉS 
Pre-Trial Trial / 
App/Rep 
Closed/ 
Term. 
Pre-Trial Trial / 
App/Rep 
Closed/ 
Term. 
Se
lf-
re
fe
rr
al
s 
DRC 1.Mudacumu
ra 
1.Ntaganda; 
2.Lubanga; 
3.Katanga 
1.Ngudjolo; 
2.Mbarushi
mana 
 
0 0 0 
 
Uganda 1.Kony; 
2.Otti 
1. Ongwen 1.Lukwiya; 
2.Odhiambo 
 
0 0 0 
CAR I 0 1.Bemba 
2.Mangenda 
3.Kilolo 
4.Babala 
5.Arido 
 
1.Bemba 0 
 
0 0 
Mali 1.Al-Hassan 1. Al-Mahdi 0 0 0 0 
U
N
SC
 r
ef
er
ra
ls
 
 
Libya 
1.Saif Al-
Islam 
Gaddafi; 
2.Khaled; 
0 1. Muammar 
Gaddafi; 
2.Al-
Senussi 
 
1.Al-
Werfailli 
0 0 
Sudan 1.Banda 0 1.Abu 
Garda; 
2.Jerbo 
 
 
 
1.Harun; 
2.Kushayb; 
3.Al-Bashir; 
4.Hussein 
0 0 
Pr
op
ri
o 
m
ot
u 
Kenya 0 0 0 1.Barasa; 
2.Gicheru; 
3.Bett 
0 1.Ali; 
2.Kosgey; 
3.Kenyatta; 
4.Muthaura; 
5.Ruto; 
6.Sang 
 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
1.Simone 
Gbagbo 
1.Laurent  
Gbagbo; 
2.Goudé 
0 0 0 0 
 
Tot. 
8  
(7 at large 
& 1 in ICC 
custody) 
12 9  8  
(all at 
large) 
0 6 
(29)80 28  14  
 
 
 
 
 
80 The same suspect, Bemba, has been indicted in two different cases. 
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The Ugandan government was the first to refer a situation to the ICC. 
Museveni, the President of Uganda, hoped that the ICC’s investigations into 
the LRA would cause ICC supporters (especially European governments) to 
cease treating the government and the LRA as equals;81 instead, they would 
replace their criticism about the failures and abuses of the government against 
the Acholi ethnic group in northern Uganda – whose interests the LRA claims 
to defend - with renewed support for a legitimate government fighting a hostis 
humani.82 The OTP, for its part, has shown a discernible bias towards the self-
referring government of Museveni from the outset.83 On 29 January 2004, ICC 
Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo infamously held a joint press-conference with 
Ugandan president Museveni to announce that Kampala had referred “the 
LRA” to the ICC.84 The referral was amended shortly thereafter so as to cover 
the “situation in northern Uganda”. Nonetheless, serious harm to the 
independence and legitimacy of the Court had already been done.85 What is 
more, the following year the OTP issued five arrest warrants, all for senior LRA 
commanders. Around 13 years have passed since then, and the ICC has not 
opened any investigation into alleged crimes by the Ugandan government. At 
first, on the basis of a dubious application of the gravity criterion,86 Prosecutor 
Ocampo intimated that LRA crimes were of such “gravity” compared to alleged 
UPDF crimes that the Court had to prioritize their investigation.87 A later 
statement by Mochochoko Phakiso, head of the OTP “Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity and Cooperation Division”, instead suggested that 
investigators did not have the evidence to prosecute UPDF crimes.88 And yet, 
evidence of UPDF crimes appears to be ‘supported by heaps of substantive 
 
81 Nouwen & Werner (n 60) 950. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Mark Kersten, ‘Why the ICC Won’t Prosecute Museveni’, Justice in Conflict, 19 March 2015, 
available at https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-
museveni/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Nouwen & Werner (n 60) 951. 
87  Mark Kersten, ‘Yeah, Right… ICC Officials Say There’s No Evidence Against Ugandan 
Military’, Justice in Conflict, 5 May 2016, available at 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/05/05/yeah-right-icc-officials-say-theres-no-evidence-
against-ugandan-military/ (last visited 30 September 2018).   
88 Ibid. See also James Owich, ‘No Evidence Against UPDF, Says ICC’, Acholi Times, 2 May 
2016, available at http://www.acholitimes.com/2016/05/02/no-evidence-against-updf-says-
icc/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
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evidence and research’.89 Starting from the second half of the 1990s, the 
government had instituted a policy of forced displacement of Acholi peasants, 
driving hundreds of thousands of them into camps, whose total population had 
grown to nearly a million by the time of the ICC’s intervention.90 The 
internment of the Acholis was achieved ‘through a campaign of murder, 
intimidation, and the bombing and burning of entire villages’.91 There is also 
evidence that the camps have been ‘tragically unprotected’;92 and authorities 
have ‘failed to provide adequate relief aid to the camps, leading to a massive 
humanitarian crisis with excess mortality levels of approximately 1,000 per 
week’.93 Albeit with the exception of the internment of the Acholis, the level of 
government violence is lower compared to that of the LRA (although murder, 
torture, rape, enlistment of children, and arbitrary arrests have been regularly 
perpetrated by the government forces),94 the Ugandan government policy of 
forced displacement surely amounts to a grave violation of the laws of war 
falling within ICC jurisdiction.95  
Similarly, in the DRC, the Prosecutor deliberately left all the political 
and military leaders in the DRC, as well as in Uganda and in Rwanda, in the 
shadows.96 The six cases opened so far exclusively target rebels, all operating 
in the Eastern part of the country (in the Ituri region and Kivu provinces). The 
cases against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga, which led to the 
Court’s two first convictions in 2012 and 2014, have raised particularly severe 
criticism.97 Lubanga, leader of the rebel Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) 
 
89 Kersten (n 83). See also: Chris Dolan, Social Torture – The Case of Northern Uganda 1986 
-2006 (US: Berghahn Books, 2009); Sverker Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings: War 
and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda (Uppsala: Uppsala University 
Press, 2003); Andrew Mwenda, ‘Uganda's Politics of Foreign Aid and Violent Conflict: The 
Political Uses of the LRA Rebellion’, in Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (eds.), The Lord's 
Resistance Army – Myth and Reality (UK: Zed Books, 2010)  45. 
90 Branch (n 57) 181. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid, 181-182. 
96 Pascal Kalume Kambale, ‘A story of missed opportunities. The role of the International 
Criminal Court in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in Christian M. d. Vos, Sara Kendall and 
Carsten Stahn (eds) Contested justice: The politics and practice of the International Criminal 
Court interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 171, 184. 
97 In addition to Lubanga and Katanga, cases have also been opened against Bosco Ntaganda 
(trial), Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (acquitted in 2012), Callixte Mbarushimana (charges not 
confirmed), and Sylvestre Mudacumura (at large since 2012). The Ntaganda trial has entered 
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operating in the district of Ituri, was found guilty by the ICC of enlisting and 
conscripting children under 15, and sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment. 
There is widespread acknowledgment that, no matter how worthy of sanction, 
the charges of recruitment and use of child-soldiers fail to reflect both the full 
scale of criminality in the country and the very crimes allegedly committed by 
Lubanga and his troops.98  
To start with, the Lubanga case does not take into account that the 
district of Ituri was actually the battleground for a war between the 
governments of the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda, all motivated by the desire to 
maintain/obtain political power and control over the significant natural 
resources of the region.99 In other words, the UPC’s operations were first 
under the effective control of the Ugandan army, and then of the Rwandan 
army, as was the case with most of the militia in the region.100 This view was 
expressly upheld by the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I. In a unique leap of 
judicial activism, the Chamber contended that the Prosecutor’s charges 
against Lubanga failed to recognize the “international” nature of the Ituri 
conflict, being thus insufficient.101 PTC I reiterated a similar view in the course 
of the proceedings against Katanga, commander of another armed rebel group 
fighting for political and military control in Ituri (Forces de Résistance 
Patriotique d’Ituri [FRPI]). In that occasion, the judges referred to the UNSC’s 
 
its final stages, following the closing statements that took place from 28 to 30 August 2018. 
Trial Chamber VI is expected to deliver its verdict “within a reasonable period”. Following a 
recalibration of the OTP’s approach from focused to in-depth investigations - set forth in the 
OTP Strategic Plan 2012 – 2015 - Ntaganda is accused of 13 counts of war crimes (murder and 
attempted murder; attacking civilians; rape; sexual slavery of civilians; pillaging; 
displacement of civilians; attacking protected objects; destroying the enemy’s property; and 
rape, sexual slavery, enlistment and conscription of child soldiers) and five crimes against 
humanity (murder and attempted murder; rape; sexual slavery; persecution; forcible transfer 
of population).  See OTP, ‘Strategic Plan 2012 – 2015’, 11 October 2013, para 4, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf   (last visited 30 
September 2018). 
98 James A. Goldston, ‘More Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 8(2) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 383, 395. See also William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 33. 
99 Kambale (n 96) 185.  
100 Ibid, 180. 
101 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylo, ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 220.  
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special report on the events in Ituri between 2002 and 2003.102 According to 
this: 
Ituri’s natural wealth has driven the conflict in the district. […] The 
competition for control of resource -rich centres […] by the combatant 
forces and their allies - Uganda, Rwanda and the Kinshasa authorities - 
has been a major factor in the prolongation of the crisis since they 
provide those who control production and export with very 
considerable profits.103   
Yet, later in the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber I rejected the reading advanced 
by PTC I, contending that the UPC ‘was involved in an internal armed conflict 
against the Armée Populaire Congolaise […] and other Lendu militias, between 
September 2002 and 13 August 2003’.104 As a result, the Trial Chamber 
realigned the position of the Court with the view of the Prosecutor, who never 
showed hesitation in presenting the Ituri conflict as predominantly of an 
ethnic nature, and firmly ignored the implication of the governments of the 
DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.105 Indeed, Ocampo’s narrative of “tribal warfare” 
motivated by ethnic identity did not show the slightest change, even after 
another court, the International Court of Justice, concluded that the Ugandan 
authorities were highly likely to have been involved in the very crimes 
investigated by the OTP in Ituri.106 A different approach was taken by ICC 
judge Van den Wyngaert. In her  minority opinion attached to the judgement 
in the Katanga case, the judge bitterly noted that ‘we will never fully 
understand what happened […] and especially who did what to whom and 
why’,107 making it also explicit that, in her view, the Majority Opinion had 
attached ‘too much importance to the ethnic aspects of this case’.108  
 
102 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the 
confirmation of charges’, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, 
93 [footnote 392]. 
103 UNSC S/2004/573, 16 July 2004, para. 16. 
104 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylo, ‘Summary of the “Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute”’, ICC, Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012, para 22.  
105 Ibid, 185.  
106 Ibid, 195; and Clark (n 56) 41. 
107 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’, 
Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ICC, Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3436-AnxI, 7 March 2014, para. 261.  
108 Ibid, para 318. 
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As just seen, the current selection of cases in the DRC situation may be 
aptly regarded as paradigmatic of the “inadmissibility” of socioeconomic 
contributors to violence in the international criminal justice we know today.109 
But the shortcomings of Ocampo’s approach in the Lubanga case do not end 
here. As described below, Ocampo’s decision to prosecute Lubanga for the 
conscription of child-soldiers, appears to have been based more on 
‘expediency’110 rather than gravity. The OTP, by its own admission,111 dropped 
the investigation of a wider range of crimes upon learning that Lubanga was 
about to be released, due to lack of sufficient evidence, by the Congolese 
authorities that were holding him in preventive detention on different counts 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.112 In other words, while Lubanga 
hardly fits into the category of persons bearing “the greatest responsibility”, 
the OTP decided to focus its investigation on the ‘more manageable crime of 
enlisting and conscripting children’113 so as to prevent Lubanga’s release by 
DRC authorities. A group of international NGOs sent a letter to the OTP, 
expressing their disappointment with the fact that “conscription of child-
soldiers” was all that the OTP was able to point to as “the worst crimes” 
committed by Lubanga.114 In a similar effort, the Women’s Initiatives for 
Gender Justice warned that ‘a failure to add more serious charges would result 
in “offending the victims and strengthen the growing feeling of mistrust of the 
 
109 Kamari Maxine Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the 
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Experts The Hague, 26 September 2006’, 14, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP_PH2_HGNGO.pdf (last visited 30 September 2018). 
111 OTP, ‘Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003-June 
2006)’, 12 September 2006, 8, 12, available at https://www.icc-
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725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf (last visited 30 September 
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112 Ibid, 187. Goldston (n 98) 394-395. FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights), 
‘Fourth ICC arrest warrant in the DRC situation’, 30 April 2008, available at 
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/Fourth-ICC-arrest-
warrant-in-the (last visited 30 September 2018). 
113 Kambale (n 96) 180. 
114 Ibid, 181. 
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work of the ICC in the DRC and of the work of the prosecutor especially’.115 
However, none of these attempts was successful.  
Finally, there is a further problematic aspect in Ocampo’s decision to 
prosecute Lubanga for the conscription of child-soldiers. The latter may be 
considered as a ‘textbook case of abusive complementarity’,116 resulting from 
the pernicious combination of prosecutorial “hyperactivity” and judicial 
deference summoned in Chapter 3. A case against Lubanga was, in fact, 
opened before the domestic court. It follows from here that the OTP could have 
used the complementarity mechanisms set out in the Rome Statute to help the 
Congolese justice system to address existing obstacles to the effective 
prosecution of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction.117 The judges, for their part, 
on the one hand conceded that in light of the existence of domestic 
proceedings against Lubanga, the OTP’s statement that the DRC national 
judicial system continues to be unable did ‘not wholly correspond to the reality 
any longer’,118. On the other hand, the same PTC I concluded that the case was 
admissible before the Court. Such conclusion was made possible through the 
application of a very narrow interpretation of the “same conduct test”, that is, 
by requiring a precise coincidence of criminality in form and substance. In 
other words, the Chamber contended that the charges against the suspect 
before the Congolese court did not include child-soldier offences, and 
therefore the DRC could not be said to be acting in relation to the specific case 
before the Court.119 The Katanga case is another example of the opportunities 
missed by the OTP to make good use of complementarity. Having been found 
guilty by the ICC as an accessory to one count of a crime against humanity and 
four counts of war crimes, a case against him was already before the Congolese 
courts, including charges of crimes against humanity and even genocide.120  
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The ICC’s involvement in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali have also confirmed 
the ‘tactical’121 relationship between the OTP and government authorities. 
With respect to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the OTP has always insisted that 
it would first focus on the pro-Gbagbo circle, which refused to cede power after 
the 2010 election, and later extend investigations to the alleged crimes of the 
side led by Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the incumbent president.122 It has also 
emphasized that the “sequenced” approach would not be at the cost of 
impartiality.123 However, at the time of writing, no public arrest warrants have 
been issued as a result of investigations into the side now in power. According 
to the OTP, such investigations would have been put on hold due the scarcity 
of the Office’s resources.124 Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, a former 
pro-Gbagbo political youth movement leader, are instead currently on trial 
before the ICC for crimes against humanity; and a warrant of arrest has been 
issued for ex-first Lady Simone Gbagbo, who remains a fugitive (under Ivorian 
custody).125  
Moving to the Malian situation, which focuses on the armed conflict 
between central authorities and rebel groups, the former are also suspected of 
having committed crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.126 In 2013, 
Prosecutor Bensouda herself warned the Malian authorities that her Office was 
aware of reports that Malian forces may have committed crimes under the 
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Court’s jurisdiction, urging them to investigate and prosecute those 
responsible. Up to the time of writing, Malian authorities had made little effort 
to secure accountability. And yet, no case concerning abuses allegedly carried 
out by government forces has been opened so far by the Court. 
ICC Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart has insisted that the OTP would 
be impartial, but ‘[s]ometimes [y]ou have to make a choice between action and 
paralysis and between pragmatism and ideals. And I think if you choose 
pragmatic action, you really shouldn’t be criticized’.127 The above overview has 
shown that, in line with the views put forward by the Deputy Prosecutor, the 
maintenance of cooperative relations with the government of the territorial 
state is at the top of the Court’s pragmatic concerns. Indeed, hardly anyone 
can deny that the surest way to sabotage the ICC’s ability to build cases 
(including protecting evidence and witnesses), enforce arrest warrants, and 
conduct outreach programmes is precisely by targeting the same powers that 
are meant to act as “limbs” of the Court.128 And yet, the fact remains that the 
prioritization of pragmatic concerns - such as ‘issues of political will, state 
cooperation, and protection of client states and state actors’129 - has led to a 
highly controversial - if not paradoxical - application of both complementarity 
and gravity. The Prosecutor has taken over from self-referring states cases of 
only relative “unwillingness” and “inability” on the part of the domestic 
authorities,130 i.e. cases concerning alleged crimes of rebel/opposition forces. 
For the latter, in fact, the Court can usually count on the support and 
cooperation of local authorities, from which follow greater chances of arrest 
and effective prosecution. However, not only may such cases ‘bear an inverse 
correlation with the degree of responsibility’,131 but they are also precisely the 
instances in which the chances of catalysing genuine domestic proceedings are 
also greater.132 By contrast, the ICC has ended up encouraging domestic 
proceedings in relation to the very crimes that, no matter how grave, domestic 
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authorities were plainly “unwilling” prosecute, such as the alleged crimes of 
the self-referring authorities themselves. At the same time, though, while 
portending little chance of success for the Court, such cases are also the ones 
in which “positive complementarity” is least likely to be effective.133 It goes 
without saying that the absence of ICC cases against executive branches has 
ended up entrenching their authority and power - against the very interests of 
their people - by providing external (symbolic) resources, mobilising internal 
support, and, arguably, even enhancing the militarization of the state. Indeed,  
these impunity gaps may be regarded as complicit in the increase in sovereign 
power among actors competing over resources and regional control.134 In 
conclusion, the ICC’s turn against non-state actors - and hence implicitly in 
favour of the state – suggests a much more Hobbesian version of international 
criminal law than the one traditionally envisaged:135 one in which states are 
helped to exercise criminal repressive powers against their enemies.136 The 
widespread concern during the process that led to the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute had been about a court that, by imposing its jurisdiction, could 
run roughshod over state sovereignty.137 State self-referrals have made evident 
that problems relating to the ICC and state sovereignty may end up being quite 
the opposite from what had been expected.138  
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4.3.2 An ad hoc Court of the UNSC139 
As already anticipated, both Resolution 1593 and Resolution 1970 made 
substantive concessions to UNSC permanent members and their allies.140 In 
fact, not only has the UNSC referred Sudan and Libya to the Court while failing 
to refer other situations,141 but – crucially – the Court’s intervention in those 
two peripheral states could take place only at the ultimate price of major states 
having their military personnel, political elites, and allies shielded from ICC 
jurisdiction. 
The preamble of Resolution 1593 did not even cite Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute, according to which the Security Council, using its powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may refer situations to the ICC regardless of 
whether the concerned states are parties to the Rome Statute. But it cited only 
the power of deferral under Article 16,142 which entitles the Council to defer an 
investigation or prosecution for the renewable period of one year, if either is 
considered as a threat to international peace and security. Presumably under 
the latter, the resolution excluded nationals of non-party states other than 
Sudan (participating in any UN or AU operations in the country) from the 
Court’s jurisdiction.143 Indeed, as a permanent - rather than one-year - deferral 
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and by giving blanket immunity from ICC jurisdiction to a wide range of actors, 
such an application of Article 16 went beyond even the powers granted to the 
UNSC by the article itself.144 Furthermore, the preamble of the resolution 
“noted” – and thereby legitimized - the bilateral agreements concluded by the 
US with several states in an attempt to shield US citizens from ICC jurisdiction. 
US authorities have insisted that such bilateral agreements are in line with 
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. This precludes the Court from proceeding 
“with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements”. However, 
while Article 98(2) is intended to cover existing agreements between states (so 
as to prevent legal conflicts which might arise because of existing agreements), 
the US bilateral immunity agreements were geared towards gaining 
prospective impunity for US nationals, being thus contrary to the intention of 
the Rome Statute (and even ‘violating principles of equality before the law’).145 
Resolution 1593 also barred the UN from paying any of the ICC’s costs arising 
from the Court’s proceedings, requiring that the parties to the Rome Statute 
bear those costs. Finally, unlike the resolutions that established the ad hoc 
tribunals, the resolution did not establish the obligation for all UN member 
states to cooperate with the Court. Rather, it simply “urged” their cooperation, 
while clearly stipulating that states that are not parties to the Rome Statute 
have “no obligation”. As Lawrence Moss has noted, the greater part of this 
extensive list of concessions was geared towards the actually rather theoretical 
value of establishing immunity from the ICC for US nationals. The likelihood 
of any US national committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court in 
Sudan is, in fact, remote.146 While such concessions nevertheless proved 
crucial to persuading the US to abstain and allow the resolution to pass, the 
UNSC also exacted a serious toll on its own credibility, as well as the Court’s 
independence and legitimacy.147  
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Six years after the referral of Sudan, on 26 February 2011, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 referring the situation of Libya 
to the ICC. This was followed, on 17 March 2011, by Resolution 1973 
authorizing “all Necessary Measures to protect” Libyan civilians. Operation 
Unified Protector (OUP) started only few days later, on 23 March 2011.148 The 
decision to refer Libya to the ICC resulted from a convergence of strategic 
interests among the UNSC members,149 several of which had maintained close 
relationship with Gaddafi until not long before. The language of the Darfur 
referral was used again, largely unchanged, due to the ease and exceptional 
speed with which Resolution 1970 was adopted.150 Like Resolution 1593, the 
Libyan referral excluded non-party states nationals (other than Libya, in this 
case) from ICC jurisdiction. What is more, it even went further than its 
archetype, restricting the ICC jurisdiction to events post-15 February 2011 to 
preclude even state parties to the Rome Statute from having their affairs with 
Libya come under scrutiny. As a result, the states that had been entangled with 
the Gaddafi regime until very recently could now help overturn it while having 
their military personnel and political elite mostly exempted from the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Finally, Resolution 1970 also reiterated the reference to the 
Security Council’s power of deferral, the exemption of the UN from paying the 
costs of the investigation, and the stipulation that ICC non-member states 
have no “obligation” to cooperate with the Court.  
None of the conditions and double standards contained by both 
referral-resolutions were subject to critical scrutiny by the OTP, whose 
selection of cases, instead, fully complied with them. As a result, the Office has 
been careful not to draw any attention to the abuses committed by the 
international military forces that supported the anti-Gaddafi factions, as well 
 
148 UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya], 17 March 2011, S/RES/1973 (2011), para 4, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html (last visited 30 September 2018). The 
resolution was passed with five abstained (Brazil, Germany, and India, and permanent 
members China and Russia) and none opposed. OUP involved 18 participating countries (14 
NATO member-states and four partners): Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
149 Anna F. Triponel and Paul R. Williams, ‘The Clash of the Titans: Justice and Realpolitik in 
Libya’ (2013) 28 (3) American University International Law Review 775, 799-800.  
150 Moss (n 140) 9. 
150 | P a g .  
 
as by the domestic combatants themselves. This is despite the fact that 
Operation Unified Protector had started after the 15 February 2011 threshold 
established by Resolution 1970, and crimes allegedly committed by ICC state 
parties would therefore fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court. It is 
estimated that OUP’s air-strikes killed at least 55 to 72 civilians, many of them 
children under the age of 18. According to Human Rights Watch, questions 
arise  
as to whether the attacking forces acted fully in accordance with their 
obligations under the laws of war to exercise “constant care to spare the 
civilian population” and take “all feasible precautions” to minimize loss 
of civilian life.151 
As to domestic forces, the Misrata militia, accused by the Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya of serious crimes,152 was even praised by former Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo as an ‘example for the world’.153 As noted by “Lawyers 
for Justice in Libya” and “Redress Trust”, the disparity between the 
prosecution of Gaddafi loyalists and members of revolutionary brigades has 
been striking: the latter received ‘blanket amnesty’;154 the members of the 
Gaddafi regime, instead, were subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the Court, as 
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illustrated by the controversial rejection of the Libyan government’s 
admissibility challenge in the Gaddafi case recalled in the previous chapter. It 
should also be noted that the recent indictment of Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf 
Al-Werfalli (2017), who fought against the Gaddafi regime back in  2011,  
actually means little with regard to the absence of prosecutions - domestically 
or internationally - for crimes perpetrated by anti-Gaddafi forces in the 2011 
Libyan civil war.155 Nowadays a brigade commander active within the Libyan 
National Army (LNA), the ICC has charged Al-Werfalli for war crimes allegedly 
committed not during the fight against Gaddafi, but between 2016 and 
January 2018. Furthermore, the LNA commander General Khalifa Haftar 
publicly expressed his gratitude for the ICC indictment of Al-Werfalli,156 thus 
pointing to a troublesome alignment of interests between the OTP and Libyan 
authorities. Haftar himself, in fact, has had a career as a warlord. He emerged 
as the new strongman in Eastern Libya after Gaddafi’s defeat, by 2015, and 
there were already suspicions that war crimes may have been committed by 
his heavily armed troops.157 What is more, Haftar’s rise to power had been 
supported by Hassan Tatanaki, a Libyan oil billionaire deeply involved in the 
Libyan civil war, and also a key figure in the recent “Ocampo Affair”. This blew 
up in September 2017, when tens of thousands of previously unknown 
documents, including ICC internal documents, were obtained by Mediapart, a 
French investigative website, and a DER SPIEGEL team, who analysed them 
in partnership with the European Investigative Collaborations (EIC) reporting 
network.158 According to the leaked documents, near the end of his term the 
ex-Prosecutor was apparently to be paid 2.55 million euros to advise Tatanaki. 
The documents also contain allegations concerning the role of current staff 
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members of the OTP,159 including the sharing of potentially confidential 
information with the former Prosecutor. While the latter were promptly 
rebutted by Bensouda, how “willing” her Office has been to look into the 
conduct of Haftar and his closest circle remains dubious. 
 
 
4.4 The Persistent Failure to Successfully 
Prosecute State Actors and their Protégés 
The analysis of the ICC’s practice so far has painted a picture of a court largely 
“unwilling” to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes of representatives of 
state powers. As illustrated in Table 6, most of the individuals indicted by the Court 
were affiliated to rebel/opposition forces at the time of the issuance of the ICC arrest 
warrants (or shortly thereafter), i.e. about 70%. This percentage rises to as much as 
100% if we consider only self-referrals. But the picture becomes even grimmer if 
we move on to consider the outright failures of the few attempts to prosecute 
state actors and their protégés. More than 15 years since its establishment, the ICC 
has still to apprehend a single state actor or protégé, with such an inability looming 
as perhaps the clearest sign of the enduring force of state sovereignty. 
In Sudan, Prosecutor Ocampo opened five cases targeting both rebel 
forces and state actors, for a total of seven suspects. Three rebels were charged 
with orchestrating an attack against the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan 
that led to the deaths of 12 peacekeepers. The Pre-Trial Chamber did not 
confirm the charges against one of the individuals, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda. 
Another, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, remains at large, after voluntarily 
appearing before the ICC at the pre-trial stage. Proceedings against another 
suspect, Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, were terminated following his 
passing. The Sudanese state actors indicted by the Court are Ali Muhammad 
Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), alleged commander of the Janjaweed 
militia acting in coordination with the Sudanese armed forces as part of the 
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counterinsurgency campaign; Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”), 
Minister of the State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan; Abdel 
Raheem Muhammad Hussein, current Minister of National Defence and 
former Minister of the Interior and former Sudanese President’s Special 
Representative in Darfur; and, finally, Sudan’s sitting head of state, President 
Omar Al-Bashir. The case against the latter, it should be noted, is the sole case 
in the history of the ICC involving charges of genocide. In the first months of 
his investigations, Prosecutor Ocampo approached the Sudanese government 
‘with velvet gloves’.160 In his first reports to the UNSC, he emphasized the 
instances in which Sudan cooperated with the Court, while glossing over any 
refusal to cooperate.161 When bringing his first case in 2007, the Prosecutor 
continued his efforts not to alienate the Sudanese government by initially 
focusing on two senior, but not top-level officials, Harun and Kushayb.162 The 
OTP also requested that the judges consider issuing summonses to appear as 
a less confrontational alternative to arrest warrants.163 Up to that time, the 
Sudanese government had continued its cooperation with the ICC in its case 
against the LRA, and even allowed ICC officials into the country for the 
purpose of admissibility assessments. It was only after the indictment of 
Harun and Kushayb that Khartoum broke off all cooperation,164 and the OTP, 
in turn, also changed its policy into one of full confrontation.165 The result has 
been a decade-long stalemate, in which all the state actors indicted by the ICC 
remain fugitives. It bears recalling that this is so despite the unparalleled 
gravity of their alleged crimes - both when compared to the charges brought 
against the three rebels indicted in the same situation, i.e. the killing of 12 
peacekeepers, and all other ICC situations. 
But Khartoum’s strenuous opposition to the Court’s intervention is not 
the only factor to blame for the ICC’s failure to discharge its mandate in Sudan. 
A crucial role should be attributed to the lack of cooperation of several states, 
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in addition to the UNSC itself, whose referral has been followed by inactivity. 
Since the issuance of the first ICC arrest warrant against him, Al-Bashir has 
travelled to several countries, some of which are states parties and all of which 
are UN members. The list of states allowing Al-Bashir to enter their territory 
and failing to surrender the suspect to the Court includes a number of state 
parties: the Republic of Chad (July 2010, August 2011, February 2013, 
December 2017); the Republic of Kenya (August 2010); Djibouti (May 2011 
and May 2016); Malawi (October 2011); DRC (February 2014); South Africa 
(June 2015); Uganda (May 2016 and November 2017); Jordan (March 2017). 
In accordance with Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, these states were all 
referred to the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council, with the 
exception of South Africa, in respect of which only non-cooperation 
proceedings have been undertaken.166 All the referred states, and South Africa, 
supported by the African Union, have contended that competing obligations 
under customary international law trump obligations under ICC law, notably 
the obligation to provide state officials with immunity from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction. The Rome Statute, for its part, while clearly waving any 
immunities for senior government officials of state parties (Article 27), leaves 
room to interpretation as far as government officials of non-party states are 
concerned. More to the point, on the one hand Article 27 states that official 
capacity shall, in no case, exempt a person from criminal responsibility under 
the Rome Statute; on the other hand, Article 98(1) requires the Court not to 
issue requests for cooperation that would result in states parties violating their 
obligations to provide immunities to senior officials of third states under 
customary international law. To complicate things further, the question 
whether a state party must respect the immunity of the head of state of a non-
party state when the arrest of the latter is sought by the Court has been the 
subject of a series of conflicting decisions by the Pre-Trial Chambers.167 On 12 
March 2018 Jordan appealed the decision rendered by the PTC. According to 
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the Chamber, Al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity because the UNSC referral 
has had the effect of placing Sudan in a position analogous to a state party, 
with the consequence that article 98(1) of the Statute is not applicable to the 
case.168 This is the first time that the Appeals Chamber is considering the 
matter of a referral of a state party’s non-compliance to the ASP and the UNSC. 
During the hearings, which took place from 10 to 14 September 2018, the 
Appeals Chamber received oral submissions on legal matters raised in this 
appeal from representatives of Jordan, the ICC Prosecutor, and amici curiae 
including representatives of the AU, the League of Arab States, and 
international law professors. After years of legal wrangling around the 
execution of the Court arrest warrants for Sudanese President Al-Bashir, the 
expectations are high that the Appeals Chamber will finally issue a decision 
that will definitely settle the position of the ICC.169 Furthermore, Jordan’s 
appeal was preceded in January 2018 by the AU’s decision, taken during the 
30th session of the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis 
Ababa, to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the question of the 
relationship between Article 27 and Article 98 and the obligations of ICC states 
parties under wider international law.170 The ICJ has not pronounced itself yet; 
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and while we also await for the ICC Appeals Chamber’s decision, the scope of 
the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir, and the heads of states of 
non-party states more broadly, remains surrounded by uncertainty.171 What is 
already clear, though, is that the lack of state cooperation has been a decisive 
weakness even in the context of UNSC referrals.172 In fact, while the effective 
power to arrest ICC suspects solely rests with states,173 neither state parties nor 
the Council have taken any ‘tangible action’.174 But with no follow-up action on 
the part of the international community, the practical limitations of going after 
heads of states are possibly insurmountable,175 and any referral involving the 
alleged crimes of the latter would hence become ‘futile’.176 
The Court’s efforts to prosecute state actors and their protégés in 
Kenya, a state party to the Rome Statute contrary to Sudan, have not been 
much more successful. Following the 2007-2008 post-election violence in 
Kenya, ICC Prosecutor Ocampo visited Kenya to discuss the proceedings with 
President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, in an effort to secure their 
cooperation – and perhaps even a referral.177 However, when it became clear 
that the government would not make such move, the Prosecutor asked and 
obtained authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation 
proprio motu. As a result of the Prosecutor’s investigations, the ICC opened 
cases against suspects from both sides of the contested elections. In March 
2011, six individuals, equally divided between the Party of National Unity 
(PNU) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), were summoned to appear. 
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Charges were confirmed against four of the six, still equally divided between 
political parties - Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Francis Kirimi Muthaura for 
PNU, and William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang for ODM - and were 
subsequently dropped against Francis Muthaura, the former head of the civil 
service for the PNU. In 2013 arrest warrants (no longer summons) were issued 
for Walter Osapiri Barasa, and in 2015 for Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech 
Bett, all allegedly responsible for offences against the administration of justice. 
In the meantime, Kenyatta (PNU) and Ruto (ODM) had joined forces under 
their shared opposition to the ICC,178 running jointly in Kenya’s 2013 
presidential election. Following the elections, they assumed office as, 
respectively, President and Deputy President of Kenya. That is also when the 
vehement opposition to the Court’s proceedings by the newly established 
government started turning into a criminal scheme geared towards corruptly 
influencing witnesses and persuading them to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, 
this plan proved successful in undermining the OTP’s capacity to collect and 
preserve the evidence it needed to build cases bearing reasonable prospects of 
conviction. Since Kenyatta and Ruto’s election, the issue of Kenyan 
sovereignty has also become a prominent theme. This, indeed, has 
progressively grown into an existential threat to the ICC, as African leaders 
started mobilizing around the claim of neo-colonialism and threats to African 
sovereignty and self-determination more broadly,179 driven, among other 
things, by the Court’s ‘selective geographies of intervention’.180 At Kenyatta’s 
inauguration ceremony in April 2013, President Museveni of Uganda, 
previously a convinced ally of the Court, noted that ‘“the usual opinionated and 
arrogant actors” are using the ICC “to install leaders of their choice in Africa 
and eliminate the ones they do not like”’.181 Not even the collapse of the ICC 
cases against Kenyatta in March 2015 and Ruto and Sang in April 2016 due to 
lack of sufficient evidence182 has done much to keep the tensions between 
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African states and the ICC at bay. Rather, contestation of the Court’s 
prosecutorial choices has continued to be played out through the language of 
sovereignty.183 Tensions culminated in the withdrawal of Burundi from the 
Rome Statute in late 2016.184 Burundi’s withdrawal was echoed by a broader 
pushback over the prosecution of sitting leaders,185 this leading to, among 
other things, the filing of a notice of withdrawal by South Africa (albeit found 
constitutionally invalid by the South African High Court due to lack of 
parliamentary approval), originally a staunch supporter of the Court,186 and 
even threats of mass-withdrawal by the AU.187 
Summing up, it appears that the ICC has two kinds of relationships with 
states on whose territory it is investigating crimes: cooperative, when states 
refer situations on their territory, and adversarial, where it examines official 
wrongdoing by an entrenched regime.188 In the former, as seen in the previous 
section, the ICC’s dependence on domestic authorities has resulted in the 
Court’s catering to the interests of domestic authorities themselves. In the 
latter, as shown just above, cooperation by domestic authorities is unlikely. 
The prospects for prosecution are, hence, tied to the willingness of external 
actors to deploy coercive instruments to change the balance of power against 
the government whose practices are under ICC scrutiny.189 The UN Operation 
Unified Protector, which contributed to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, 
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may be considered, to date, an isolated case. What is more, it has also 
remained a far from successful one, considering that the participating states 
soon proved to be more interested in following-up on their own interests in 
the region, and Gaddafi’s ICC arrest warrant is thus still pending. In line with 
these considerations, the element of “top-down” enforcement has been 
severely restricted, ‘if not exactly trivialized’,190 in the Court’s practice, either 
already at the level of selection and prioritization choices, or subsequently at 
the level of outcomes, meaning that the Court has proved unable to effectively 
investigate and prosecute. 
 
 
4.4.1 (Recalibrating the Critique of) African Bias 
A further significant pattern, which we have already touched upon and on 
which this section focuses, is their apparent accordance with the existing 
distribution of political power among states, in addition to within them. At the 
time of writing, Georgia is the only fully-fledged investigation outside Africa, 
and every single person indicted by the OTP is African and black.191 While, as 
discussed in the section below, such a state of affairs may be expected to 
undergo some change, this consideration does not spare us from asking why 
the selection of defendants has been so stark as to suggest that Africans have 
a “monopoly” on international crime.192 Indeed, not even a radical change - 
which, at any rate, is hardly likely to take place - could undo the ICC’s record 
so far, let alone at a time when the ICC “African bias” is at the centre of the 
quarrel between a number of African member-states and the Court.193  
Both during the interviews undertaken for the purpose of this study (see 
Annex II, code 2: “compliance of the ICC’s decisions with the Rome Statute”) 
and elsewhere, the OTP and some of the Court’s staunchest supporters have 
been keen on emphasizing that, of a total of ten African situations currently 
under ICC investigation, only on two occasions has the ICC become involved 
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by the OTP on its own initiative (Kenya and Burundi). In contrast, in six 
instances the Court’s intervention was required by the state parties themselves 
(Uganda, DRC, CAR – which has requested the Court’s intervention in two 
instances – Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali); in two other situations, the ICC became 
involved at the request of the UNSC (Sudan and Libya). Much has already been 
said in this chapter, and the previous one, to shed light on the complex and, 
more to the point, highly discretional character of the OTP’s selection choices. 
Suffice it to recall the most basic fact that a state party referral does not 
automatically trigger an investigation, which will only start when the 
Prosecutor finds that there is a “reasonable basis” to proceed. But a crucial 
point still needs to be articulated clearly and brought to the forefront of the 
critique. The ICC’s African focus is, at a closer look, a focus on African rebels. 
In other words, African rebels – and not African state actors – do make up for 
both the majority of the ICC suspects and the totality of the individuals 
successfully prosecuted. Acknowledging this qualifications is of crucial 
importance if we do not want to feed the highly unlikely expectation of a 
reversal of the Court’s African bias. In fact, the overwhelming focus on African 
rebels is in line with the very structure of the Rome Statute. That is to say, by 
placing some of the Court’s major functions at the disposal of states’ processes 
and decisions, the Statute itself has laid the ground for a Court largely 
“unwilling” and even more “unable” to successfully prosecute state actors and 
their protégés. At the same time, in more stabilized societies, state actors and 
their protégés are highly more likely than rebels to commit crimes under ICC 
jurisdiction. 
But there is also a further structural reason why we should not feed ill-
placed expectations in the future of the Court. Such reason lays deeper than 
the everyday functioning of the institution and even pre-dates the Rome 
negotiations, that is, the ICC regime is ab initio built on the structural 
inequality between centre and periphery.194 More to the point, the Court’s –
subject matter, personal and temporal – jurisdiction reflects a certain view of 
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justice that entrenches existing divides by steering judicial intervention 
towards the periphery of the world.195 I am referring to a set of interconnected 
and mutually-reinforcing biases,196 such as political-economic and 
civilizational biases, which, in turn entail a ‘global epistemic hierarchy’197 to 
which the distribution of symbolic value and resources are inescapably tied. 198 
The ICC jurisdiction has thus been tailored so as to focus on “atrocity crimes” 
- less likely to take place in stabilized societies - and on those particularly 
“savage” individuals199 bearing the “greatest responsibility” thereof. Less 
spectacular forms of domination, violence, and inequality, as well as complex 
stories of complicity and entanglement, have been placed beyond the scope of 
justice as defined in the Rome Statute.200 An ‘entire history of Western 
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violence’,201 ‘colonial subject formation’,202 and economic exploitation in 
Africa are all striking examples that fall all outside the Court’s jurisdiction. To 
these, we should add persisting postcolonial histories, e.g. the criminal 
responsibility of Western states, corporations, as well as donors and aid 
agencies, even in those episodes of violent atrocity that the ICC is willing to 
investigate.203 Hence, in line with the existing international institutions, the 
Rome Statute mandates intervention in the outskirts of the world, thus having 
‘the incidental effect of seeming to legitimate the social evil that it does not 
condemn’;204 and, perhaps more than any other institution, as Antonio 
Franceschet has already bitterly noted, the ICC has been tacitly given the task 
of managing the effects of inequality in international society.205 In short, while 
most of the attention is placed on the Court’s daily prosecutorial choices, both 
their implementation and, most fundamentally,  the idea of justice itself set 
forth in the Rome Statute are even more inescapably bound up with a fact 
which is as fundamental as it is overlooked: the more we insist on the technical 
character of international criminal law, the more we look away from its role in 
ratifying ‘the hegemony of that on whose shoulders justice sits’.206 
 
 
4.4.2 A New Course in the ICC’s Prosecutorial Strategy? 
More “Willing” but Not Any More “Able” 
Several observers have pointed to a reorientation of the Court’s prosecutorial 
policies since the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, took office in mid-
2012. The preceding term of Luis Moreno Ocampo has been poignantly 
summarized by Hans Koechler in terms of a ‘sharp discrepancy between 
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hesitation, even inaction, on the one hand and decisive, bold prosecutorial 
initiatives on the other – depending on the political circumstances’.207 Leading 
to the opening of  19 cases – all against Africans – and only a single verdict for 
a mid-level warlord at the end of his term (Lubanga), Ocampo’s prosecutorial 
policies were geared towards the questionable twofold objective of showcasing 
the ICC’s “industriousness” while at the same time appeasing the diffidence of 
powerful states.208  
Bensouda seems to be heading towards a different path in several 
respects. Her approach is more understated and careful,209 as attested by the 
limited number of cases (i.e. seven) opened up to the time of writing (that is, 
less than three years from the end of her mandate). One of these cases led to 
the conviction of Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi, sentenced to nine-years 
imprisonment for intentionally directing attacks against historic monuments 
and religious buildings. Three other cases concern offences against the 
administration of justice in the Kenyan and CAR situation, one of which led to 
a guilty verdict for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido. Two 
other cases in the Libyan situation involve, respectively, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed 
Khaled, a former official in the Gaddafi regime, and the already mentioned Al-
Werfalli. Both suspects remain at large. Finally, on 31 March 2018 the Malian 
authorities surrendered Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud 
to the ICC, a Malian member of Ansar Eddine and the de facto chief of the 
Islamic police, whose arrest warrant had been issued by the PTC only a few 
days before.  
Part of Bensouda’s mandate has, hence, been ‘to clean the slate after a 
number of bungled investigations and prosecutions’,210 while making the ICC’s 
Office of the Prosecutor ‘increasingly strategic and opportunistic in its 
decision-making’.211 For instance, let us consider that when the OTP sought 
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Al-Mahdi’s arrest, he had already spent one year in a prison in Niger and 
pledged to cooperate with legal proceedings.212 Not to mention that the 
Prosecutor could even count on video evidence showing Al-Mahdi committing 
the acts he was accused of.213 To be sure, all of this made the case particularly 
expeditious.214 On the other hand, Al Mahdi is also suspected to have 
committed other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court (murder, rape, and 
torture); but he was not prosecuted for them – perhaps, we can speculate, 
because the OTP could not find sufficient evidence to make this case, or 
because abstaining from pursuing such a case was part of the plea bargain.215 
In the Al Hassan case, the Malian authorities surrendered the suspect to the 
Court exceptionally swiftly - only few days after the issuance of his arrest 
warrant.216 Finally, turning to the Al-Werfalli case in the Libyan situation, 
whereas the suspect is currently still at large, the top tier of the Libyan 
National Army at least paid lip service to the ICC indictment of the 
commander.  
However, there are more nuances to Bensouda’s “new course”. The 
pursuit of (the bulk of) cases that can be adjudicated efficiently has coexisted 
with the opening of a number of investigations (to be sure, especially 
preliminary examinations) that, while running counter to the interests of both 
powerful and less powerful states, may help the ICC ‘regain the active support 
of the thousands of civil society groups that supported its establishment’.217 In 
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April 2014, the OTP opened proprio motu a preliminary examination into the 
situation in Ukraine, which, if turned into a formal investigation, may 
implicate alleged crimes of Russian forces. The following month, upon receipt 
of new information, the Office re-opened the preliminary examination of the 
situation in Iraq, including allegations of war crimes by British troops, initially 
terminated on 9 February 2006. At the beginning of 2015, the OTP made 
public its preliminary examination into alleged crimes committed by Israeli 
and Palestinian forces in the occupied Palestinian territory. One year later, the 
Prosecutor launched the Court’s the first full-blown investigation outside of 
the African continent - in Georgia - which also marked the first time that the 
ICC is dealing with international crimes.218 Before that, the Court had not dealt 
with the international aspects of internal conflicts it has investigated, such as 
in the DRC and Libya.219 On 25 October 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
authorized the Prosecutor to open a proprio motu investigation in Burundi for 
alleged crimes against humanity committed by the government and affiliated 
groups. While Burundi is not a major power, the opening of such an 
investigation is at odds with the OTP’s disinclination to target state actors. 
Indeed, it resulted in Burundi withdrawing from the Rome Statute, the only 
state to ever leave the Court. But it was less than one month later, on 20 
November 2017, that the OTP took a momentous - if long overdue - 
decision.220 After a decade-long preliminary examination, Bensouda put an 
end to the era of warming relations between the Court and US authorities221 
by requesting judicial authorization to commence an investigation into alleged 
crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan since 3 May 2003, and other 
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alleged crimes linked to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and committed on 
the territory of other states parties since 1 July 2002. Following Bensouda’s 
move, the ICC may become the first international organization to put the 
alleged war crimes of senior American officials under judicial scrutiny.222 The 
OTP’s new course against state actors did not end here. At the beginning of the 
following year, in February 2018, the OTP announced the opening of two 
preliminary examinations in the situations of the Philippines and Venezuela, 
two state parties to the Rome Statute, both targeting alleged crimes of 
government forces. Only two months later, vis-à-vis the UNSC’s failure to refer 
Myanmar to the Court, in an unprecedented bid, Bensouda asked the Court’s 
judges to rule on whether the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the alleged 
deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar, a non-party state, to 
Bangladesh, which is a state party. This is one of the well-documented crimes 
attributed to Myanmar’s armed forces against the Rohingya. Upon 
confirmation by PTC I, on 18 September 2018, the OTP announced the 
opening of a preliminary examination of the situation. In addition to all of this, 
the Prosecutor has repeatedly launched appeals to state parties to increase the 
budget allocated to the OTP and thus enable it to catch up with the ‘delay in 
investigating both sides’, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, for instance.223  
Many commentators have welcomed these OTP’s moves as a good way 
to react to the ICC’s legitimacy crisis and, notably, to rebut the critique of a 
court focusing only on weak (African) countries.224 What is perhaps 
underestimated is that these moves were largely inevitable.225 In Georgia, the 
OTP delayed making a decision for seven years. In Afghanistan, it waited for 
10 years. But, in both cases, it could not continue delaying forever.226 Some of 
the victims may have died and some of the potential witnesses may be very 
elderly people; not to mention that such a delayed intervention is likely to have 
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undermined the trust of the affected communities in the process.227 In the case 
of Burundi, in contrast, delay was not an option.228 The Rome Statute in fact 
sets a one-year deadline, providing that the withdrawing state continues to 
have a legal obligation to cooperate with any investigation opened before the 
effective date of withdrawal, that is, one year after the notification of 
withdrawal (Article 127).229 Another example is the public opening of the 
preliminary examination into the Palestinian situation. The latter followed 
Palestine’s accession to the Rome Statute and its lodging of an Article 12(3) 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, which in turn had been made 
possible by the earlier upgrade of Palestine to “non-member state” observer 
status at the UN. 
There are also other reasons to be less enthusiast about what these 
investigations will mean for the ICC.230 In particular, even if there may be 
legitimacy gains, these may be short-lived.231 Above all, it should be recalled 
that the investigations in Georgia, Burundi, and Afghanistan were or will be 
opened on the Prosecutor’s own authority. In other words, since no state party 
has asked for an investigation, there are reasons to doubt that the countries 
involved will be cooperative. This means that, even if – at the very best – the 
Court manages to gather enough evidence, the prospects for arrests are dim.232 
For example, while the Georgian government has so far largely cooperated 
with the Court, things might change if there is an arrest warrant against a 
Georgian, ‘depending on whether it is against a member of the military, the 
previous government or the current government’.233 Far from promising is 
Russia’s withdrawal of signature from the Rome Statute (following the OTP’s 
allegations of crimes committed by Russian forces on Ukrainian territory),234 
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which certainly does not bode well in terms of cooperation by Russian 
authorities (involved in both the Georgian situation and in the Ukrainian 
preliminary examination). By the same token, turning to Burundi, cooperation 
is the last thing we may reasonably expect from the government that pulled 
out of the Court right after the opening of a preliminary examination into the 
country. Nor can we reasonably expect self-incriminating cooperation from 
the government of the United States,235 as resoundingly emphasized by US 
national security adviser John Bolton during a virulent attack on the Court in 
September 2018.236 It is also doubtful whether the ICC will have ‘the political 
juice’237 to persuade its most staunch supporters in Europe to cooperate with 
the Court while incurring the wrath of the current US government. Hence, the 
question arises of what would be left of the Court’s standing if European 
countries break in favour of the US.238 Add to this that Taliban crimes 
constitute most of the crimes that fall under ICC jurisdiction.239 In this respect, 
it bears recalling that the 2017 Report on Preliminary Examinations excludes 
that there exists a reasonable basis to believe that civilian deaths resulting 
from the military operations of international forces amount to war crimes.240 
All these things considered, there is, as Mark Kersten has concluded, nearly 
‘every chance that the Court’s investigation into Afghanistan will never result 
in a successful ICC prosecution of a US official’.241  
By the same token, the prospect of lack of cooperation is also likely to 
daunt the Prosecutor in the context of other preliminary examinations 
implicating government forces. To put it differently, there is the risk that 
several of them will be added to the list of “extended” preliminary 
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examinations. Palestine is a case in point. The Prosecutor, in fact, will have to 
settle several daunting legal questions before opening a formal investigation. 
In an attempt to speed up the clock, on 22 May 2018 the Palestinian Authority 
referred the situation of Palestine to the ICC. The referral came after more than 
100 Palestinians were killed and 10,000 injured by Israeli troops during six 
weeks of protests along the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel. 
However, although a state referral makes it much harder for the OTP to 
protract the preliminary examination phase for years, it is unlikely that 
Bensouda will rush into the opening of a formal investigation. Rodrigo 
Duterte, Philippines’ President, has announced that he will seek to withdraw 
the country from the Rome Statute.242 Myanmar has also promptly stated its 
firm opposition to the Court’s preliminary examination.243 Even the UK 
authorities, while boasting one of the strongest legal systems in the world, have 
never shown any genuine attempt to prosecute high-ranking military 
commanders and senior officials who ordered and/or were complicit in the 
commission of war crimes in Iraq. Their willingness to do so appears even 
more remote now that the Iraq Historical Allegations Team (IHAT) has been 
permanently shut down by the government.244 Hence, the extent to which the 
latter will meet its commitments under the Rome Statute in the case of a fully-
fledged investigation remains unclear. A nuanced position has been 
apparently taken by Venezuelan authorities, who have been under ICC 
attention for crimes allegedly committed in the context of demonstrations and 
related political unrest in country since, at least, April 2017. While rejecting 
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the opening of the preliminary examination, the government has reiterated its 
commitment to the Rome Statute. It has also guaranteed its cooperation with 
the Court in order to achieve a swift closure of the inquiry.245 
To conclude, many ICC supporters had expected that the Court’s 
problems would greatly improve once the new Prosecutor took the reins.246 
However, we should still ask to what degree even the most upright prosecutor 
can do away with the more structural weaknesses of the Court.247 While the 
Court has reached an unprecedented involvement in situations where it may take on 
the interests of “unwilling” states,248 major powers included, the question we cannot 
exclude is whether the Court has become any more “able”, let alone vis-à-vis the 
current wave of sovereignism. To date, the ICC has reached four convictions249 and 
two acquittals (see Table 2).250 Fifteen suspects remain at large, including all state 
actors and protégés with a pending ICC warrant of arrest, i.e. 8/15 as shown in 
Table 6. Considering that the ICC has already underperformed by comparison with 
the other existing institutions - notably as far as its ability to discharge its 
mandate against “unwilling” states is concerned - the more likely outcome is 
that we will see years of investigations while the Court’s docket will undergo a 
‘considerable shrinkage’.251 On the other hand, the international criminal law 
project is full of stories of unexpected twists.252 For example, as has already 
happened in a few instances, ICC’s suspects may always surrender themselves to 
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the Court.253 International criminal justice is also known for alternating 
periods of quiescence and intense activity.254 What is more, challenging times 
may actually yield creative efforts to fill the gaps or, at minimum, keep the 
project alive.255 And yet, there is always the risk that states will seize on the 
hurdles that may lie ahead of the Court to justify their retreat from the 
institution.256 They may push towards further cuts to the Court’s budget.257 Or, 
if the ICC takes on big powers and fails, some states may even definitely pull 
out from a jurisdiction that major powers continue to eschew.258 Summing up, 
the near future awaiting the Court will be an important test of the limits of 
international adjudication,259 especially considering that the very investigations 
expected to restore the ICC legitimacy may, instead,  end up exposing and 
exacerbating its weaknesses.260  
 
 
4.5 Conclusions: A Full-Blown Short-Circuit 
This chapter has shown that most of the situations before the ICC are situations 
enjoying some sort of “sovereign backing”, namely in which either the UNSC or a state 
has expressly endorsed the Court’s intervention through a referral (or, in the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire, through an Article 12(3) declaration). The view that the OTP has 
articulated a preference for opening fully-fledged investigations in “sovereign-backed” 
situations is also supported by the fact that, while almost all the preliminary 
examinations initiated by referral (70%) have been converted into investigations, this 
percentage drops to only 25% in the context of Prosecutor’s proprio motu preliminary 
examinations. What is more, the average duration of the latter is as longs as around 
five years. This is in stark contrast with an average duration of approximately a year 
for referred situations, which again drops to an average of less than two months for 
UNSC referrals. Furthermore, 70% of the individuals indicted by the Court were 
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affiliated to rebel/opposition forces at the time of the issuance of the ICC arrest 
warrants or shortly thereafter, this percentage rising to 100% if we look at self-referrals 
only. Add to this that the few state actors and protégés that have been publicly indicted 
by the ICC are all from - three - African countries: Sudan, Kenya, and Libya. It also 
bears recalling that, while the Kenyan situation enjoyed the non-opposition of major 
powers, it was the only opened proprio motu by the Prosecutor. The Court’s 
interventions in Sudan and Libya, instead, were expressly endorsed by the UNSC 
through its referrals. Indeed, they could take place only at the ultimate price of major 
states having their military personnel, political elite, and allies shielded from ICC 
jurisdiction. Finally, there is even a more striking fact than the already markedly 
different proportion of rebel/opposition forces on the one hand, and state actors and 
protégés on the other. To date, all the efforts of the ICC to prosecute the latter have 
failed - eight remain fugitives, four have had their charges withdrawn/vacated, and 
two were not confirmed (see Table 6). This means that all the individuals who are or 
have been in the Court’s custody are associated with African rebel/opposition forces.  
Some may argue that, by “rendering services” to (African) states “in 
need”, that is, (supposedly) “unable” to prosecute crimes of rebel/opposition 
forces, the ICC is still playing a full part in the project of “civilising” 
sovereignty.261 To be sure, a tendency to more easily bypass a traditional focus 
on the state (than public international law generally or international human 
rights law) is already inscribed at the heart of international criminal law. This, 
in fact, is committed to a (decontextualizing) model of individual 
responsibility that makes all individuals equally worthy of the attention of 
international criminal law.262 Nevertheless, the fact that all the suspects who 
are or have been in the Court’s custody are associated with non-state actors 
should no longer be overlooked, especially considering that states - with their 
organs, such as army, police, paramilitary groups, bureaucracy, etc. – are 
particularly well-equipped to perpetrate the crimes under the Court’s 
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jurisdiction.263 Indeed, albeit states are certainly not the only actors capable of 
international crimes, ironically, the issue of non-state actors’ criminal 
responsibility was actually far from the minds of the architects of the Rome 
Statute. Nor should we downplay that the individuals who are or have been in 
the Court’s custody are all from African countries.  
Importantly, if we are genuinely interested in gleaning a sense of the 
Court’s prospects, we cannot merely translate ‘the gap between the ICC’s 
current - partial - practice and impartial justice’264 into ‘a temporal gap 
between the imperfect present and perfect future’,265 no matter how tempting 
it may be to envision (international criminal) law as able to eschew politics and 
its arbitrariness.266 What we need, instead, is  a deeper anchoring into the 
political conditions that made it possible for the ICC to be established and that, 
as a result, frame its daily operation. The process of delegating legal authority 
to the Court is, in fact, an intensely political one, which while situating the ICC 
closer to the mechanisms of political diplomacy267 also reinforces existing 
interests and power relations by giving them the “force of law”.268 As 
illustrated at length, such a process unfolds through the selection of a 
particular institutional design, besides certain definitions of what is “justice”, 
“legal” and “illegal” in the first place;269 through the translation of 
prosecutorial selection and prioritization choices into judicial process;270 and, 
ultimately, through the consolidation of certain narratives and actors at the 
expense of others. In particular, the present study has shown that while 
reflecting the persistence of the state as the primary site of political authority 
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and coercion, the overarching system of the Rome Statute also cuts against the 
normative aspirations of sovereignty as responsibility - by leaving the Court 
ill-equipped to break precisely with a notorious pattern of hyper-protected 
sovereignty. This also means that the ICC selectivity debate should be 
reframed from a focus on the adverse influence of major powers and the UNSC 
- still overwhelmingly dominant today271 - to the terms of a full-blown short-
circuit: between the Court’s ambition to hold power to account on the one 
hand, and the institution’s enmeshment with the very same power it is meant 
to constrain, on the other. In other words, the current tribunalization of a 
highly selective range of violence, and the sanctioning of an even more 
restricted selection, should be expressly related to the Court’s subjection to the 
existing distribution of political power both within and among states.  Such a 
perspective, finally, also has the merit of unequivocally dismissing the delusion that 
international society has transformed into an international legal order where the 
factual conditions of power politics are sublimated into ‘serene legal puzzle-solving’.272 
Indeed, the Court’s severe selectivities – in its normative and institutional 
conceptualizations as well as operational practice273 - strike a hard blow to the liberal 
ambition of containing inequality through the ‘equalising remit of international 
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law and normative structures applicable to all’.274 A way forward can be to take 
this reality as the starting point for a more honest assessment of the prospects of both 
the ICC and sovereignty as responsibility, to which the following and conclusive 
chapter is, hence,  dedicated.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions. Irresponsible 
Sovereignty: A Dead-End? 
 
 
‘Rights claims performatively reinforce the sovereignty  
which they purport to limit, contest, or displace.’ 
Ben Golder1 
 
 
5.1 In Defence of a Greater Supranationalism? 
The previous chapters have resorted to a post-positivist qualification of the 
conventional constructivist account of norm development in an effort to 
challenge the dominant narrative about the ongoing recharacterization of 
sovereignty as responsibility. More to the point, they have drawn attention to 
the reconstitution of norms as part of institutional practice in order to question 
the popular view that situates the ICC at the cutting edge of normative change. 
Covering the overall system established by the Rome Statute, the resulting 
analysis has painted a complex architecture that, while restating the 
prominence of the state as the primary site of political authority and coercion, 
remains deeply colluded with a “traditional” pattern of irresponsible 
sovereignty both in its institutional design and functioning. Hence, Chapters 
3 and 4 have proposed a reconsideration of the scope of the ICC’s authority 
and power. On the one hand, a coalition of small and medium powers, in open 
defiance of UNSC’s domination of international criminal justice, successfully 
campaigned for a court with a formally independent prosecutor; that is, 
formally independent from political direction when opening investigations 
and building cases.2 What is more, the OTP’s formal independence is 
complemented by the final and legally-binding nature of the Court’s decisions. 
 
1 Ben Golder, ‘Foucault and the Unfinished Human of Rights’ (2010) 6(3) Law, Culture and 
the Humanities 354, 360. 
2 See William A. Schabas, ‘Double standards and the quest for justice’, in Samuel Totten (ed) 
Last Lectures on the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide (London: Routledge, 2017) 
282, 288; and Kenneth A. Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics. 
Embedding the International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding’ 
(2014) 12(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 437, 442. 
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In other words, in a dispute over jurisdiction between the territorial state and 
the Court, the latter has authority to override the territorial state’s claims and 
seize jurisdiction. Furthermore, external states may pressure resistant states 
to comply with the Court’s decision, and even act as surrogate enforcers 
against their consent. At the same time, though, Chapters 3 and 4 have been 
unequivocal in framing the Court’s supranational authority within a largely 
unchanged structure of international law.3 States, in fact, firmly remain the 
pillars upon which the Court’s reach, resources, and effectiveness are 
fundamentally built, although their self-interested agendas are still often at 
odds with international accountability.4 In particular, even when national 
authorities have been declared unwilling or unable to deal with certain crimes, 
no higher authority has been delegated the power to force state compliance. 
To put it differently, the Rome Statute is no exception to the “rule” that, albeit 
courts are commonly said to “enforce the law”, it is always states, with a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, that do so.5 Once recast in this light, 
the Court’s stark failure to establish accountability for representatives of state 
power appears largely predictable. Moreover, such failure corroborates the 
thesis, anticipated in Chapter 2, that separating authority from power is often 
highly idealized and ineffectual even in the context of a judicial institution.6  
Some readers may now be prone to conclude that the solution to the 
ICC’s apparently inextricable conundrum is, at least in theory, within easy 
reach. In other words, they may join the already broad chorus of observers 
urging that the gap between international law and enforcement finally be 
filled. Even a critical international scholar such as  David Kennedy has openly 
 
3 Rodman ibid. 440.  
4 Ibid, 442. See also E.H. Carr, ‘The Foundations of Law’, in Michael Cox (ed) The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 159-167. 
5 Karen J. Alter, ‘Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding Vs. Other-binding 
Delegation’ (2008) 71(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 37, 44. See also: William W. 
Burke-White, ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement’ (2002) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 3; Kai Ambos, 
‘Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of International Criminal Law: A 
First Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal Law’ (2013) 33(2), 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33(2) 293, 298. 
6 Ingo Venzke, ‘Between Power and Persuasion: On International Institutions' Authority in 
Making Law’ (2013) 4(3) Transnational Legal Theory 354, 373. 
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embraced a disenchanted, ‘muscular pragmatism’,7 by invoking the 
reconciliation of the human rights movement with its own ‘decisionistic 
responsibility’8 and  ‘governmental power’.9 That is to say, moving from the 
idea that human rights are a key modality of global governance, only 
masqueraded as an anti-politics),10 Kennedy has concluded that human rights 
institutions need to pragmatically come out of the shadows11 and become able 
to exercise their ‘will to power’.12 However, while subscribing to the political 
nature of human rights in full, and actually while building exactly on the latter, 
the analysis below departs from the more straightforward conclusions reached 
by Kennedy and others. Instead, it, offers a problematization of questions 
about the feasibility and desirability of a greater transfer of authority and 
coercive capabilities to the supranational level. The chapter ends with a critical 
reconsideration of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility, as well as a broader 
discussion about cosmopolitan governance. 
 
 
5.2 The Role of Coercion in International Law: 
Another Round-Up 
Reflection about the feasibility and desirability of a greater supranational 
transfer of authority and coercive capabilities starts from the old, and yet still 
burning question about the role of coercion in international law. A wide array 
of prominent scholars has suggested that international law is ‘inherently a 
non-coercive kind of law, or is moving towards such a state of affairs’.13 It has 
been argued that ‘the character of a rule as law is not determined by its 
enforcement, but rather because of compliance by the majority of the society 
 
7 Ben Golder, Beyond redemption? Problematising the critique of human rights in 
contemporary international legal thought (2014) 2(1) London Review of International Law 
77, 81. 
8 Ibid, 105. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 83. 
11 Ibid, 86. 
12 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton UP,2004) 346. 
13 Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Coerciveness of International Law’ (2009) 52 German Yearbook of 
International Law 437, 438. 
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in which the law applies’,14 and that a narrow view of law as requiring 
enforcement by a coercive sovereign should be finally discarded.15 This view is 
largely indebted to H.L.A Hart’s seminal intuitions. According to Hart, the 
classical idea of law as a set of commands from a coercive sovereign16 offers a 
reductive picture that conflates one form of power with the richer 
phenomenon that, at a closer look, is the law.17 In particular, an exclusive focus 
on law in its duty-imposing or vertical mode neglects two major features of 
law. Firstly, it misses the normative aspects of law that exist independent of 
the imposition of coercion.18 Law, in other words, seeks to establish a 
framework of norms for how people “ought” to behave,19 and as such it can be 
distinguished from orders backed by force.20 Secondly, the classical 
understanding overlooks a variety of law which is actually extensively present 
in all advanced legal systems: power-conferring legal rules.21 These rules are 
not concerned with establishing duties or prohibiting actions.22 Rather, they 
enable individuals to arrange their lives by creating or varying legal relations. 
 
14 Edwin Egede and Peter Sutch, The Politics of International Law and International Justice 
(Edinburgh, Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 116. See also Abram Chayes 
and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). According to 
the authors, maximising compliance with international law is a task more of management than 
of enforcement, ensuring that all parties know what is expected of them, have the capacity to 
comply, and receive the needed assistance. Seen from this perspective, efforts to improve 
compliance by adding sanctions appear to be a ‘waste of time’ (ibid, 2). In a similar vein, see 
Sandra Raponi, ‘Is Coercion Necessary for Law? The Role of Coercion in International and 
Domestic Law’ (2015) 8, 1 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 35. Raponi has 
argued that several elements are more important for a viable global system of law than a strong 
supranational system of coercive enforcement. In particular, states, international bodies, 
officials, and other agents must regard international legal rules as generally binding on them, 
and the rules of international law must be determined and applied impartially (ibid, 58). 
15 Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
Duncan Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401, 402. 
See also Regina Queiroz, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Sovereignty and Global Justice’, in Diogo Aurelio, 
Gabriele Angelis, Regina Queiroz (eds) Sovereign justice: Global justice in a world of nations 
(Berlin & New. York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010) 161, 168. 
16  This idea of law was most notably advanced most by John Austin and Jeremy Bentham. See 
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of 
Jurisprudence (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), 13-14; Jeremy Bentham, ‘Of Laws 
in General’, in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (H.L.A. Hart Ed., 1970), 1-2. 
17 See Ekow N. Yankah, ‘The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms’ (2008) 42 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 1195; and Frederick Schauer, ‘Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of 
Sanctions in a Theory of Law’ (2010) 23(1) Ratio Juris 1, 2. 
18 Yankah, ibid, 1214. 
19 Ibid, 1196. 
20 Ibid, 1208. 
21 Schauer (n 17) 3. 
22 Ibid. 
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Think of the law of contracts and wills, or the conferring of public power on 
judicial, legislative, and administrative bodies.23 It should also be noted that 
these “permissive” norms are not directly backed by sanctions, though failing 
to meet adopted obligations may result in sanctions.24 And, yet, they thrive 
independently from coercion, thus pointing to the effectiveness of means other 
than coercion (e.g. communication, persuasion, give-and-take, welfarism, 
etc.)25 to ensure compliance. In sum, according to Hart, a focus on coercion is 
distorting, because it ignores the normative, empowering, non-hierarchical, 
and ultimately non-coercive nature of much of law as it actually exists.26  
In line with Hart’s view, Jürgen Habermas has regarded European law 
as the most advanced example of the ongoing the shift in the balance between, 
on the one hand, the enforceability of the law, and the recognition of its 
legitimacy, on the other hand.27 He has noted that:  
supranational law, insofar as it is not rejected by national constitutional 
courts in eligible exceptional cases, enjoys priority over the national law 
of the member states, even though the latter continue to exercise a 
monopoly over the means of the legitimate use of force.28  
Karen Alter has reached similar conclusions while expressly focusing on 
delegation to international courts. According to Alter, sanctioning power 
would not be the key, because actors tend to follow international courts’ 
rulings simply because such courts are acknowledged as the authoritative body 
charged with interpreting the law.29 Furthermore, ‘the stronger the 
enforcement mechanism, the less likely it is to actually be used’.30 Alexandra 
 
23 Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart 
(2010) 21(4) European Journal of International Law 967, 972. 
24 Yankah (n 17) 1215. 
25 Bert Van Roermund, Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular’, in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty 
in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 33, 37. 
26 Schauer (n 17) 9. 
27 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Plea for a constitutionalization of international law’ (2014) 40(1) 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 5, 6. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Alter (n 5) 74. 
30 Ibid. Alter has stressed that international legal systems with sanctioning mechanisms, such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), ‘rarely 
invoke the sanctioning mechanisms, nor is it clear that the mere possibility of appealing to 
sanctions systematically increases compliance with legal rulings’ (ibid). The rulings of the 
International Court of Justice, too, ‘can be backed up by the use of force, but the United 
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Huneeus has also expressly criticized the concept of compliance itself for being 
too narrow. She has argued that, no matter which definition you choose, 
compliance cannot tell us the full extent of a law’s impact, because it excludes 
other important effects that a law may have. In fact, whereas a state may fail 
to comply with a particular court ruling, there may be ways in which that ruling 
nonetheless alters its behaviour, or it may have effects on non-party states and 
non-state actors.31 Thinking further along this line, Laurence Helfer has 
emphasized the distinction between compliance and effectiveness, suggesting 
that international courts’ rulings with low compliance rates may still be quite 
effective if they generate ‘some modification of state behaviour’.32 Hence, the 
real effectiveness test would not be compliance, but the counterfactual of what 
the outcome would have been, absent the court.33 
At the other end of the spectrum, several other observers have recently 
revived calls for the building of coercive international institutions. According 
to Carmen Pavel:  
a small number of strong, well-circumscribed international 
institutions, which can evolve independently to provide minimal 
policing, protection and criminal responsibility functions, may be 
sufficient to prevent some of the most severe violations.34  
Similarly, Anne Peters and Aidan Hehir and Anthony Lang have suggested that 
it is time to fill in the ‘missing link’35 between international law and 
 
Nations Security Council has never authorized such a backup because doing so would be a 
drastic step of great political significance’ (ibid). 
31 Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Compliance with judgments and decisions’, in Cesare Romano, Karen 
J. Alter Yuval Shany (eds) The Oxford handbook of international adjudication (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 437, 439-440. 
32 Laurence Helfer, ‘The effectiveness of international adjudicators’, in Cesare Romano, Karen 
J. Alter Yuval Shany (eds) The Oxford handbook of international adjudication (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 464, 467. 
33 See Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter Yuval Shany, ‘Mapping International Adjudicative 
Bodies, the Issues, and Players’, in Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter Yuval Shany (eds) The 
Oxford handbook of international adjudication (Oxford University Press, 2013) 3, 18.  
34 Carmen Pavel, ‘The only way to protect citizens from their governments is to divide 
sovereign authority between the national and international levels’, 11 November 2014, 
available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/11/11/the-only-way-to-fully-protect-
citizens-from-their-governments-is-to-divide-sovereign-authority-between-the-national-
and-international-levels/ (last visited 30 September 2018). 
35 Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty (2009) 20 European Journal of 
International Law 513, 535. 
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enforcement.36 In Heather Roff’s view, the ‘lack of coercive power is the largest 
and most problematic factor for international right’.37 Similar positions have 
also been echoed within the ICC debate. It has been argued that where a state 
has been deemed “unwilling”, ‘the Court could be placed in the paradoxical 
situation of having to depend upon the same institutional and procedural 
weaknesses’38  deemed incapable of supporting domestic proceedings in the 
first place. While a non-compliance referral to the ASP or UNSC is likely to be 
the Court’s only available recourse, the ICC should be able to ‘rely on the 
effectiveness of the collective international response to cajole or coerce 
compliance’.39 In other words, the only way the ICC can be effective vis-à-vis 
non-compliant states ‘is by persuading powerful third parties to act as 
surrogate enforcers’,40 on the model of  the cooperation between the ICTY and 
NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia.41 Furthermore, it is all the more 
necessary, as has been stressed, when the perpetrators are still in power,42 
which is often the case in the ICC’s interventions. Against this backdrop, the 
R2P doctrine has been expressly pinpointed as the ‘conceptual framework to 
contextualise the obligations incumbent on States to fulfil the goals of the 
Rome Statute’.43 As Rod Rastan has put it, unless the Rome Statute is viewed 
 
36 Aidan Hehir and Anthony Lang, ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the 
International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2015) 26(1) Criminal Law 
Forum 153, 178. 
37 Heather M. Roff Global Justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect: A Provisional 
Duty (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013) 106. 
38 Rod Rastan, ‘Testing Co-operation: The International Criminal Court and National 
Authorities’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 431, 455. 
39 Ibid. With regards to the failure of states and the UNSC to cooperate in the Darfur situation, 
Bensouda, has similarly argued that ‘[c]oncerted and uniform efforts should be made to 
discuss the Court's referrals of State Party non-compliance to the Council with the aim of 
exploring the options available to compel the States concerned to comply with their statutory 
obligations’. See OTP, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in 
Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)’, 12 December 2017, para 31, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180620-otp-stat (last visited 30 September 
2018). 
40 Rodman (n 2) 455. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid, 442-443. 
43 Rod Rastan, ‘The Responsibility to Enforce: Connecting Justice with Unity’, in Carsten 
Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 163, 169. Some glimpse of recognition of the 
‘possible new demand on military and police forces’ following the establishment of the ICC is 
found in the R2P report itself. See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre, 2001), 60, available at 
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as a system in which the international community assumes “responsibilities”, 
should an individual state fail in its duties to cooperate with the Court44 then 
‘the enforcement pillar simply will not hold’.45 This view has also been upheld 
by more than 1/3 of the respondents  to the semi-structured interviews 
undertaken for the purpose of this study (see Annex II, code 11: “lack of state 
cooperation”). 
It bears clarifying, though, that invoking the establishment of coercive 
institutions is not the same as regarding coercion as offering an exhaustive 
account of the nature of law. Indeed, the idea that coercion by itself does not 
explain the law is conventional wisdom even among staunch advocates of 
coercive international institutions. Yet, one may still argue that dismissing 
coercion too quickly leaves something important amiss.46  
Derrida has offered a poignant line of thought to the debate. He has 
argued that there are laws that are not enforced, but there is no law without 
“enforceability”. According to the philosopher, enforceability is not an exterior 
to law and, indeed, there is no such thing as law that doesn’t imply in itself, a 
priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being 
enforced.47 So, for example, in a state where no kidnapping has occurred, ‘it is 
nevertheless true that if someone commits this crime - or even contemplates 
committing it - the potential for enforcement is ever-present’.48 Similar 
premises may lie behind the claim that between an authoritative normative 
system that is obeyed without coercion (meaning voluntarily - think, e.g., of 
religion and morality) and one that can be coercively enforced, the latter 
intuitively matches our idea of law.49  
As explained here below, this argument proves compelling especially 
when narrowed down to criminal law. On the one hand, in fact, the “force” 
implied in the Derridean concept of “enforceability” does not necessarily need 
 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents (last 
visited 30 September 2018). 
44 Rastan, ibid, 182. 
45 Rastan (n 43) 456.  
46 Yankah (n 17) 1197. 
47 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ (1989–1990) 11 
(919) Cardozo Law Review 920.  
48 Anthony D’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’, (Dec.1984/Feb.1985) 79 
Northwestern University Law Review 1293, 1296. 
49 Yankah (n 17) 1245. 
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to be coercive, but may also be indirect, symbolic, interior, discursive, etc.50 
Yet, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine how criminal law could retain its 
duty-imposing nature in the absence of a vertical coercive system in which a 
superior gives orders to an inferior and threatens sanctions for non-
compliance. To put it differently, it is true that the multiple dimensions of law 
cannot be forced into a single coercive model; but the coercive model is the 
only one fit for criminal law. Hart was aware of that; and, on that basis, he has 
also expressed his own reservations about the cost-efficiency of the criminal 
justice system.51 In a similar fashion, Philip Allott, has defined criminal law as 
‘the most primitive, the least efficient, and the most morally dubious of 
systems for socialising human beings’.52 This is especially true in view of  
criminal law’s decontextualizing tendencies. Such tendencies are already 
evident in contemporary forms of “penal populism” at the domestic level, the 
latter being utterly neglectful of the inherent connection between criminal 
security and social security.53 But, according to Allott, they are extreme when 
transposed at the international level: 
[t]he international rule of law will follow, but cannot precede, the 
coming-to-consciousness of the idea of human sociality, the species-
consciousness of the human species.54 
The considerations laid out about the duty-imposing nature of criminal law 
have major implications for the future of the ICC. In fact, it seems plausible to 
argue that unless a greater turn towards a more accomplished vertical system 
takes place, the ability of the Rome Statute to live up to its most basic goal – 
to investigate and, where warranted, try individuals charged with the “gravest” 
 
50 Derrida (n 47), 925-926. 
51 H.L.A. Hart and John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy 
of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 2nd edition). 
52 Philip Allott, ‘Deliver us from social evil’, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, 11 August 2004, 68, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/86F44E4E-F7DB-44AD-8D61-BEDAB373280B/0/040811Allott.pdf 
(last visited 30 September 2018).  
53 See John Pratt and Michelle Miao, ‘Penal Populism: The End of Reason’ (2017) The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law, Research Paper, No. 2017–02. 
54 Allott (n 52).   
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crimes of concern to the international community55 - will remain seriously 
impaired; that is, limited to individuals designated by governments for ICC 
prosecution. This also means that, when repeated across a number of 
situations, the defiance of the Court’s authority by governments will make the 
crisis of the latter irremediable.56 In sum, the view of international 
prosecutions as a stark alternative to forcible kinds of intervention needs to be 
reviewed.  
At the same time, though, my point is that it is precisely the 
acknowledgment above that – if taken seriously – leaves no margin for the 
kind of a(nti-)political quick fix underpinned by the “technocratic 
solutionism” of Pavel, Peters, and Rastan, among others. As Martti 
Koskenniemi has famously put it, ‘in the real world’57 there is no technical, 
juridical, or other language in which such questions ‘would have ‘‘already’’ 
been resolved so that the only questions would be limited to those of technical 
application’.58 In line with Koskenniemi’s warnings, the following paragraphs 
conclude that the prospects of sovereignty as responsibility, as well as the 
broader discussion about cosmopolitan governance, lie more with the re-
politicization of the debate – whose specific terms are laid down below – than 
a straightforward invocation of greater forms of supranationalism. 
 
 
5.3 Sovereignty as Responsibility: A Re-Politicized 
Perspective 
The creators of sovereignty as responsibility have expressly designed the 
concept as ‘inherently anti-political’.59 By insisting on humanitarian ethics, 
they have sought to decouple the issue of transfer of functional capacity 
 
55 Other - even loftier - objectives of the Rome Statute are to help prevent the crimes that fall 
under ICC jurisdiction from happening again (deterrence), and to contribute to long‐term 
peace and stability in post‐conflict societies. 
56 Antonio Franceschet, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Authority Crisis and Kant’s 
Political Ethics’ (2016) 16(2) International Criminal Law Review 201, 207. 
57 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What use for sovereignty today’ (2011) 1, 1 Asian Journal of 
International Law 61, 67. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Chris Brown, ‘The Antipolitical Theory of Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 5(4) Global 
Responsibility to Protect 423, 425. 
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(protection, in the case in point) from questions of shifting constellations of 
power, let alone sovereignty. The official narrative is, thus, aligned with the 
ambiguous (to say the very least) consensus of states about supranational 
institution-building. While this is far from surprising, what appears especially 
unwarranted is that a large share of the academic debate has remained 
inattentive to the discontinuities of what is being propounded. 
The picture I am painting here is quite different. Questioning the 
purportedly beneficent nature of emergent normative grids of international 
relations,60 I suggest that once questions of delegation of both authority and 
coercive capabilities are genuinely and fully allowed to resurface, no 
straightforward solution looms on the horizon. The debate is free to unfold in 
all its quintessentially political character. More to the point, the trajectory of 
sovereignty (as responsibility) can unequivocally disclose itself in terms of 
ongoing struggles to relocate power.61 What is more, while these processes 
take place at the level of issues-areas and may lead to messy separations of 
lines of authority, they nevertheless raise the critical question of how it is 
possible to relocate power without relocating the permanent possibility of its 
irresponsible exercise.62 Importantly, “power” here refers specifically to the 
modes of power that are constitutive of sovereignty: (i) a claim to supreme 
authority (or ordering power) bounded by territory and function; and (ii) the 
power to exercise such a claim in practice, which, in turn, involves both the 
dimensions of (a) authority and (b) coercion (see Chapter 2). Even a (critical) 
cosmopolitan such as Heikki Patomäki has come closer to this view, by 
suggesting that ‘at least some elements of world statehood exist already, 
involving the possibility of making binding collective decisions and creating 
 
60 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Neil Walker (ed) Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 3, 8. 
61 See Robert B. J. Walker, ‘Polis, Cosmopolis, Politics’ (2003) 28 Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political 267. See also Birgit Peters and Johan Karlsson Schaffer, ‘The Turn to Authority 
beyond States’ (2013) 4(3) Transnational Legal Theory 315, 318: ‘the temptation to re-
describe global governance in terms of authority—with all its ambiguous normative baggage—
may also make it more difficult to speak truth to global power’. 
62 See also Jeremy Moses, Sovereignty and Responsibility: Power, Norms and Intervention 
in International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014) about the irresponsible character of sovereignty.  
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new law’;63 Neil Walker has also expressly admonished that we should be more 
aware of the various sites – e.g. supranational and functional, in addition to 
subnational – at which sovereignty may be located or shared.64  
That being said, it is important to place a caveat on my argument. The 
claim that the “new” patterns of legal and political authority have much to do 
with the matrix of sovereignty does not presuppose a unitary account of 
“power-as-sovereignty”, such as the one that Derrida, for example,  has come 
close to in his late reading of sovereignty. In the latter, the French philosopher 
has broadened the concept of sovereignty so as to encompass any ‘power or 
potency that transfers and realizes itself’.65 Accordingly, not only sovereigns 
would be public officers, nor even those who invest them with sovereign 
power, but we are all sovereigns, without exception, for all ‘the fundamental 
axiomatics of responsibility or decision (ethical, juridical, political) are 
grounded on the sovereignty of the subject, that is, the intentional auto-
determination of the conscious self”.66 Before Derrida, while writing about 
decolonization and “post-colonial regeneration”, Fanon had emphasized the 
importance of ‘the practice of teaching the people a remembrance of their 
sovereignty’,67 and even theorized sovereignty as a mode of recalling dignity 
for oneself.68 Yet, no matter how one may be tempted to regard sovereignty as 
a category that pertains to life as such, I acknowledge the risks entailed by 
locating sovereignty virtually everywhere. In particular, I worry about the 
potential weakening of the conceptual currency of sovereignty to the point of 
turning it into more of fetish than an effective analytical tool. Instead, I am 
more sceptical about the warning that conceptually extending the locations of 
sovereignty has the counter-productive effect of hindering our efforts to think 
 
63 Heikki Patomäki, ‘The Anarchical Society as Futurology’, in Madeline Carr, Adam 
Humphreys and Hidemi Suganami (eds.). The Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary 
Challenges and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 253, 256.  
64 Neil Walker, ‘Introduction’, in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Aldershot, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2006). 
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outside sovereignty itself.69 In fact, especially in this basic formulation, this  
admonition detracts from the enormous barriers that inevitably stand in the 
way of imagining post-sovereign or non-sovereign political subjects. Whether 
we like it or not, sovereignty is at the heart of modern political imagination.70 
Its matrix is a haunting presence in reflections about (the transformation of) 
politics.71 But let me be clear on this point. I am not implying that we should 
enslave ourselves to the current object-language of sovereignty just because it 
is the current organizing grid for both constitutional and international 
politics.72 This would be no less a mistake, and one with clearly conservative 
consequences.73 Instead, what I am arguing, following Neil Walker’s 
reasoning, is that anyone who is dissatisfied with the adequacy of the 
possibility of transformation within the framework of sovereignty must ask a 
formidable set of questions about any alternative.74 Chiefly, they should ask 
how it is possible to think beyond the grid of sovereignty in terms which, 
nonetheless, epistemically and operationally begin with this matrix, and the 
forms and subjects of authority which it sustains.75  
Admittedly, several theoretical accounts have already sought to 
conceive templates of political agency in which sovereignty does not figure 
prominently, or, more radically, does not figure at all. Among the most 
outspoken contemporary advocates of this line of thought, Neil MacCormick 
has suggested that we should think of sovereignty as we think of virginity, that 
is, ‘something that can be lost by one without another’s gaining it’.76 In the 
early 2000s Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri advanced the concept of the 
“multitude”, which is still a popular idea today within the critique of 
sovereignty. The multitude, as a form bringing into being a political subject, is 
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a spontaneous and disruptive expression of the popular will (or “constituent 
power”), operating as such outside of institutionalized politics (or “constituted 
power”). In 2004, having in mind the concept of “multitude”, Patomäki and 
Teivo Teivainen described the World Social Forum (inaugurated in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, a few years before) as a platform providing global civil society 
with new forms of agency and politics in the form of collective transformative 
actions.77 Calls for ‘a non-sovereign or anti-sovereign politics’78 have also been 
advanced from post-modern philosophers, as well as by post-anarchist 
political theorists. So, for example, Giorgio Agamben has seen in the figure of 
the refugee or stateless person both the embodiment of a politically 
disqualified existence and the harbinger of a new horizon of political 
existence79 (while yet remaining vague about the shape of this “coming 
political community”).80 Saul Newman has pointed to a “politics of post-
anarchism” which, albeit unable to transcend power entirely, ‘can radically 
modify this field of power through ongoing practices of freedom’.81 According 
to Newman, the practices of resistance of e.g. indigenous groups, anti-
capitalist networks, environmental activists, anti-war movements, etc. all take 
place outside the ontological order of state sovereignty (even if, as the authors 
themselves have acknowledged, all such actors impose demands upon the 
state).82 Newman and John Lechte have also put forward the concept of 
‘inoperativity’.83 Contrary to any political project of “emancipation”, which 
always risks a new founding of violence and is hence a form of sovereignty, 
inoperativity is, according to the authors, ‘an affirmation of our ever-present 
humanity, an affirmation of the freedom, equality and justice that we already 
live’.84 Finally, it should be noted that these arguments testify to a longer-term 
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desideratum.85 In particular, at the beginning of the 1960s, Hanna Arendt had 
already reserved the term “sovereignty” for “constituted power”, to which the 
“constituent power” is no longer recognized as having a claim, thus subsuming 
sovereignty/“constituted power” into the classical category of “tyranny”. 
Hence, according to Arendt, ‘if men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty 
they must renounce’,86 while restoring the “political-as-public-and non-
sovereign-sphere”.87  
The demands for post-sovereign or non-sovereign political subjects are 
understandable from a normative point of view, especially if we focus on the 
always potentially authoritarian face of sovereignty. Indeed, such face of 
sovereignty serves as a compelling incentive to hold on to those interstices that 
we may deem “political-as-public-and non-sovereign-sphere”. And yet, 
desirable though one may find it to “cut the head off the sovereign”, several 
seemingly anti-sovereign movements do not go beyond sovereignty.88 For 
example, the attractive – but equally vague – concept of an anti-sovereign 
multitude shies away from inevitable questions, such as who decides, or how 
decisions will be imposed on those who might disagree.89 Other forms of 
radical politics are also caught within the logics of sovereignty. Think of 
successful revolutions.90 The latter, as anticipated in Chapter 2, amount to a 
“founding transgression” which negates the entirety of the law in order to 
institute a new one. Finally, coming back closer to the specific subject of this 
dissertation, similar considerations also apply to human rights. Rights are 
often regarded as the expression of universal moral claims that transcend and 
restrain the political.91 Nonetheless, once we genuinely leave rhetoric aside, 
rights loom up as ‘intrinsically partial and political’.92 According to  Foucault, 
formal regimes of rights are fundamentally implicated in relations of power – 
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‘facilitating, transmitting and naturalizing relations of domination even as, 
indeed especially as, they claim to emancipate’.93 To be sure, one need not be 
an expert Foucauldian analyst to see that formal rights are the result of certain 
political values (i) being granted legal recognition, often through a 
transgression of – or the placing of a different claim above - the existing law,94 
and (ii) being protected by governing authorities.95 As Louiza Odysseos has 
put it, the juridical act of codifying moral rights into legal entitlements ‘is an 
exercise in sovereign power and the resulting, legally endowed rights are its 
“product”’.96 
The above considerations have a crucial significance for the 
theorization of sovereignty and its alternatives. The contemporary discussion 
is largely dominated by the question whether one is “for” or “against” 
sovereignty.97 As a result, an inquiry that seeks to understand what sovereignty 
is has become exceptionally difficult - and for this reason all the more 
necessary.98 To this end, appreciating sovereignty as the juncture where 
power and rights meet gets us right to the heart of sovereignty and its 
fundamental ambivalence. In other words, sovereignty is better understood as 
an apparatus not only capable of the greatest oppression, but also underlying 
the enshrinement of rights in  positive law, in addition to their enforcement.99 
In other words, even when rights are protected, it can only be at the behest of 
some sort of sovereign power, which determines their content and mode of 
implementation.100 It follows that, contrary to the thesis advanced by 
MacCormick and other post-sovereigntists, sovereignty does not dissolve, but 
becomes vested in those authorities charged with their definition, 
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enshrinement in law and implementation.101 Furthermore, the irreducible 
nature of sovereignty as being both inside and outside the law at the same 
time102 unequivocally reveals the aporetic nature of law, whose foundation, 
even before its enforcement, derives from something which exists outside the 
law itself, and therefore cannot be fully subsumed in it.103 Therefore, in 
agreement with Foucault and Derrida, we can speak of a law ‘contaminated by 
its own foundational violence’,104 and which, as such, ‘can never reign 
absolute’.105 Having said that, as already cautioned above, the outspoken 
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between rights and sovereignty 
does not amount to ruling out altogether the possibility of non-sovereign 
modes of agency and power in the (supranational) public sphere. This is, 
indeed, an important and challenging question, which nevertheless falls 
beyond the scope of the present dissertation. The point I am making is more 
circumspect; namely, that projects of the kind of a global power to prosecute 
cases and punish criminals, such as embodied in the ICC, are more about 
“traditional” sovereignty  – or, to be more precise, about the relocation of 
sovereign functions –than they are about representing any real alternative.106 
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5.3.1 The Slippery Slope of Supranationalism 
Having recast the trajectory of sovereignty as responsibility in terms of the 
relocation of sovereign functions, the final step of the analysis consists of 
explicitly considering to what degree and under which conditions a further 
relocation of sovereign functions to the supranational level may be feasible and 
desirable.  
Since the late 1990s, international society has shown several signs of 
retreat from the early and mid-1990s’ triumphalism about an imminent 
“cosmopolitanization”. Both the ICC and R2P were thus born 
posthumously;107 that is, into a world where the liberal discourse of the 
domestication of the international domain had already shifted onto the 
defensive.108 And, whereas the tale of the Rome Statute is already more of a 
story about the demise of a global sovereign than about its rise,109 at the time 
of writing this retreat has only deepened. We are witnessing a world-wide 
proliferation of populist, nationalist, and xenophobic tendencies, the rise of 
actual authoritarianisms in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the 
Philippines, and Turkey, as well as worrying departures from the 
commitments of states in the field of climate change, among other things.110 
As Patomäki has recently put it, at the heart of all this, we may arguably find 
the heightened insecurity and existential uncertainty resulting from the 
uneven growth and deep contradictions of the neoliberal planetary economy. 
These, in fact, can trigger various social-psychological mechanisms, such as 
resentment, anger, emotional distancing, and even hatred.111 Against this 
backdrop, it is not surprising that of the approximately 60 UN resolutions that 
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have so far invoked R2P, only five have acknowledged the existence of Pillar 
three, i.e. the external responsibility of the international community.112  
Notwithstanding the current bleak state of affairs, one may argue that 
the preconditions for a greater supranationalism may resurge once again in 
the future.113 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the authority of the 
international courts has often developed gradually through a series of 
progressive changes - each involving greater sovereignty costs (e.g. the 
European Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the Andean 
Community),114 while the ICC is a relatively young institution. Taking this 
point further, we may even expressly contemplate a future scenario in which 
state-parties become more available to act as the Court’s surrogate, or even 
allow the ICC to be equipped with its own police force. And yet, in both of these 
cases, we would still have to ask how international institutions/agents may 
take on functions of the sovereign state without perpetuating the same 
situations that they try to eliminate.115 Foucault has been categorical in this 
respect: seizing the ‘‘centres of power’’ reproduces old patterns of government 
and domination instead of changing them.116 Hence, Foucault’s invitation to 
always politically question things that are conventionally assumed to be 
“beyond” all suspicion and look ‘as if they have nothing  to do with power’117 - 
such as institutions that are only ‘apparently neutral and independent’118 - and 
to deconstruct them ‘in such a way that the obscured political violence within 
them would be unmasked’.119 The risk, otherwise, is to remain blind to and 
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hence subdued by their waged political violence. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the concern that the ‘potential for abuse is latent in the very 
structure of power that enables state [emphasis mine] authorities to perform 
their functions’120 sounds particularly narrow. It exemplifies the tendency, 
widespread among liberal cosmopolitans, to see the state, especially the post-
colonial state, ‘as the primary locus of threat to human rights’,121 and the 
“international” or “supranational” as a ‘sanitized space populated by heroic 
actors ready to rescue people in these benighted locales’.122 The underrating of 
the operation of power beyond the state goes hand-in-hand with the lack of a 
serious reflection about international agency, often sublimated into a 
discrimination in favour of the – invariably Western, liberal – “good” deemed 
in possession of the material, epistemological, and moral resources to drive 
progress towards a cosmopolitan order.123 Except that moving beyond the 
state does not sublimate the problem of agency, let alone its entanglement with 
power and power inequalities. Instead, it makes such problems exceptionally 
more complex, and ends up casting serious doubts about the desirability of a 
cosmopolitan reconfiguration of the international space. Such a slippery slope 
is clearly epitomized by the selectivities of ICC intervention, and, in particular, 
by the failures of the system established by the Rome Statute to go against the 
existing distribution of power, both at the domestic and international level. 
After all, the case of the ICC has shown that empowering an international court 
means creating a “legal” sovereignty that is likely to be as arbitrary as, in 
addition to being generally weaker and less accountable than, the “political” 
sovereignty it supposedly displaces.124 Hence, the conclusion that the 
prospects of sovereignty as responsibility can only be validly assessed from an 
analytic standpoint genuinely critical of liberal depoliticization; that is, 
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receptive to the modes of power that are tied to the protection of rights even 
in a supranational and cosmopolitan order, and able to address them as both 
a tool and potential curse for the enforcement of such an order.125  
 
 
5.4 Closing Remarks 
To be sure, the conclusions expounded above are quite a long shot from the 
popular expectation that the ICC would mark a major advance for the legalist 
worldview against the traditional concept of sovereignty. Indeed, using a 
creole vocabulary – derived chiefly from post-positivist constructivist 
scholars, post-modernism, post-colonial studies and TWAIL scholarship – the 
present study is intended to radically call into question the dominant narrative 
about the ongoing recharacterization of sovereignty as responsibility in its 
entirety.  
To start with, the dissertation has sought to re-orientate the whole set 
of foundations upon which the sovereignty as responsibility debate is 
premised. As a whole, it has challenged any reading of international society 
that either deliberately or inadvertently ends up collapsing on either the realm 
of “ideas”, “agency” and “intentionality”, or the domain of “the material”. 
Instead, it has brought to centre stage the recursive quality of the relationship 
between agency and structure, and, in particular, its implication in the 
reproduction of unequal international – social, political, and juridical – 
realities. Moving along these lines, Chapter 2 has offered a reconceptualization 
of sovereignty as both norm and fact at the same time. In the effort to equally 
eschew both the normative-legal approach and that of pure fact, sovereignty 
has been acknowledged as both a socially constructed claim to supreme 
ordering power and the power through which any such claim is established 
and enforced. Importantly, “power” is meant not only in its standard coercive 
function, but also in its productive and  institutional (chiefly, power as 
authority) dimensions. As a result, to the extent that such a reading of 
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sovereignty makes it possible to unpack the different layers of sovereignty and 
their mutual relationships, it also paves the way for a more elaborated 
understanding of change as far as the norm of sovereignty is concerned. More 
to the point, it opens up the possibility that a shift may be taking place at the 
normative level without (still) being matched by the corresponding set of 
changes at the factual level. Indeed, receptive of the competing pressures 
through which change arguably makes its way in real life, such a perspective 
would have proved crucial to make sense of the significance of the ICC against 
the current state and prospects of sovereignty as responsibility, as seen in the 
Chapters 3 and 4. After advancing this conceptual reappraisal of sovereignty, 
Chapter 2 clung to the latter to offer a way out of the conventional model of 
sovereign equality commonly assumed as a benchmark for assessing change, 
namely the so-called “Westphalian sovereignty”. More to the point, it has 
criticized the standard narrative for portraying sovereignty as responsibility as 
a radical break with a (dehistoricized and reified) previous norm of equality, 
and obscuring, as a result, the continuities with longstanding forms of 
inequality and intervention. Finally, building on the work of post-positivist 
constructivist scholars, Chapter 2 has sought to offer a qualification of the 
dominant understanding of norm development, i.e. the conventional 
constructivist norm life cycle proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink. In defiance 
of constructivism’s declared ambitions, Finnemore and Sikkink have ended up 
positing a linear, static, and largely depoliticized “win or fail” trajectory, which 
has blatantly missed the opportunity of channelling agency and the structuring 
power of norms into a more complex process of mutual constitution. Notably, 
I am referring to Finnemore and Sikkink’s reduction of norm 
institutionalization as an end point of the norm emergence process. In fact, 
their failure to acknowledge institutionalization as a crucially originative 
juncture lends itself to a dichotomic view in which norms as scripts of 
emancipation, and power a practice of domination at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. In contrast, in Chapter 2 I have proposed an updated version of the 
norm life-cycle that focuses on the “reconstitution of norms as part of 
institutional practice”, and particularly on how the relative power of relevant 
actors reconstitute norms during norm negotiation and implementation. In 
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the specific context of the ICC/sovereignty as responsibility debate, this has 
meant asking two major sequential questions: firstly, how the overarching 
system negotiated by states at the Rome Conference has affected the selection 
of situations and cases before the ICC and their outcomes; and secondly, how 
the selection of situations and cases and their outcomes, in turn, have “fed 
back” to the norm of sovereignty institutionalized as part of the Court’s 
practice.  
The remaining three chapters have been devoted to the unravelling of 
the two questions outlined above. Hence, Chapters 3 and 4 have depicted a Court 
caught within a full-blown short-circuit – between a “sovereignty-limiting” rationale 
and a “sovereignty-based” mode of operation. Such a state of affairs is unequivocally 
reflected in the “tribunalization” of a highly selective range of violence and the 
sanctioning of an even more restricted selection, which both lay bare the Court’s 
subjection to the existing distribution of power both among states and within them. 
Special attention has been called to the fact that, to the degree that the Rome 
Statute places the Court in the pressing need to enlist state power to its cause, 
it also relocates the “unwillingness” and “inability” of states to investigate and 
prosecute to the ICC. This is most clearly exemplified by the fact that, to date, the 
few efforts of the Court to prosecute state actors and protégés have failed, and 
all the individuals who are or have been in the Court’s custody are associated 
with rebel/opposition forces. But, the selectivity of the Court’s intervention 
looms even more severely if we consider that all the rebel/opposition forces in 
the Court’s custody are black and from Africa, a fact that powerfully exposes 
the continuing  rac(ial)ism, civilizing impulse, and coloniality of the liberal 
international project.126 
Finally, these findings have been discussed in this conclusive chapter, 
which has channelled them into a critical reconsideration of the idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility itself. This has drawn attention to the 
transformation and integration of technologies of sovereignty into the 
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‘complex economies of power’127 that are inherent to the supranational 
expansion of rights.128   
The next logical step is, hence, to firmly discard the common, over-
simplistic dichotomy between “state‐centred” and “supranational, 
cosmopolitan”. In other words, the conventional dichotomic framing should 
give way to a more cautious “cosmo-political” horizon, receptive of the 
strained liaison which, upon more careful consideration, is already found in 
the term “cosmopolitanism” itself: between cosmos and polis, combined in an 
aporetic movement toward both the dispersal and concentration of the 
political order of the polis.129 This is not to ignore that any progress in that 
direction requires daunting theoretical efforts, given the present centrality of 
the polis v. cosmopolis contraposition in theories of world order. Nor should 
we overlook the risk of inadvertently slipping back into it.130 Nonetheless, the 
legacy of experiences such as those of the ICC may serve as a powerful 
reminder. In particular, bearing the latter in mind, institutional cosmopolitans 
may consider disallowing themselves from imagining superior institutions as 
entirely immune from the tension between “sovereignty-limiting” rationale 
and “sovereignty-based” operation in the first place. Rather, perhaps less 
ambitiously, they may ask under which conditions could such tension be 
handled to the advantage of collective forms of agency. Indeed, recast under 
this light, the turn to authority beyond states looms as a more accurate and 
productive research programme, with the potential to link current debates in 
normative and empirical international studies, such as discussions about 
sovereignty and the development of international norms on the one hand, and 
conversations about the rise of non-state actors, human rights, and the use of 
coercion, on the other.131 But the remit of the present work also extends beyond 
the institutional cosmopolitan perspective, and even the liberal paradigm 
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itself. Let me digress a little here just to say that the critique of liberalism has 
been a fundamental theme of Western thought for more than a century, but 
has rarely ushered in a basic shift.132 This is evident in the resilience of the 
classical liberal framing of human rights in terms of law and legal 
institutionalization. Indeed, this framing has hardly been questioned even 
within much of the critical theorising about human rights;133 although it has 
powerfully exposed, for example, the narrow legalistic, as well as Eurocentric 
and rudimentarily retributive, core of international criminal justice. Reversing 
this trend, future research may engage in the rethinking of human rights in 
terms other than law and legal institutionalisation,134 while clinging, instead, 
to their political ethos of contestation with practices of domination.135 Perhaps 
this is something similar to what Foucault had in mind when the philosopher  
famously – albeit no less elliptically – called for a ‘new right that is both anti-
disciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty’.136 Or, more 
radically, future research programs may embrace a more overtly anarchist 
orientation and displace the human rights project altogether in favour of some 
alternative political imaginary.137  
In conclusion, this dissertation has sought to make its contribution to 
the ‘unravelling of power’138 by focusing on its manifold articulations and 
operations within norms, as well as within laws, institutions, and practices, 
wherein - to quote Antje Wiener once again - ‘norms lie’.139 Importantly, this 
has been pursued not as an end in itself, nor as a way of deprecating political 
agency; but, quite to the contrary, as an essential analytical endeavour, if we 
are to glean both theoretical and practical margins of resistance. Indeed, it is 
precisely the postmodern sensitivity and its underlying genealogical outlook 
that militates against reducing the history of international society to a ‘tragedy 
 
132 Fred R. Dallmayr, ‘Review of John Milbank and Adrian Pabst: The Politics of Virtue: Post-
Liberalism and the Human Future’ (2017) 79(3) The Review of Politics 495. 
133 See, on this point, Golder (n 7). 
134 Lechte &Newman (n 78) 183. 
135 Newman (n 102) 29. 
136 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Colin Gordon (ed) Power Knowledge (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980) 94. 
137 See Golder (n 7). 
138 Jabri (n 106) 110. 
139 Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, in press) 27. 
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of endless repetition’140 – or equally so a simple story about the inevitable 
moral progress of humanity. This means not only firmly discarding the idea of 
transhistorical essences and teleological successions in favour of  particular 
trajectories and accidents,141 but also reserving some space for a ‘future-
oriented reflexive self-regulation’142 that ‘may  intervene – recursively – in the 
social conditions that constitute and determine the sphere of human 
freedom’.143 In other words, acknowledging that norms, laws, institutions, and 
practices contain within themselves the power relations that traverse society  
is a crucial step towards transforming these same power relations and the 
norms, laws, institutions, and practice they underpin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 Heikki Patomäki, ‘On the Complexities of Time and Temporality: Implications for World 
History and Global Futures’ (2011) 57(3) Australian Journal of Politics & History 339, 340. 
141 Heikki Patomäki, ‘Back to the Kantian “Idea for a Universal History”? Overcoming 
Eurocentric Accounts of the International Problematic’ (2007) 35(3) Millennium 575, 576. 
142 Patomäki (n 140) 339. 
143 Ibid. 
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Annex I - Semi-structured Interviews144 
Grid
 
(1) On which grounds, if any, does it make sense to speak about the 
“politics of international criminal law” at the ICC? 
a. Which are the main elements we should factor in? 
i. Do these elements also affect the OTP/Court’s decisions, in 
addition to their outcomes? 
1. If yes, do they affect both case selection and situation 
selection choices? 
b. In which respects, if any, can we view positively the interplay between 
law and politics in international criminal justice? 
(2) How do you assess the critique of the ICC being a neo-colonial 
actor in Africa? 
a. Is the Rome Statute more neo-colonial than other international 
regimes?  
i. If yes, how? 
(3) Looking at the ICC’s achievements in its first 15 years of activity, 
which have been the major shortcomings, and which kind of 
institutional changes may help the Court overcome them? 
a. Are there significant changes between Ocampo and Bensouda’s 
approaches? 
b. How should we interpret the Court’s utter failure at establishing 
accountability for state actors? 
c. How do you realistically see the ICC in the near future? And what 
about in around 30 years from now? 
 
144 Most of the interviews were carried out in person, in The Hague or in Amsterdam, between 
August 2016 and January 2017. On a few occasions, the interviews took place via Skype/phone 
in order to accommodate the availability of the interviewees. In addition, in some instances 
further contacts followed via Skype/phone after the formal conclusion of the fieldwork. 
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Annex II – Semi-structured Interview Notes 
 
CODE LIST: 
[1] LAW v. POLITICS  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE ROME STATUTE 
[3] EVIDENCE 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
[7] ROLE OF STATE PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
[8] CONSENSUAL NATURE OF THE ROME STATUTE v. SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY 
[9] ICC’ LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
[10] ICC’S LACK OF AUTONOMOUS ENFORCEMENT POWERS/DEPENDENCE ON GOVERNMENTS 
[11] LACK OF STATE COOPERATION 
[12] ICC’S INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS/POLITICS 
[13] PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS 
[14] SCARCITY OF RESOURCES 
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
[16] ICC’S EAGERNESS TO PROSECUTE 
[17] ICC’S BIAS v. AFRICA 
[18] ICC’S BIAS IN FAVOUR OF SELF-REFERRING GOVERNMENTS 
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO MAJOR POWERS 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL APPLICATION OF (POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY  
[21] ICC SUBJECTION TO THE EXISTING LOCAL AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER  
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
[23] VICTORS’JUSTICE 
[24] STATUTORY LOOPHOLES/LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
[25] EXPERTISE OF ICC STAFF 
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY (CRISIS) 
[27] DIFFERENCES OCAMPO/BENSOUDA 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ICC 
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
[30] NEED FOR GREATER ICC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THE 
WORK OF THE COURT 
[31] NEED FOR A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF WHAT THE ICC CAN ACHIEVE 
[32] CHALLENGES TO ICC REFORM 
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QUESTION (1): On which grounds, if any, does it make sense to speak 
about the “politics of international criminal law” at the ICC? 
 
 
 
Respondent 1 (R-1)  
 
 
CODES 
[1] R-1 argues that ‘politics is all outside the Court’. [1] LAW v. POLITICS  
[7] At the same time, though, ‘the Court needs political 
support from all state parties’. 
[7] [ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
 
[4] The respondent adds that most of the criticism against 
the Court is ‘speculative’, and ‘there is a tendency to blame 
the Court for 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[7] the failures of states’.  [7] ROLE OF STATE PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
[2] R-1 also stresses that the decision whether to open an 
investigation or a prosecution depends on whether the 
legal criteria set by the Rome Statute concerning 
jurisdiction and admissibility are met.  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE  
[3] Another factor is the available evidence. For example, 
referring to the Ugandan situation, R-1 stresses that ‘there 
was a great deal of evidence about LRA crimes’, while ‘the 
Court has insufficient evidence about alleged crimes of 
the UPDF [Ugandan People Defence Force]’.  
[3] EVIDENCE 
 
[2] The criterion of state cooperation, instead, does not 
play any role for admissibility purposes,  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[11] while lack of state cooperation and other difficulties in 
enforcing arrest warrants are, nevertheless, crucial issues 
[11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
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for the Court. In this respect, the respondent recalls that 
the first trial in the Ugandan situation could start only 
when the suspect (Ongwen) surrendered himself 13 years 
after the referral by the Ugandan government. 
[2] Moving to the level of situation selection decisions, R-1 
invites us to consider that ongoing preliminary 
examinations do not amount to decisions not to 
investigate, but simply mean that the preliminary 
examination phase has not been completed yet. 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
 
Respondent 2 (R-2)  
 
 
 
[11] According to R-2, ‘political factors may have 
consequences at the implementation level’, e.g., ‘because 
states fail to cooperate with the Court’; 
 [11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
 
 
[1] but political factors ‘do not affect in any way the 
decisions of the Court’. 
[1] LAW v. POLITICS  
[2] The Court’s selection of situations and cases, instead, 
follows from ‘the legal criteria set in the Rome Statute 
about jurisdiction and admissibility, 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[3] and the available evidence’. [3] EVIDENCE 
[2] The respondent clarifies that ‘the Court does its own 
part by opening each case that warrants intervention 
according to the Rome Statute’; 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[7] but, after that, ‘states have to do their part, otherwise 
the system established in Rome will simply not hold’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
[2] R-2 also stresses that disparities in the outcomes and 
duration of PEs are not due to political considerations and 
double standards, but are the result of ‘differences in the 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
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gravity of the alleged crimes or whether a state has 
genuinely investigated them or is undertaking tangible 
efforts in that direction’. Similarly, the absence of cases 
against self-referring governments can be explained in 
terms of their ‘insufficient gravity’. In this respect, R-2 
suggests that governments would never request the 
Court’s intervention if they committed crimes serious 
enough to be prosecuted by the Court. At the same time, 
the respondent notes that the OTP’s investigations are 
still ongoing in all self-referred situations, meaning that 
cases against members of self-referring governments may 
still be opened. With respect to the situation in Côte 
d'Ivoire (opened proprio motu by the OTP, but a de facto 
self-referral), R-2 refers to ‘technical delays’ in the 
opening of ICC cases against pro-Ouattara forces. 
[7] Having said that, R-2 concedes that ‘the importance of 
developing partnerships and relationships with state 
authorities cannot be underestimated’, for states have a 
‘crucial role’ as far as the collection of evidence and the 
enforcement of arrest warrants are concerned. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
 
[15] Accordingly, R-2 concludes that if both self-referring 
governments and rebels have committed crimes of 
“sufficient gravity”, it may be more effective to prosecute 
rebel crimes first and governments’ crimes after. 
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Respondent 3 (R-3)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-3, there are many grounds on which it 
does make sense to speak of “politics of international 
criminal law” at the ICC. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
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[7] To start with, ‘the ICC has been created by states’. ‘Most 
basically, this means that the Rome Statute is the result of 
negotiations among states’. Furthermore, ‘states decide 
whether to be part of the Rome Statue, and they can 
decide to withdraw’. Hence, ‘political pressures arise in 
particular from the ASP, the political organ of the Court’. 
Another factor having crucial political ramifications is, 
according to the respondent, the ‘state-based character of 
enforcement under the Rome Statute’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
 
[12] Against this backdrop, the Court’s selection decisions 
should be understood in relation to the Court’s ‘policy 
considerations’, and we should openly speak of the 
‘institutional politics of the ICC’. 
[12] ICC’S INSTITUTIONAL 
INTERESTS/POLITICS 
 
[15] According to the respondent, ‘the OTP is especially 
interested in achieving successful prosecutions’. In 
support of this thesis, R-3 recalls that the ICC has proved 
to be reluctant to intervene in situations of the 
“unwillingness” and “inability” of state authorities. While 
these are the only situations in which the Rome Statute 
clearly mandates intervention, most of the situations 
before the Court have been found admissible due to 
inaction at the domestic level, which is not even expressly 
contemplated in the Rome Statute. The respondent also 
refers to a ‘politicization-effectiveness nexus’: ‘the more 
the Court’s intervention is politicized the more it is likely 
to result in successful prosecutions; and vice versa’. 
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
[16] R-3 also highlights ‘the OTP’s eagerness to intervene  [16] ICC’S EAGERNESS TO PROSECUTE 
[17] in African situations’, [17] ICC’S BIAS v. AFRICA 
[20] showing ‘little respect for domestic proceedings’ (the 
respondent cites the examples of the Lubanga and 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF 
(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
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Katanga cases), and thus ultimately bypassing 
complementarity. 
 
Respondent 4 (R-4)  
 
 
 
[4] R-4 suggests that ‘criticizing each decision taken by the 
Court for being political is simply too simplistic and 
inappropriate, no matter how popular in these days’. The 
respondent argues that while certain individuals may feel 
threatened by the Court and undertake an offensive 
against it on many levels, ‘it is important to distinguish 
between self-interest and other kinds of more legitimate 
criticism’. 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[2] R-4 clarifies that ‘determinations of admissibility 
follow the legal standards set by the Rome Statute’. Yet, 
the respondent distinguishes between admissibility and 
selection, as well as between situations and cases, 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[13] conceding that ‘pragmatic considerations may 
influence case selection’.  
[13] PRAGMATIC 
CONSIDERATIONS 
[15] In this respect, R-4 refers to ‘effectiveness’ as an 
‘important factor for the credibility of the institution’. 
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
[4] The respondent adds that ‘the ICC is still a young 
institution and is still learning lessons’. Accordingly, ‘it 
should not be condemned’. Instead, we should focus on 
the fact that enough states joined the Rome Statute, 
making a permanent global court – ‘with a formally 
independent prosecutor’, and, what is more, ‘formally in 
the position to investigate and prosecute also state 
officials’ - finally possible. 
 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
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Respondent 5 (R-5)  
 
 
 
[4] R-5 argues that ‘nowadays it is quite popular to 
interpret in some political sense whatever the OTP does 
or not; yet, such an attitude is, at best, a great 
misunderstanding’. 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[2] ‘There is no attempt to please one side or the other’. 
Instead, ‘the Court is guided by the law 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[3] and evidence’. [3] EVIDENCE 
[2] Accordingly, the respondent notes that the length and 
outcomes of preliminary examinations are due to the 
specific features of each situation in terms of “sufficient 
gravity”, and whether there are ongoing domestic 
proceedings. By the same token, the respondent suggests 
that not too much should be read into the absence of cases 
against state actors, for this, too, ‘is the result of the 
application of “gravity” and “complementarity” as 
mandated by the Rome Statute, 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[3] as well as of the available evidence’. [3] EVIDENCE 
[11] Yet, the respondent concedes that the lack of 
cooperation is and will be a ‘crucial problem’ for the 
Court, as it may ‘dramatically hamper’ its work. 
[11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
 
Respondent 6 (R-6)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-6, law and politics are always 
inextricably linked. In particular, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is necessarily informed by policy 
and political considerations. The respondent also invites 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
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us to consider that the ICC has to balance numerous - 
often conflicting - interests, 
[15] while, at the same time, proving its ‘effectiveness to the 
world’. R-6 adds that it is precisely in the attempt to 
be/appear effective that 
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
[10] the ICC has been ‘too reliant on governments’. [10] ICC’S LACK OF AUTONOMOUS ENFORCEMENT 
POWERS/DEPENDENCE ON 
GOVERNMENTS 
[16] A related problem has been the Court’s sense of 
entitlement over cases which seemed easier to prosecute, 
[16] ICC’S EAGERNESS TO 
PROSECUTE 
[19] coupled by the reluctance to go against the interest of 
major states and their allies, from Afghanistan and 
Colombia to Iraq and Palestine. R-6 emphasizes that such 
deference to major states had been particularly clear 
during the first term of Prosecutor Ocampo,  
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO 
MAJOR POWERS 
 
[27] while nowadays, ‘something seems to be moving’ - at 
least, at the level of preliminary examinations. R-6 
suggests that Prosecutor Bensouda may be very close (‘in 
a matter of days or weeks’) to requesting judicial 
authorization for the opening of a preliminary 
examination in Afghanistan. 
[27] DIFFERENCES 
OCAMPO/BENSOUDA 
 
[32] The respondent also invokes ‘a more disenchanted 
view about what the ICC can do and what it cannot’. 
[31] NEED FOR A MORE 
REALISTIC VIEW OF WHAT 
THE ICC CAN ACHIEVE 
 
Respondent 7 (R-7)  
 
 
 
[6] Each case has its own ‘political aspects’, and, according 
to R-7, 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
[5] it is also ‘extremely complex’. It requires delving into a 
wide range of complexities - ranging from the domain of 
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
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history, to cultural, ethnic, religious, as well as political 
issues. In particular, we cannot ignore the highly 
politicized climate of crisis and post-crisis situations, as 
well as the geographical, cultural, and linguistic 
remoteness of the crime scenes from the seat of the Court 
and its investigators. Managing these complexities 
requires ‘a lot of efforts’, and ‘it can be incredibly time-
consuming and labour-intensive’.  
[3] Particularly daunting and crucial is the question of 
evidence. The ICC is a criminal court, which means that 
‘the prosecution must provide evidence that sustains 
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt’. Hence, R-7 
suggests that we should raise questions about ‘how 
evidence is collected,  
[3] EVIDENCE 
[25] through which expertise and contextual knowledge,  [25] EXPERTISE OF ICC STAFF 
[3] which evidence is lost, presented to judges, withhold’, 
etc. In this respect, the respondent clarifies that the ICC 
Prosecutor has a greater room for manoeuvre than the 
defence, e.g., it can withhold evidence and choose to not 
call witnesses. Furthermore, R-7 refers to the serious 
challenges that may arise from the outsourcing of 
evidence collection to intermediaries or third-party 
organizations, such as, e.g., UN peace-keeping 
operations. On the one hand, when building international 
criminal cases, some level of outsourcing is justified and 
even potentially effective, especially in light of the 
‘contextual knowledge of local intermediaries’. On the 
other hand, the ‘large extent of outsourcing and the lack 
of supervision by the OTP have proved to be a major 
problem’. For instance, in the Lubanga case, not even one 
of the nine witnesses who claimed to have been child 
soldiers in the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
[3] EVIDENCE 
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Congo (FPLC) was considered reliable by the judges. R-7 
emphasizes that the issue of ‘manipulation of witnesses’ – 
for example, upon financial compensation or other 
benefits, such as relocation - is a real one. The respondent 
also adds that, while inefficient investigations are among 
the causes that had led to the collapse of several ICC cases, 
it is still not clear today to what extent the OTP is 
interested in more efficient investigations. R-7 cites the 
Kenyan situation as a case in point: whereas no real 
security threat would have stood in the way of ICC 
investigators obtaining certain relevant evidence (i.e. 
transcripts or videos of public speeches), no step in that 
direction ever took place. Another example is the 
situation in Darfur, in which the OTP expressed 
willingness and ability to conduct effective investigations 
without ever sending investigators to Darfur. 
 
Respondent 8 (R-8)  
 
 
 
[4] According to R-8, ‘accusing the Court of being merely 
driven by politics cuts a very complex story out’.  
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[32] Rather, ‘it is time to do a reality check’, by genuinely 
assessing ‘what the Court can realistically achieve, and to 
re-calibrate expectations where necessary’. 
[31] NEED FOR A MORE 
REALISTIC VIEW OF WHAT 
THE ICC CAN ACHIEVE 
 
[6] According to the respondent, as a matter of fact, the 
Court deals with ‘highly charged political issues’. 
Furthermore, its work involves several stakeholders – 
with very different, indeed, often diverging expectations 
– and different values to be combined. We should also 
consider that ‘prioritization must happen in any criminal 
law response to mass-atrocities’,  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
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and that the ICC is evidently ‘under-resourced’.  
 [5] Therefore, the OTP is called to take ‘incredibly difficult 
decisions’. This also means that ‘whatever the OTP 
chooses to do is going to be criticized’.  
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
 
[4] R-8 notes that the OTP is continuously subject to 
‘unsubstantiated allegations of politicization’,  
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[6] to which the Court and its supporters respond – 
likewise simplistically - in terms of the ‘mechanic 
application of the law’. This politicization v. mechanic 
application of the law is precisely the simplistic 
dichotomy that, according to R-8, we ought to discard, 
while, instead, giving way to a ‘middle standpoint’ – ‘not 
fully legal or political’. That is to say, we need to create 
more room for a thorough and open discussion about the 
different colliding values inherent in the use of 
prosecutorial discretion, and we need to become more 
available to the idea of  different criteria - other than 
either legal or political - being considered and applied. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
[24] Another aspect we should consider, according to R-8, 
is that several pivotal issues were hotly debated at the 
Rome Conference without being clearly settled. 
Therefore, in the daily practice of the Court, a lot is left to 
interpretation and several issues remain uncertain. R-8 
cites complementarity as a case in point, which, while 
being a pillar of the system negotiated in the Rome, is also 
a new principle - unknown at the ICTY and ICTR. This 
state of affairs is also compounded by the fact that the ICC 
judges do not share a single, common legal tradition. 
Hence, the laborious and sometimes dissonant 
jurisprudence of the ICC should not come as a surprise. 
[24] STATUTORY 
LOOPHOLES/LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
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Respondent 9 (R-9)  
 
 
[6] According to R-9, politics is an inescapable component 
of international criminal law, albeit the system 
established by Rome Statute seeks to constrain it.  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
[7] The respondent cites as an example the election of ICC 
judges. ‘Candidates are nominated by state parties’, 
meaning that, for example, ‘the government of Uganda 
would do anything in its power to prevent the nomination 
of a judge expected to go against the government’s own 
interests’. More broadly, the ICC’s dependence on states 
may cause the Court to work in the interests of 
governments. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
[18]  This is how, R-9 continues, the absence of ICC cases 
against Ugandan government authorities has been 
interpreted by some communities - especially in Northern 
Uganda, where there is ‘substantive evidence that the 
government has committed crimes under the jurisdiction 
of the Court’. 
[18] ICC’S BIAS IN FAVOUR 
OF SELF-REFERRING 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
Respondent 10 (R-10)  
 
 
 
[6] The ‘politics of prosecutions’, the respondent suggests, 
is particularly evident if we look at ‘case selection’. In 
particular, whereas the ICC is meant to be ‘a court of last 
resort under the Rome Statute’, in practice, it has visibly 
displayed a certain ‘eagerness to have successful cases in 
order to justify its own existence’. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
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[18] This is the backdrop, R-10 continues, against which we 
should understand the one-sided prosecutions (only 
against rebels) in self-referred situations. R-10 refers to 
the Ongwen case. Questions may be raised as to whether 
Ongwen fits the criterion of “the most responsible 
person”, especially if we consider that the suspect himself 
had been a child-soldier. 
[18] ICC’S BIAS IN FAVOUR 
OF SELF-REFERRING 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
[20] Furthermore, considering the capacities of the 
Ugandan judiciary and the ongoing domestic prosecution 
of another LRA member, i.e., Kwoyelo, we should also ask 
whether, in the Ongwen case, the Court has acted as a 
court of last resort in compliance with the principle of 
complementarity.  
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF 
(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
 
 
[6] Political sensitivity is also at play behind the ‘huge 
disparities in the duration of preliminary examinations’. 
‘Think of how long’, R-9 continues, ‘the OTP has waited 
for before asking judicial authorization to open a proprio 
motu investigation in Afghanistan’. Moreover, R-10 adds, 
this figure becomes even more unsettling when compared 
to the ‘fast pace at which the OTP has made its 
determinations in referred situations’. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
 
Respondent 11 (R-11)  
 
 
 
[6] R-11 defines themselves as one of the pioneers of the 
political critique of the ICC. According to the respondent, 
‘international justice is determined by international 
politics’. ‘The ad hoc tribunals have made this clear 
already in the 1990s, starting from the basic fact that they 
were established at the behest of the UNSC’.  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY   
[23] The respondent also cites in support of their thesis the 
‘striking selectivity of the ICTR’. The Tribunal ‘left 
[23]VICTORS’JUSTICE 
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unaddressed all the crimes committed by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front’ (RPF), despite the existence of ‘well-
documented evidence’ about crimes committed by the 
latter, including the report of a UN Commission of 
experts. R-12 considers the above as ‘a clear case of 
“victor’s justice”’, for ‘only the vanquished’ (Hutus) were 
indicted by the Tribunal, but not the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, which was led by Kagame and came into power in 
the aftermath of the civil war in the country. This selective 
approach continues nowadays at the ICC, both across 
situations and within them. The respondent explains that 
the ICC ‘has been only an African Court for its first 15 
years’, while being ‘careful not to encroach upon US 
hegemony’. 
[20] Against this backdrop, we should understand the 
OTP’s decision to uphold positive complementarity in 
Colombia, but not in Libya, for example. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF (POSITIVE) 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
[21] What is more, within the African situations the ICC is 
investigating, the Court has sided with ‘those holding 
positions of power’, by shielding self-referring 
governments and other actors, e.g., ‘Western 
multinational companies and Western governments’, 
from prosecution. 
[21] ICC’S SUBJECTION TO 
THE EXISTING LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWER 
[6] Focusing on self-referrals, R-11 suggests that these are 
a paradigmatic example of the politics of international 
criminal law at the ICC.  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
[29] More to the point, the respondent stresses that African 
governments have referred their own situations ‘to solve 
internal political problems, and the ICC has played their 
game by indicting only their enemies’. Furthermore, 
widening the focus to the broad participation/support of 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
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African governments to the establishment of the Court, R-
12 suggests that this, too, had deep political roots. In 
particular, African governments regarded the 
negotiations of the ICC Statute as an opportunity to 
negotiate an international treaty in a framework of equal 
standing with their European ex-colonizers, and as a great 
opportunity to improve their international standing. 
 
Respondent 12 (R-12)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-12, ‘all justice, not only justice at the 
ICC, is political’. Justice is about ‘manufactured truth’, 
and it always involves some level of ‘transfiguration’. The 
political element in the ICC is even heightened by the fact 
that  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY   
[5] the Rome Statute establishes a system ‘at the 
intersection between individual responsibility and state 
responsibility’. 
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
[22] To this we should add the ‘controversial relationship 
between the ICC and the UNSC as set forth in the Rome 
Statute, in particular, in Article 16’. In this respect, R-13 
recalls UNSC Resolution 1422, in 2002, yielding to US 
demands, requested the ICC to defer potential 
prosecutions of peacekeepers from non-state parties for a 
12-month period. 
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
 
[6] The respondent also argues that looking at the OTP’s 
selection decisions, ‘it looks like the OTP censors itself in 
accordance with political considerations’. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY   
[19] More to the point, the OTP has set ‘a very high 
admissibility bar for situations impinging upon the 
interests of major powers and their allies, for example, in 
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO 
MAJOR POWERS 
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the Comoros situation’. At the same time, R-12 warns ‘not 
to be surprised about this state of affairs’. 
 [8] The Rome Statute must be understood within a 
‘consensual paradigm’. This means that ‘the ICC acts 
within the limits and the rules set by states during the 
negotiations’; and it is far from surprising that ‘states 
have opted for an institution with limited powers, unable 
to override states’. Against this backdrop, ‘there is not 
much reason to expect anything different from what we 
have now’. 
[8] CONSENSUAL NATURE OF 
THE ROME STATUTE v. 
SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
 
Respondent 13 (R-13)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-13, people that look at the ICC primarily 
as a criminal court may be ‘phobic about the idea of a 
“politics of international criminal law” 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
V. POLITICS DICHOTOMY   
[12] However, the respondent continues, this is precisely 
where a change of perspective is most pressingly needed, 
for ‘the ICC is not only a criminal court, but also an 
international institution’. In particular, as such, the ICC 
has to protect its own ‘ICC’s institutional interests’, in 
order to ensure that it is not fundamentally undermined 
and the story it tells remains compelling.  
[12] ICC’S INSTITUTIONAL 
INTERESTS/POLITICS 
 
 
[21] Selection decisions at the ICC may, hence, be traced 
back to the Court’s own ‘political sensitivity’, which, in 
particular, tends to reflect the ‘local and global 
distribution of power’. According to the respondent, this 
is particularly clear as far as case selection choices are 
concerned; 
[21] ICC’S SUBJECTION TO 
THE EXISTING LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWER 
[20] but is also reflected in the OTP’s different approaches 
to positive complementarity across situations. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF (POSITIVE) 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
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Respondent 14 (R-14)  
 
 
 
[6] R-14 invites us to be cautious about speaking of the 
“politics of international criminal law”. ‘The OTP does 
some politics to the extent that the Office is not subject to 
the principle of mandatory jurisdiction’, meaning that the 
Prosecutor makes choices as to whether 
investigate/prosecute or not.  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
V. POLITICS DICHOTOMY   
[3] Other factors to consider are: issues of evidence, in 
particular ‘whether there is available evidence and its 
quality’; 
[3] EVIDENCE 
 
[14] the ‘limited resources available to the Court’; [14] SCARCITY OF RESOURCES 
 
[7] and the ‘support and cooperation – or lack thereof – by 
the international community’. The ICC, for example, R-14 
notes, has attempted to target a few high-ranking 
government authorities, but the international community 
has proved reluctant to assist the Court in that respect. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
[21] R-14 also argues that ‘it comes handy to have a Court 
not posing any real threat to those in power’.   
[21] ICC’S SUBJECTION TO 
THE EXISTING LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWER 
[1] On the other hand, with respect to the decisions 
rendered by the ICC’s Chambers, the respondent stresses 
that the story of the ICC is full of ‘excellent decisions - by 
no means affected by political considerations’. 
[1] LAW v. POLITICS 
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QUESTION (2): How do you assess the critique of the ICC being a neo-
colonial actor in Africa? 
 
 
Respondent 1 (R-1)  
 
 
 
[2] As a ‘firm supporter of the ICC’, R-1 ‘would never stand 
up for an institution that unfairly targeted Africans’. 
‘Neither the Rome Statute nor the OTP’s decisions to 
investigate and prosecute subscribe in any way to an anti-
African bias’.  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[28] Instead, there is ‘overwhelming evidence about the 
ongoing support to the Court by African states’. Senegal, 
R-1 notes, was the first country ever to ratify the Rome 
Statute; and, ever since then, the African continent has 
been ‘firm in its commitment to international criminal 
justice’, as attested by ‘the routine enforcement of the 
Court’s cooperation  requests’ as well as by ‘the number of 
African state referrals’, which, nowadays, are ‘the 
majority of the situations before the Court’. 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
 
 
Respondent 2 (R-2)  
 
 
 
[4] According to R-2, the critique of African bias ‘rests on 
misunderstandings about how the Court’s jurisdiction is 
activated, as well as its limits’. 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[9] In particular, ‘the ICC does not have universal 
jurisdiction’,  
[9] ICC’S LIMITED 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
[22] and ‘it can only investigate situations in non-party 
states if the UNSC refers their situations to the Court’. So, 
for example, ‘the UNSC should be blamed for not 
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
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referring Syria, rather than criticizing the Court for 
targeting only African states’. 
[2] Furthermore, referring to the admissibility criteria set 
by the Rome Statute, the respondent argues that ‘all the 
African situations currently before the Court are 
distinguished by the gravity of the crimes and inability or 
unwillingness of domestic authorities to investigate and 
prosecute’.  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
 
Respondent 3 (R-3)  
 
 
 
[30] According to R-3, ‘it is a bit of a stretch to accuse the 
ICC of racism, as someone is doing’. Yet, ‘it is a fact that - 
with the exception of Georgia - the ICC is intervening only 
in Africa. The respondent also argues that this state of 
affairs ‘must change 
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
 
[26] if the Court wants to redress its serious legitimacy 
crisis’. 
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
 
Respondent 4 (R-4)  
 
 
 
[28] According to R-4, the critique of African bias is easily 
confuted by the fact that only two situations were opened 
proprio motu by the Prosecutor (Côte d’Ivoire and 
Kenya). Instead, the Court intervened in CAR, DRC, Mali 
and Uganda at their own request through self-referrals’; 
and in Libya and Sudan as a result of Security Council 
referrals.  
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
 
[2] What is more, all the states where the ICC has 
intervened ‘score very poorly on indexes such as the 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
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Failed State Index’, and several of them are, indeed, 
‘among the “most critical” situations’. 
[28] R-4 also notes that ‘of all the cases currently under 
investigation, only the Libyan government has challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Court’, which confirms that the 
Court’s interventions in Africa enjoy widespread support 
from local authorities. Furthermore, ‘there is plenty of 
evidence that African civil society, too, strongly supports 
the work of the Court’. 
[28] AFRICAN 
GOVERNMENTS’ENGAGEMENT 
WITH THE ICC 
 
[9] Moving the attention towards the situations which the 
Court is not investigating, R-4 points out that ‘several 
situations of concern just do not fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction’; 
[9] ICC’S LIMITED 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
[22] and the ‘Court’s jurisdiction could be activated only via 
Security Council referral’, which, yet, is ‘subject to 
political calculations’. ‘This is a huge problem’. 
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
[2] The respondent also rejects the idea that the OTP 
decisions not to open investigations in Iraq and in the 
Mavi Marmara situation were based on questionable 
gravity determinations by the OTP, emphasizing instead 
their compliance with the Rome Statute. 
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[26] However, R-4 concedes that ‘it is vital that the ICC 
keeps up and expands its efforts to combat the perception 
of African bias’. 
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
 
Respondent 5 (R-5)  
 
 
 
[4] According to R-5, the very mission and work of the 
Court may place the institution on a ‘collision course with 
several actors, especially government authorities 
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
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adamant to remain beyond the law’. ‘Much of the critique 
of African bias must be understood against this 
background’. While a few actors may be ‘particularly 
interested in discrediting the ICC in whatever way’, it 
must be clear that  
[2] the Court’s decisions to investigate and prosecute 
follow from ‘the mandate of the Rome Statute’.  
[2] COMPLIANCE OF THE 
ICC’S DECISIONS WITH THE 
ROME STATUTE 
[9] In particular, they are tied to the territorial and 
personal jurisdiction of the Court, 
[9] ICC’S LIMITED 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
[22] and whether the UNSC refers a situation to the Court’, 
in addition to questions of admissibility. So, for example, 
‘many people ignore that Syria is not a state party and the 
ICC could intervene only via a UNSC referral’. 
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
 
Respondent 6 (R-6)  
 
 
 
[26] R-6 affirms that the ICC must expand its focus beyond 
Africa, if it wants to tackle the current legitimacy crisis.  
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
 
[30] Some new positive developments - towards a 
geographical diversification of the ICC’s docket - 
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
 
[27] are emerging from the preliminary examinations 
opened by Prosecutor Bensouda. 
[27] DIFFERENCES 
OCAMPO/BENSOUDA 
 
[17] Yet, with regard to the Malian situation, one may raise 
the question ‘whether the ICC really needed yet another 
African situation’, as well as whether the al-Mahdi case – 
about the destruction of historic monuments and 
religious buildings in Timbuktu – ‘is really in line with the 
prosecutorial strategy laid in the 2014 OTP policy paper’. 
[17] ICC’S BIAS v. AFRICA 
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[26] With regard to the current unease of several African 
state parties in their relationship with the Court, the 
respondent suggests that, in order to overcome the latter, 
the ICC should make itself available to ‘genuine dialogue  
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
 
[6] and political solutions’. In particular, rather than 
merely insisting on the obligation of African state parties’ 
to cooperate with the Court, the ICC must take in due 
account the concerns raised by the African Union, in 
particular as far as the issue of state immunity is 
concerned. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
[19] Finally, according to R-6, it is of crucial importance 
that the OTP ‘definitely puts an end to the special 
treatment so far accorded to major powers’. This is ‘the 
greatest challenge’ awaiting Bensouda, and much of the 
Court’s credibility depends on that. 
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO 
MAJOR POWERS 
 
 
Respondent 7 (R-7)  
 
 
 
[30] According to R-7, ‘it is clear that the lack of 
involvement beyond Africa  
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
[26] is putting strains on the legitimacy of the Court’.  [26] ICC LEGITIMACY (CRISIS) 
[27] However, the respondent also notes that, looking at the 
current list of preliminary examination, ‘things seem to be 
changing’, meaning that non-African situations may land 
in the Court’s docket. 
 
 
 
 
 
[27] DIFFERENCES 
OCAMPO/BENSOUDA 
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Respondent 8 (R-8)  
 
 
 
[26] According to R-8, while African states themselves have 
requested the intervention of the Court, the legitimacy of 
the ICC and the overcoming of the current crisis 
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
[30] are inescapably tied to the ‘inclusion of non-Africa 
situations in the Court’s docket’. 
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
 
Respondent 9 (R-9)  
 
 
 
[9] According to R-9, the charge of neo-colonialism is 
premised on a limited understanding of the Court’s 
jurisdiction as established by the Rome Statute. In 
particular, whereas Western powers may have committed 
serious crimes in the past, such crimes date back far 
beyond the entry into force of the Rome Statute, meaning 
that they fall outside the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Court. As to crimes which are being committed nowadays, 
Western legal systems are able to deal with those crimes 
themselves, contrary to African countries, where, R-9 
continues, impunity for serious crimes is exceptionally 
widespread. 
[9] ICC’ LIMITED 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
 
 
Respondent 10 (R-10)  
 
 
 
[20] According to R-10, the fundamental principle of 
complementarity - upon which the Rome Statute is 
premised - is meant to function as bulwark against 
unwarranted investigations and neo-colonialism. In this 
sense, the respondent argues, the Rome Statute is not 
neo—colonial. Indeed, the Statute in itself can be 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF 
(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY  
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considered quite an improvement compared to other 
international regimes – ‘precisely thanks to the original 
nature of the ICC as a court of last resort’. On the other 
hand, the present striking disparities in the duration and 
outcomes of preliminary examination disclose, rather 
clearly, the eagerness of the OTP to intervene in certain 
situations and in certain cases,  
 [19] as well as its own reluctance to do so in others, such as 
in Afghanistan and other situations impinging on major 
states. 
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO 
MAJOR POWERS 
[26] This is becoming everyday clearer to observers across 
the world. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the Court is 
being seriously undermined by the shortcomings of the 
OTP’s approach. The respondent adds that ‘the very 
relevance of the Court is being questioned from many 
quarters, both within and outside Africa’. 
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY 
(CRISIS) 
 
[28] At the same time, though, R-10 invites us to 
acknowledge that most of the African situations currently 
before the Court have been referred by African states 
themselves. Furthermore, as to the two UNSC referrals, 
the respondent notes that they have been ‘broadly 
supported by African countries themselves’. 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
 
 
Respondent 11 (R-11)  
 
 
 
[17] According to R-11, the ICC’s current African focus 
‘seriously undermines the quality of justice upheld by the 
ICC’, as it ‘amounts to a violation of a fundamental 
principle of customary international law – the principle of 
non-discrimination’.  
[17] ICC’S BIAS v. AFRICA 
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[5] Having said that, the Rome Statute is not a neo-colonial 
instrument, according to the respondent. Instead, ‘the 
Rome Statute is a very complex and ambitious document, 
which draws from and seeks to combine a wide range of 
different fields of law’. 
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
[25] Hence, the critical question we should raise is whether 
the OTP, the judges, and the Court’s staff more broadly 
‘have the expertise needed to handle such high level of 
complexity’. 
[25] EXPERTISE OF ICC 
STAFF 
 
Respondent 12 (R-12)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-12, ‘it is hard to tell whether the Rome 
Statute is more neo-colonial than other existing 
international regimes’. ‘At first glance, at least, one has 
the impression that all existing regimes are just as much 
neo-colonial, even the often-acclaimed institute of 
universal jurisdiction’. R-12 suggests that ‘universal 
jurisdiction will be really universal only when we will see 
a Belgium criminal under a Rwandan prosecutor’. 
 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
Respondent 13 (R-13)  
 
 
 
[6] R-13 invites us to approach the neo-colonial critique of 
the ICC with a certain cautiousness. On the one hand, the 
Rome Statute emanates from ‘a Western philosophy of 
justice’. For example, the respondent refers to ‘Western 
ideas of individuality and responsibility’, and ‘the 
Western tradition of liberal cosmopolitanism’. On the 
other hand, this state of affairs brings us back to the 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW 
v. POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
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‘power relationships’ in which international law generally 
is produced.  
[28] The respondent also invites us not to overlook the role 
of non-Western states, and in particular ‘former colonies’, 
in the process that has led to the creation of the ICC. 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
 
 
Respondent 14 (R-14)  
 
 
 
[20] R-14 is sceptical of the neo-colonial critique of the ICC. 
The respondent, on the one hand, acknowledges that ‘the 
ICC waited too long to intervene outside Africa’. For 
example, ‘questions may be raised about the OTP’s 
approach to the Colombian situation’, which the Office 
has been choosing not to convert into a fully-fledged 
investigation for more than 15 years. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF 
(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
[28] On the other hand, R-14 points out that African states 
themselves have referred their own situations to the ICC. 
[28] AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH/SUPPORT 
TO THE ICC 
 
[9] Furthermore, the current African focus of the ICC is 
also the result of the ‘Court’s limited jurisdictional reach  
[9] ICC’S LIMITED 
JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
[22] and the failures of the UNSC to refer situations beyond 
Africa’. The respondent cites Syria as a case in point. 
[22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
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QUESTION (3): Looking at the ICC’s achievements in its first 15 years of 
activity, which have been the major shortcomings, and which kind of 
institutional change may help the Court overcome them? 
 
 
Respondent 1 (R-1)  
 
 
 
[5] According to R-1, there are ‘several challenges ahead’. 
In particular, ‘as the ICC focuses on non-party states, we 
may expect very hard cases’.  
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
[8] Referring to the relationship between the Court and 
state sovereignty, the respondent argues that ‘states 
have created the ICC out of their sovereign decisions’. 
R-11 adds that it is a mistake to argue that the ICC was 
ever supposed to constrain sovereignty, for ‘the Rome 
Statute is about individual criminal responsibility and 
not about sovereignty’. 
[8] CONSENSUAL NATURE OF THE 
ROME STATUTE v. 
SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
[4] Another shortcoming in the debate about the Court, 
R-1 continues, is that ‘critics fail to acknowledge that the 
Rome Statute has created a system, not only a court’.  
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[11] Instead, criticism should be more firmly directed at 
those ‘states that fail to comply with their cooperation 
duties’, since ‘we can have an effective Court only to the 
extent that states are willing to enforce the Court’s 
decisions’. The ICC of the future is, hence, a court that 
can firmly count on state cooperation’. 
 
 
 
 
[11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
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Respondent 2 (R-2)  
 
 
 
[5] R-2 notes that ‘the Rome Statute is in a tough spot’, 
as it aims to strike a balance between the sovereign right 
of domestic jurisdiction and the responsibility of the 
international community to end impunity.  
[5] ICC’S ARDUOUS MISSION 
 [11] Furthermore, according to R-2, ‘the lack of state 
cooperation is one of the most pressing problems the 
Court faces’, and ‘without on-site cooperation and 
enforcement of the Court’s requests there is not much 
that the Court can achieve on its own’. In this respect, 
R-2 recalls the crucial support provided to the Court by 
peace-keeping forces, e.g. in the DRC, in terms of the 
protection of ICC staff, the collection of evidence, and 
the enforcement of arrest warrants. 
[11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
 
[7] R-2 concludes that it is time for the entire 
international community to live up to its responsibility 
to fight impunity by providing the Court with adequate 
support and cooperation; ‘otherwise, the system 
established by the Rome Statute will simply not hold’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
 
Respondent 3 (R-3)  
 
 
 
[25] Speaking of the future/reform of the Court, 
according to R-3, ‘both technical and structural changes 
are needed’. Starting from the former, a major problem 
today is the lack of investigators, as well as their limited 
expertise. The current investigators are ‘generalists’ 
who move across all situations and spend only very little 
time on site (a few days at a time). As a result, they are 
‘largely unable to provide a deep contextual knowledge’. 
[25] EXPERTISE OF ICC STAFF 
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[3] Another connected problem is the ‘low standard of 
evidence’, which is one of the reasons behind the 
collapse of many cases. 
[3] EVIDENCE 
[20] Moving to more structural problems, one of the most 
serious lies in the current prevailing interpretation of 
complementarity, which has brought the ICC far from 
the Court of “last resort” that it was meant to be. The 
current version of the “same person/same conduct test” 
should be reconsidered and give way to a more 
deferential approach towards domestic courts. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF (POSITIVE) 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
[26] Affected communities in Africa are also particularly 
disappointed  
[26] ICC LEGITIMACY (CRISIS) 
[18] by the lack of ICC cases against members of self-
referring governments. 
[18] ICC’S BIAS IN FAVOUR OF 
SELF-REFERRING GOVERMENTS 
 
[6] Finally, given the ‘deep political implications’ of the 
Court’s activities, ‘the ICC may well do better to openly 
acknowledge the them’. 
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW v. 
POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
 
Respondent 4 (R-4)  
 
 
 
[4] According to R-4, ‘we should not be too pessimistic 
about the future of the Court’, as ‘the story of 
international criminal law and the ICC itself are full of 
twists and turns and unexpected success’.  
[4] CRITIQUE OF THE  
CRITICISM OF THE ICC 
[1] The respondent adds that albeit the ICC is still young 
and has a lot to learn, it is, nonetheless, ‘the cornerstone 
of a global legal order’;  
[1] LAW v. POLITICS 
[7] and ‘it is the responsibility of states and civil society 
to nurture such an order by fully supporting the Court’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
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Respondent 5 (R-5)  
 
 
 
[1] According to R-5, it is important that the ICC carries 
out its work ‘without fear – undeterred or favour’, while 
‘focusing on the victims and being firm in its fight 
against impunity’.  
[1] LAW v. POLITICS  
[7] However, states, too, ‘should be resolute in their fight 
against impunity, and aptly cooperate with the Court’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
[31] Against this backdrop, an important factor for the 
future success of the ICC is a ‘greater engagement with 
and outreach to local communities’. 
[30] NEED FOR GREATER ICC 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES 
AFFECTED BY THE WORK OF THE 
COURT 
 
 
Respondent 6 (R-6)  
 
 
 
[27] According to R-6, several positive developments 
have already taken place since Bensouda has taken 
office in 2012. A number of prosecutorial strategies and 
policies have been reconsidered. In particular, 
investigations have become more in-depth and cases 
are being built more carefully, as we can see, the 
respondent notes, from the limited number of cases 
being opened by Bensouda.  
[27] DIFFERENCES 
OCAMPO/BENSOUDA 
[30] Yet, the persisting absence of cases outside Africa  [29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
[26] is ‘particularly detrimental to the Court’s legitimacy’. [26] ICC LEGITIMACY (CRISIS) 
[11] On the other hand, the respondent notes that if the 
Court enlarges its focus beyond Africa - and, notably, if 
it turns to powerful states which are not even party to 
the Rome Statute, such as the US, Russia, Israel – we 
must expect non-cooperation and a serious backlash 
against the Court. 
[11] LACK OF STATE 
COOPERATION 
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Respondent 7 (R-7)  
 
 
 
 [25] R-7 points to two major avenues of improvements 
for the Court. Firstly, from the OTP’s side, we should 
expect more careful and efficient investigations and 
case-building,  
[25] EXPERTISE OF ICC STAFF 
 
[30] in addition to a diversification of the geographical 
scope of the cases. 
[29] NEED FOR GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION (BEYOND 
AFRICA) OF ICC CASES  
[11] Outside the Court, greater cooperation by both states  [11] LACK OF STATE COOPERATION 
[22] and the UNSC is needed. [22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
[33] In this regard, according to R-7, more pressure 
needs to be put on uncooperative state parties: not only 
can and should they be reported to the ASP; but, 
following the ICTY model, uncooperative state parties 
may also be subjected to both political and economic 
pressure by the international community. The success 
of the system established by the Rome Statute, hence, 
‘depends on the willingness of the international 
community to genuinely support the Court’, something 
which has been ‘largely unsatisfactory so far’.  
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
 
 
Respondent 8 (R-8)  
 
 
[32] R-8 reiterates that the Court ‘needs to re-calibrate 
expectations’ as a basic component of its strategy to 
address the current legitimacy crisis. It is important to 
have an honest discussion about ‘which goals to 
prioritize  
[31] NEED FOR A MORE 
REALISTIC VIEW OF WHAT THE 
ICC CAN ACHIEVE 
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[14] ‘in light of the extremely limited capacities and 
budget of the Court’. 
[14] SCARCITY OF RESOURCES 
 
[32] For example, the ICC may – and, according to R-8, 
should - decide to focus and invest on its ‘expressive 
function’. 
[31] NEED FOR A MORE 
REALISTIC VIEW OF WHAT THE 
ICC CAN ACHIEVE 
 
[31] Another important improvement would be to engage 
in open discussions with the local communities and the 
individuals directly affected from the work of the ICC, 
and to take in due account their responses when 
deciding whether/how to intervene in a certain 
situation/case. 
[30] NEED FOR GREATER ICC 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES 
AFFECTED BY THE WORK OF THE 
COURT 
 
[7] On the other hand, ‘state parties 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
[22] and the UNSC have to increase their support’, [22] ICC-UNSC RELATIONSHIP 
[14] in particular ‘financial support’ as far as state parties 
are concerned. 
[14] SCARCITY OF RESOURCES 
 
Respondent 9 (R-9)  
 
 
 
[31] According to R-9, while the ICC has achieved a 
number of exceptionally important goals, there are still 
things that can be improved and crucial challenges 
ahead. One of the avenues for improvement is about 
how the ICC engages and communicates with local 
affected communities and individuals. Much has 
already been done - notably, in terms of outreach and 
management of the expectations of victims. So, for 
example, thanks to the outreach activities carried out by 
ICC local offices, affected communities are starting to 
understand that ‘reparations are not for everyone, but 
only for whom has been directly involved in the Court’s 
[30] NEED FOR GREATER ICC 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES 
AFFECTED BY THE WORK OF THE 
COURT 
 
235 | P a g .  
 
cases’. It is also becoming clearer that the Trust Fund’s 
reparations mandate is related only to those specific 
judicial proceedings that result in a conviction. People, 
the respondent continues, have also understood that it 
takes several years before proceedings before the Court 
reach the reparation stage. The issue of reparation is a 
very sensitive one, since a major reason behind the 
strong support of the Court by African communities has 
been precisely their ‘hope to get reparations’, and it thus 
requires timely and effective solutions. For example, 
nowadays, due to the limited logistic capacities of the 
ICC, many victims remain excluded from the Court’s 
proceedings, for instance, because the Court fails to 
register them or because there are missing data in their 
registration. The respondent recalls, in this respect, the 
fact that victims may be illiterate and thus in need for 
special support. Special support – much more of what 
is being granted nowadays – is also needed for severely 
traumatized victims, such as victims of sexual violence. 
All these things considered, according to R-9, we should 
ask whether and to what degree the ICC is able to 
provide that kind of reparative justice which victims 
expect. The support to the Court by African 
communities may decrease dramatically if the ICC will 
fail in this. A further cause of disappointment among 
affected communities is that not all hearings before the 
Court are public, raising, therefore, an issue of lack of 
transparency. Some Ugandan communities have also 
alleged that closed sessions may take place as the result 
of agreements between the Court and the government 
of Uganda.  
[20] Furthermore, according to R-9, the ICC should put 
more effort into its cooperation with local domestic 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION OF 
(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY  
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judiciaries and their capacity-building. For example, 
The Ugandan judicial system has the potential for great 
improvement. The respondent refers to the fact that in 
Uganda the lack of communication between the ICC and 
the criminal division of the Supreme Court – which is 
also dealing with LRA crimes - has been striking. 
According to R-9, there is also the widespread 
impression that the two courts ‘are sending different 
messages’. The respondent suggests that an in-situ 
court may solve several of the problems the ICC 
currently faces in Uganda.  
[10] Finally, R-9 turns to the problem of the ICC’s lack of 
enforcement power, which has caused many suspects to 
remain at large. The respondent argues that the 
relevance and the legitimacy of the Court are 
inescapably tied to its capacity to enforce arrest 
warrants and thus be effective. If non-compliant states 
continue to defy the Court’s authority - for example, by 
welcoming visits by the president of Sudan rather than 
fulfilling their obligation to arrest him– it is very hard 
to envision a positive future for the Court. 
[10] ICC’S LACK OF 
AUTONOMOUS ENFORCEMENT 
POWERS/DEPENDENCE ON 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
Respondent 10 (R-10)  
 
 
 
[20] R-10 suggests that the Court most urgently needs to 
return to its own role as a court of last resort. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION 
OF(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
[25] Furthermore, ‘some fresh air’ and ‘new perspectives’ 
at the Office of the Prosecutor could be very useful. The 
OTP, according to R-10, needs more careful and 
effective case-building. In particular, the respondent 
points to the need for greater expertise in the collection 
and preservation of evidence, including ‘more thorough 
[25] EXPERTISE OF ICC STAFF 
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knowledge of and respect for the local cultural contexts 
and traditions’. 
 
Respondent 11 (R-11)  
 
 
 
[15] According to R-11, the Court has turned into a 
‘complex and cost-ineffective bureaucratic structure’,  
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
 
[20] which has proved ‘particularly unable to live up to 
the fundamental principle of complementarity - let 
alone positive complementarity - laid down in the Rome 
Statute’. Hence, the respondent invokes a ‘radical 
change of direction’. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION 
OF(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
[15] The Court of the future ought to become a ‘much 
more streamlined and cost-effective institution’,  
[15] (COST-)EFFECTIVENESS 
 
[20] and especially, ‘it ought to reconnect itself to the 
spirit of complementarity’. ‘When states created the 
Court, they wanted to establish a Court of last resort’. 
This idea has been reaffirmed through the concept of 
positive complementarity. In other words, ‘the Court 
should intervene only when really needed’, while, 
instead, engaging more and more openly in diplomatic 
and capacity-building activities’. 
[20] CONTROVERSIAL 
APPLICATION 
OF(POSITIVE)COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
 
Respondent 12 (R-12)  
 
 
 
[6] According to R-12, ‘what would be mostly needed for 
the Court is a radical change of political approach’. And 
yet, ‘we see the Court going in the opposite direction’.  
[6] INADEQUACY OF THE LAW V. 
POLITICS DICHOTOMY  
[8] The respondent recalls in this respect the 
amendments to the crime of aggression - which have 
expanded ‘the consensual nature of the Court’s 
[8] CONSENSUAL NATURE OF THE 
ROME STATUTE v. 
SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY 
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jurisdiction’, to the detriment of its supranational 
authority 
[19] - and the decision not to open an investigation in the 
Comoros situation. 
[19] ICC’S DEFERENCE TO 
MAJOR POWERS 
 
 
Respondent 13 (R-13)  
 
 
 
[33] According to R-13, whereas reform at the ICC  is 
needed, a conversation about reform is also a very 
difficult one to have, especially in the current political 
climate, which appears far less well-disposed than in 
the 90s, when the Rome Statute was drafted. The 
respondent explicitly cites the current rise of populism 
- as well as the growing barriers to cooperation - around 
the globe; and argues that if we now opened a 
discussion about how to fix problems at the ICC, we 
would risk going from bad to worse.  
[32] CHALLENGES TO ICC 
REFORM 
 
[31] Speaking of the ICC of the future, R-13 suggests that 
it is difficult to make any predictions. At the same time, 
‘much depends on the kind of aspirational story that the 
Court itself wants to tell’. Having said that, the Court 
may benefit from ‘a greater involvement of local 
communities and youth in its work’. 
[30] NEED FOR GREATER ICC 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS/COMMUNITIES 
AFFECTED BY THE WORK OF THE 
COURT 
 
 
Respondent 14 (R-14)  
 
 
 
[1] According to R-14, the future of the Court lies in its 
capacity to ‘carry out a deep self-reflection and live up 
to its own nature as a judicial institution unfettered by 
political considerations’. In particular, the ICC has to 
stand up to its responsibility to ‘investigate and 
[1] LAW v. POLITICS 
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prosecute wherever is warranted by the Rome Statute - 
irrespective of the existing distribution of power’. 
[33] Furthermore, the respondent notes that not only 
state parties, but also the UN and the broad 
international community, have to ‘urgently increase 
their level of support to the ICC’. 
[7] ROLE OF STATE 
PARTIES/INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
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